Witness Details Movements of Senior Leaders and Arrests and Disappearance of Cadres

International Counsel Victor Koppe (left) rejoined the Nuon Chea defense team in court at the ECCC on Tuesday following the resignations of three colleagues –Michiel Pestman, Jasper Pauw, and Andrew Ianuzzi – in December.

Hearings resumed in Case 002 at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) for 2013 amidst an uncertain climate, with funding difficulties ongoing and three of Nuon Chea’s international co-counsels – Michiel Pestman, Andrew Ianuzzi and Jasper Pauw – having resigned en masse in December 2012. Witness Sor Vi was the first person to take the stand this year. A former guard at K-1 — Pol Pot’s Phnom Penh residence during the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime — Mr. Vi testified on a range of issues, including his duties at K-1 and the attendance of senior Khmer Rouge leaders, including co-accused Ieng Sary, Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan, at meetings there.

Health Issues Continue to Plague Co-Accused Ieng Sary and Nuon Chea

After a 10-minute delay, proceedings opened with Trial Chamber Greffier Duch Phary reporting that all parties to the case were present except for International Co-Counsel for Ieng Sary Michael Karnavas who was absent due to personal commitments, and the co-accused Ieng Sary and Nuon Chea, who were observing the proceedings from the holding cells due to their health concerns. In addition, Mr. Phary noted that International Co-Counsel for Nuon Chea Victor Koppe, who had already been recognized by the Chamber, was also present in the courtroom. Watching the morning’s proceedings were approximately 280 high school students from Ang Duong High School in Prey Veng province seated in the public gallery.

Trial Chamber President Nil Nonn noted that the ECCC treating doctor had assessed both Mr. Sary and Mr. Chea. He reported that Mr. Sary’s health was unchanged, and the doctor was of the view that Mr. Sary could not participate from the courtroom but could do so from the holding cell. Mr. Chea was reportedly in the same condition. Accordingly, the president ordered audio-visual arrangements to be made so that both could participate from the holding cell for today’s hearing.

Witness Sor Vi Testifies on the Evacuation of People to Kampong Speu

The president turned his attention to the witness Sor Vi, who had taken the stand. The witness began by telling the court that while Sor Vi was his official name, his birth name was Sor Sarim. Now 52 years old, Mr. Vi was born in Kampong Speu province and lives in Pailin city, where he works as a farmer. He is married to Nam Hun and they have four children.

Mr. Vi also confirmed with the president that he had been interviewed by the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges (OCIJ)[2] and had reviewed the written record of interview since then. After the witness had confirmed that his interview was consistent and accurate, National Assistant Co-Prosecutor Seng Bunkheang began questioning of the witness on the part of the Office of the Co-Prosecutors (OCP) by first summarizing the witness’s biographical details as reported to the OCIJ and noting in particular that the witness was first a sub-district messenger in Kong Pisey district.[3]The prosecutor then asked Mr. Vi to advise when Kong Pisey district was liberated by the Khmer Rouge. Mr. Vi said it was “almost occupied” by the Khmer Rouge in 1974, with very little opposing forces remaining, also noting that “Sector 33,” in which the district was located, was itself “in the southwest of the country,” thus presumably suggesting that the district was in the Southwest Zone.

Mr. Bunkheang asked the witness when he moved from messenger to Khmer Rouge soldier, noting the witness had discussed this change with the OCIJ.[4] Mr. Vi advised that he was transferred to work in Samrong district in June 1975;[5] he was an “ordinary combatant” then, he said. He could not recall the name of his commander, however, andalso appeared to deny fighting Lon Nol soldiers, replying, when asked, that the war was over by then.

As for where he lived by April 17, 1975, when Phnom Penh was liberated, Mr. Vi said that he lived “at the commune office of Po Angkrong.” Noting that the witness had testified to the OCIJ seeing people being evacuated,[6] Mr. Bunkheang asked the witness to tell the Court about this. Mr. Vi explained that he saw people being evacuated along National Road 3 “and I saw them being moved to Kong Pisey. However, I do not know what happened across the country, but I believe that it could have been the case all across the country at that time – [that] the same situation happened.” Some people “came by cars or motorbikes, but mostly a lot of people came by foot,” he added, also noting that people from his area were never evacuated.

“Soldiers were not tasked with any kind of duties” in relation to the evacuees, Mr. Vi continued. However, “village chiefs would be helping the people to settle down at some places in the sector, [and] people would be assigned some tasks.”

Witness’s Transfer to Office K-1 in Phnom Penh and Role as Guard

According to the witness’s written record of interview, Mr. Bunkheang said, Mr. Vi was eventually transferred to K-1 Office in Phnom Penh.[7] Prompted for further details of this event, Mr. Vi said that he could not recall the name of the commander who ordered his transfer, but he did go there and remained at K-1 until January 6, 1979. He explained that, between his arrival in 1975 and early 1976, “I noted that … most parts of [Phnom Penh] were abandoned.” Mr. Bunkheang said that the witness had testified to the OCIJ that he had not seen any Phnom Penh dwellers other than workers and soldiers.[8] He then asked the witness whether Phnom Penh changed during the relevant time. The witness denied this, responding that things “remained the same all along.”

Turning back to the issue of K-1, the prosecutor asked the witness to describe the office more specifically. Mr. Vi described that K-1 was located about a kilometer south of the Royal Palace in Phnom Penh, and he further explained, “K-1 was a place where Pol Pot lived. He was there permanently. … I saw other leaders including Uncle Ieng Sary, Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, who came and went to the office. Every time they came to the meetings and worked, they would stay there.”

Mr. Vi confirmed that he saw the co-accused “very often.” This prompted the prosecutor to note that in the written record of Mr. Vi’s OCIJ interview, the witness had described K-1 as providing protection to the co-accused and other “senior uncles.”[9] Asked to detail his role at K-1, Mr. Vi advised, “I worked as a protection officer. I worked at K-1 regularly.” Mr. Bunkheang noted that the witness had also testified on the three layers of protection at K-1, the first being a layer of planks and barbed wire.[10]

The prosecutor turned to the seemingly-unconnected topic of whether the witness could remember the “first group” of people working at K-1 and specifically a person named Tan. Mr. Vi confirmed, at the same time clarifying the relevance of the prosecutor’s question, that Tan was in charge of the guard groups of the “first and second layers of guard units.”

Defense Counsel Locks Horns with Trial Chamber President in First Clash of the Year

According to Mr. Vi’s prior testimony to the OCIJ, the prosecutor advised, he had said that the first two groups of guards consisted of some 50 to 60 personnel, with a third group of approximately 10 personnel. This comment prompted an objection from International Co-Counsel for Khieu Samphan Arthur Vercken. He objected that, while the prosecutor’s intention might be to clarify potential inconsistencies in the witness’s testimony, it was inappropriate for the prosecutor to be reading to the witness descriptions he gave to the OCIJ.

Mr. Bunkheang replied that he was trying to refresh the witness’s memory and clarify he knows. After a brief pause, the president overruled the objection. Mr. Vercken stood as if to signal his intention to respond, but the president advised that he could not do so as the matter had been resolved.

Mr. Vercken pressed on unabated, however, although his comments were not audible at first as his microphone had been deactivated. The counsel advised that the president seemed to have taken it as a fait accompli that he had no further objections. President Nonn responded that it had already been ruled that parties could only speak once on an objection. Mr. Vercken said that it might have been a translation issue and what he wanted to raise was that Mr. Bunkheang had said he wanted to refresh the witness’s memory, but the witness had not signaled any memory difficulties. International Senior Assistant Co-Prosecutor Dale Lysak stood to respond for the OCP, but the president signaled that OCP should instead continue with its questions.

Details of Command Structure at K-1

The national prosecutor thus pressed on his questions, noting that Mr. Vi had testified to the OCIJ that he belonged to a guard group and containing approximately 100 guards and led by a person who disappeared.[11] Asked in which guard layer he worked, Mr. Vi said that he worked in the second layer throughout his time at K-1. “Normally, I patrolled at nights,” he continued, “Every now and then I had to be ready at the gate to open the doors for incoming visitors.”

Four towers had been within the perimeter of the second guard layer, Mr. Bunkheang noted the witness as having previously testified. Asked about their height, Mr. Vi advised that the towers were two meters high and were “lower than the plank wall” – that is, the first layer. However, he denied that it would be possible for guards of the second perimeter to observe the walls of the first. He also advised, when asked, that “five guards were assigned to each tower, and they made a daily shift.” Mr. Vi was assigned to the towers “but not that often,” as he was usually assigned to foot patrols. Tower guards were armed, he added.

Regarding the command structure in the guard unit, Mr. Vi stated, “There was a chain of command. Tan was overall in charge, and below Tan, there were group chiefs and unit chiefs. Each daily work would be reported first to the group and unit chiefs.” Mr. Vi could recall Tan had the alias Khieu, although he could not recall his full family name. Mr. Bunkheang asked whether Tan’s name was Oeun Tan. Mr. Vi said that he “did not know the name of this person because I separated from him for a long time; in fact, I separated from him since 1984.” He also did not know whether Tan had testified before the Trial Chamber.

Turning to a new subject, Mr. Bunkheang noted that the witness had told the OCIJ that a person named Soth had been the deputy chief of K-1. Asked whether this was Ta Soth, the witness confirmed this, although he said that he also could not recall this person’s family name.

Mr. Bunkheang noted that the witness had testified seeing the co-accused coming and going at K-1[12] and asked the witness where he had been located when he saw the co-accused. Mr. Vi responded that he had been at the front entrance when he was assigned to guard duty there and was usually stationed there for five-day shifts. He testified seeing the co-accused at K-1“from the time I started working there until 1979. … [They] had their own vehicle and their own driver.” Mr. Vi said he could recall that Mr. Samphan’s driver was named Soeun, whereas Soth (presumably the previously-mentioned Soth) was Mr. Chea’s driver. “The vehicles came into the compound of K-1. … They entered the compound and nobody actually came to greet them,” he added.

Briefly departing from the subject of K-1, Mr. Bunkheang asked the witness whether he ever went to K-3. The witness denied this, although stating that he did know it was an “important location” where some uncles lived. Asked whether he resided at K-1, Mr. Vi replied that he lived at “a house which was about 100 meters away from the guard post.”

Study Sessions and Self-Criticism Meetings at K-1 and Borey Keila

Study sessions had been held at K-1, according to the witness’s previous testimony to the OCIJ.[13] Mr. Bunkheang asked whether senior cadres attended those sessions. The witness denied any knowledge of this; he also denied that cadres attending the sessions brought along their own bodyguards for protection. Regarding his role during these meetings, Mr. Vi explained, “We were instructed from the superiors that they came from zones to work at K-1, and we were instructed to clear the roads and be ready to provide good protection to those people. … It was important that the second layer be vigilant to be ready to provide protection to those people.”

The witness denied a suggestion from Mr. Bunkheang that it was important for him be familiar with the various leaders attending study sessions, such as the co-accused or zone or district leaders. This prompted Mr. Bunkheang to shift gears, asking if the witness could identify any zone or district leaders who attended study sessions. Mr. Vi explained that he “only knew the dates of the meeting” and then had to undertake preparations for them. Next, Mr. Bunkheang asked the witness if he knew Ta Mok. The witness confirmed that he did, although he asserted that “at that time, I did not pay much attention.”

At this point, Mr. Vi confirmed that he attended self-criticism sessions on a fortnightly or monthly basis. The fortnightly sessions lasted for one day, were held at a house not far from the guard tower, and were led by Tan, he explained. While he could not recall the contents of the sessions, he could describe that “mostly the study sessions focused on strengthening protection, which was the core duty.” Mr. Vi continued, “As for politics, it was not taught thoroughly and I could not recall it well, as I was pretty young back then, and I only focused on my assigned duties. I tend to forget quite a lot.”

Mr. Vi confirmed attending one study session at Borei Keila as he accompanied Pol Pot there. At Borei Keila, Mr. Vi testified seeing soldiers arriving from sectors and zones. “There were quite a lot of them but I did not know their levels,” he said, explaining that Pol Pot, who, along with Tan, was the only leader from K-1 at this session, worked mainly with the soldiers at that time.

Returning to self-criticism meetings at K-1, Mr. Vi testified that these meetings “lasted for three days” and were led by the group chief. As to their purpose and content, he described:

The meetings aimed to make good of the people. If we made mistakes, we would be corrected by our peers; we would be criticized and [advised] not to engage in such acts again to become a good person. For example, if we slept while guarding, we would be criticized. We were instructed to be punctual during our guard shifts.

The witness then denied, when asked, attending any major speeches at Olympic Stadium.

Further Details of Witness’s Experiences Pre-1975 and during the Evacuation

After a short morning adjournment, the hearing resumed with Mr. Lysak continuing to put questions to Mr. Vi on behalf of the prosecution. He first directed the witness back to the period in 1975 when Mr. Vi joined the Samrong district army and asked him to describe his tasks as an “ordinary combatant.” Mr. Vi said, “When the war ended, the Samrong district army, similar to the condition of the Sector 33 army, assisted the people to dig canals and build dams with the people in the sector. I was personally involved in” such activities.

Mr. Lysak queried whether the witness knew of any efforts on the part of soldiers in the district army to identify whether any evacuees from Phnom Penh were Lon Nol soldiers. The witness denied any knowledge of such an activity, responding that “it was to be dealt with by the base cadres, particularly the sub-district and village chiefs. … That’s all I knew.”

Asked whether he could name any of the 10 guards who worked at the first layer in K-1, Mr. Vi offered the names of three individuals: Horn, Sin, and Prin. The president then permitted the prosecutor to show the witness a document he was initially shown during his interview with the OCIJ.[14] Beginning with the first page – a handwritten list – Mr. Lysak noted that the list was of 16 people under the title “K-1.”[15] He asked Mr. Vi whether these people were all people from the first layer at K-1 or from the first and second layer. The witness put on his glasses, perused the document, and responded that all 16 “worked in the first layer.”

The prosecutor directed Mr. Vi to a second handwritten list of the names of 18 people, entitled “K-1 outside Uncle’s House.”[16] He asked Mr. Vi whether these people were all from the second layer. The witness requested some time to read through all the names in the list. After some moments passed, Mr. Vi advised that all were indeed part of the second layer. This prompted Mr. Lysak to note that the 13th individual on the list was named Song and inquired whether this name was an alias for the witness. Mr. Vi said he thought this was so.

Moving on, Mr. Lysak asked whether Mr. Vi was ever advised during study sessions on preventing attacks on the leaders at K-1. The witness agreed, noting that such concerns were discussed and that “although nothing happened, the concerns remained a major alert for all of us.” He added, however, that “there was no attempted attack on Office K-1 during the time that I was there. I did not witness any such attempt.”

Trips by Senior Khmer Rouge to the Provinces

Moving on, the prosecutor noted that, in Mr. Vi’s OCIJ interview, he had detailed that the “senior uncles” made trips to the provinces, with Mr. Sary and Mr. Chea doing so regularly and Mr. Samphan doing so less regularly.[17] Mr. Lysak asked Mr. Vi to explain how he knew about these trips. The witness responded, “I knew through my superiors … because some of the guards or the bodyguards were assigned to these people.” He also confirmed that, to his knowledge, these guards or bodyguards were in fact the drivers of the co-accused he had previously mentioned. As to the frequency and details of the trips, the witness stated, “As far as I knew, they were not that frequent. … It is possible they made other trips I did not know of. … I did not know well as I personally did not go on these trips.”

How did the witness know that Mr. Samphan traveled to the provinces less frequently than the other uncles? Mr. Lysak queried. The witness explained that this answer was based on his “personal conclusion” on his observations of Mr. Samphan “coming and going to K-1.” He continued, “Sometimes I learned through the bodyguards that he did not go to the provinces that often. … He did not have the opportunity to go down to the countryside as often as the other uncles as he was busy working in the city.”

The witness conceded that it was possible that Mr. Samphan went to the provinces more frequently than he knew because he did not personally accompany him on these trips. As for the type of work Mr. Samphan was busy doing in the city, Mr. Vi said:

I knew that he held a role. Of course, every Cambodian knew that he was the president of the State Presidium back then. So I concluded that he did not have to make direct contact with the countryside that often. But I could not attest to the fact that he was too busy in his role in Phnom Penh.

Again, Mr. Vi emphasized that this opinion was a personal conclusion.

According to the written record of witness’s OCIJ interview, Mr. Lysak continued, he had testified that the radio only broadcast good things about the regime.[18] Mr. Vi confirmed that he usually listened to the radio when it was broadcast, and did so while he was at K-1, although not while on duty, as this “would be against discipline.” Instead, he said, he listened to the radio “when I was off guard … [and] at night.” The witness confirmed that that radio was broadcast by the DK regime and that it “did not say anything bad about the regime at all.”

Next, Mr. Lysak noted that Mr. Vi had testified to the OCIJ that Tan and Soth had discussed their trips to the provinces with the upper echelon.[19] Asked for further details about this, Mr. Vi said that after Tan and Soth “returned from escorting the leadership … [they] said that people at the bases had sufficient food to eat. … As for other matters, maybe they had other matters or experiences, but they did not tell us. That’s all they told us.”

At this point, Mr. Lysak requested permission to use a statement of Soth to put a question to the witness, noting that Soth was deceased and the Court’s previous practice had been to allow the use of such statements in these situations. Permitted to do so, the prosecutor read a passage in which Soth confirmed that he only saw good conditions but heard from “the olds” that some people lacked clothes, household goods, and medicines and that some people died from hunger. Soth had also testified to taking Mr. Chea to Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, Siem Reap, Kampot, Kratie, Takeo, and Steung Traing in order to meet with cadres and educate them on party policy. Mr. Chea also saw dam sites very often, according to Soth, visiting them approximately five to six times a month.[20]

Asked about this statement, Mr. Vi said that everyone who returned from the provinces said that people there lived in good conditions. The witness elaborated that he knew only “very little about policy back then,” as by “early 1976,” he had started working at K-1, where he remained. In answer to a question from the prosecutor, Mr. Vi denied knowing whether people were free to express their own opinion. He reiterated that he was very young at the time and also that he “was less interested in politics.”

This answer prompted Mr. Lysak to ask the witness whether at self-criticism sessions, people would be criticized for speaking ill of party policy. The witness responded, “During every self-criticism meeting, we were allowed to talk only about our livelihoods, about our guard duty, about our need to be very vigilant, about the need to be careful. … We were encouraged to raise animals, to plant vegetables. That was the subject of those meetings.”

Authority Structure at K-1

Mr. Lysak noted that the witness had testified to the OCIJ that Tan and Soth took their orders from Pol Pot and Mr. Chea.[21] The witness also testified that Kan alias Lin supervised Tan and Soth and was responsible for K-1 and K-3, while Pang chaired 870 before Kan.[22] The prosecutor asked Mr. Vi to clarify who gave orders to these people. Mr. Vi responded that people “received tasks from all sections” — sometimes directly from Pang and Lin, sometimes directly from Pol Pot, “from the top.” However, Mr. Vi denied ever witnessing Pol Pot, Mr. Chea, or Mr. Samphan giving orders directly to any of these people or, indeed, attending any meetings with them.

According to Mr. Lysak, Ta Soth also stated in another part of his statement that he shared leadership with Pang and that Pang in turn received his orders from Pol Pot and the three co-accused persons “in accordance with their expertise, tasks and directions.”[23] Queried about whether this could be true, Mr. Vi said he believed that it could because “he worked closely with them.” However, he could not say “whether they met with Pang and how many times because Pang did not say” anything about this.

As to whether he knew of Office K-7, the witness denied this, stating that he never went there. He had merely heard of the office and “did not actually know what K-7 was about or what its function was.”

Disappearances at Office K-1 and Internal Enemies

When people were insubordinate or wandered around freely, the witness had told the OCIJ that they were sent to factories and never sent to prisons or killed.[24] However, Mr. Lysak noted, the witness also identified to the OCIJ three cadres who disappeared: Sem, who was the chairman of K-1; Pang, the chairman of 870; and Pang’s friend Yorn, who was in the K-1 interior protection team.[25] Asked whether it was indeed the case that some people were arrested, Mr. Vi said that he had already stated in his OCIJ interview what he knew. He reiterated:

Sem disappeared from K-1 Office. Two months later I heard he was a traitor. … By 1976, when I came, he was there, but about a year later, he was no longer to be seen. Pang also disappeared. Pang would come to K-1 very often because he was overall in charge of that office. I did not see him again. Like Sem, he was accused of being a traitor. I have no idea where he could have been detained, on which date, and who made such arrest. I just did not see him for a while, and later on I heard from others who said that they were accused of being traitors.

It was a kind of routine already. When someone disappeared, later on, we would hear that they had disappeared because they were accused of being a traitor. … Another person, who was often seen bringing food, chicken to these uncles, then on some given occasion, you would never see him or her again. Later on, you would hear that he or she was arrested.

The prosecutor noted that according to the witness’s prior statement, Tan had announced that Sem disappeared and was a traitor. Asked for details of this, the witness said there was no “formal meeting; we just heard from one another.”

Queried about whether the superiors ever discussed the infiltration of Yuon, KGB, or CIA agents in the DK regime, the witness said, “During the meeting, the chairman would not talk more specifically about the situation [of] internal enemies.” He continued to explain, “I don’t remember having heard anything mentioned about this in the meeting, or perhaps it was a long time ago and I cannot recollect everything very well. But the main focus of the session was about the work, about our vigilance in helping protect our leaders.”

Moving on, Mr. Lysak asked the witness to provide details of who Yorn was and how the witness learned of his disappearance. Mr. Vi stated:

Yorn worked on the inside. … Yorn was in charge of transporting food, mainly vegetables, to uncles. At that time, we rarely saw vegetables being transported from the outside into the compound because we were self-sufficient. We grew our own vegetables and raised domestic animals for food. These vegetables would be brought to the uncles from the inside.

Later on, Yorn, like Pang, disappeared. We similarly heard that he was accused of committing treason. I cannot say whether [Yorn and Pang] were friends, were close, but they were overall in charge of the work, and we treated them as our superiors who were very close to us.

By way of conclusion of this discussion, Mr. Lysak informed the Chamber that on the case file was an S-21 prisoner list which listed Ney Muong alias Yorn as having been admitted to S-21.[26] In addition, at 3391 of OCP’s Revised S-21 Prisoner List, Kep Sar alias Sem was identified as the chief of Office K-1.[27]

Involvement of Senior Leaders in Deciding on Arrests of Individuals

Next, Mr. Lysak asked Mr. Vi who from within the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) hierarchy had the power to decide on arrests of individuals. The witness denied any knowledge of this, stating, “What I learned was that the people disappeared suddenly. To my understanding, before any arrest was made, no one could be informed. I did not even know how many times a person had to be tempered before he or she was subject to arrest.”

Following the lunch break, the prosecutor resumed questioning Mr. Vi before a new audience of approximately 100 villagers from Kiri Vong district, Takeo province. He noted that the witness had previously stated that Pol Pot was “well aware” of the arrests of the traitors, but he was not sure whether Mr. Samphan was also aware as he was “cautious” of his work and “lived in fear.”[28] Mr. Lysak first asked Mr. Vi why he believed Pol Pot knew of the arrests of traitors. The witness stated, “I made my personal conclusion that it was only Pol Pot who could make such arrest. As for Ieng Sary and Nuon Chea, I am not fully certain that they took part in making the decision of the arrest of those traitors. However, it is my understanding that they knew about the arrests.”

Regarding why he was unsure if Mr. Samphan knew of the disappearances, the witness said he made this conclusion based on his personal analysis. He further explained:

It seemed, in his work, Khieu Samphan engaged in deep thinking. I made such a conclusion because I compared the situation. For instance, I am from a family and I was the youngest child, … so I compared the situation of the behavior of the children within that small family. Before, I stated that Khieu Samphan was very cautious about his work; … that analysis is not based on anything else but my personal assessment. … In that regime, I could only make a limited conclusion of the situation, and after January 1979, I was more mature and I could analyze the situation more accurately. He was a very cautious individual. He did not want anything to go wrong. When I look back on the regime experience, I knew that he was meticulous and strict. It meant he was very afraid of making a mistake in his work.

Asked whether he ever worked for Mr. Samphan, Mr. Vi responded that he worked at K-1, which was the place of Pol Pot, and that when people like Mr. Samphan were at K-1, “we took care of their security and safety, [although] we did not engage in any daily work, like carrying a pot of tea for him, for instance.”

Mr. Vi then revisited his earlier use of a family metaphor in relation to Mr. Samphan, expanding and explaining:

In a scenario with six or seven children, if one of the children behaved strangely, everyone took note of that child. This does not mean that none of the other senior leaders was cautious, but it seemed that Khieu Samphan was more cautious, more meticulous and strict. As I said, it was my own conclusion and assessment of the situation.

The witness also confirmed that Mr. Samphan continued to live with Mr. Chea and Pol Pot after 1979, confirming they all lived together “near the border area.” Mr. Lysak inquired how long Mr. Samphan lived with them. The question elicited an objection from National Co-Counsel for Khieu Samphan Kong Sam Onn, who said that this was outside the scope of the trial. Mr. Lysak responded that this subject was part of the Closing Order and the allegations in this case. With this, the Trial Chamber judges were prompted to confer, with Judge Silvia Cartwright seen to engage in conversation with the president while Judges Jean-Marc Lavergne and You Ottara spoke to one another. All judges then conferred briefly before the president advised that the objection was not sustained.

Permitted the floor, Mr. Vi advised that Mr. Samphan continued to live with Mr. Chea and Pol Pot “after 1979,” although when they all moved to Anlong Veng, the witness did not go with them, staying instead in Pailin.

On Refashioning and Reeducation

Moving on, Mr. Lysak noted that the witness had told the OCIJ that cadres who were found to be sleeping on guard duty were refashioned and reeducated.[29] Asked to elaborate on what this meant, Mr. Vi explained that, with a person who “was criticized repeatedly,” it was “customary” that “before he was transferred to other ministries, the removal would not be done lightly.” He continued:

That individual would need to be refashioned several times. For example, if that person left the guard post or walked around freely or failed to abide by discipline, that individual would be refashioned for those mistakes before they were transferred to other ministries. … When they were transferred to other units, I did not know what happened to them or whether they were further refashioned at the new location. I met those people before they were transferred outside. Even later, outside the regime, I met some of them as well. During the regime, when there was any anniversary, usually it would be held at the stadium, and that was the occasion that I met some of those people. They did not talk about being tortured or criticized severely. They spoke of their living condition, which was moderate.

As for what these celebrated anniversaries were, the witness said these would include “the new year celebration, the Party’s anniversary, etc. Usually there would be at least two celebrations held, but I could not recall the specific name of those anniversaries.” The prosecutor also asked what the name of the stadium was where the celebrations were held. The witness said he knew it only as the “old stadium.” He denied seeing any of the senior leaders at those celebrations.

The witness had also testified to the OCIJ that he “might” have heard of S-21 specifically, but did indeed learn that there was a security office in Phnom Penh, although not its exact whereabouts.[30] Mr. Lysak asked the witness to advise how he knew about this. The witness said that he knew this “based on my analysis that there had to be a security office in Phnom Penh … based on my thinking.”

The prosecutor noted that the witness had recounted to the OCIJ hearing a statement that the leadership during the DK regime had made mistakes, and even if they did not sanction torture, they needed to be responsible for it.[31] Asked when he heard this statement, Mr. Vi said that the statement was made by Pol Pot during a speech in May 1979 “when he talked in a session on top of the Cardamom Mountains.” He further explained, “There were about 10 to 20 people from the bodyguard unit who attended this session. At the time, there was a meeting chaired by Pol Pot directly who talked about this right in front of the bodyguard unit. … [Pol Pot] chaired the meeting all by himself.”

Witness Expands on Issues including the Evacuation

With the prosecution having finished its examination, National Co-Lawyer for the civil parties Hong Kimsuon took the floor. Noting  the witness’s prior testimony about first joining the revolution in 1974 in Kong Pisey district, Kampong Speu,[32] Mr. Kimsuon asked when this district was liberated. Mr. Vi repeated that this district “was not entirely liberated in 1973 because we could still see bombs dropped from the planes. By 1974, we could see less bombs dropped, and Lon Nol soldiers were no longer going to that area. So I could presume that by 1974, the district itself was entirely liberated.”

The witness confirmed, when asked, that he was introduced to the revolution by his uncle Mon, who was involved in the revolution at commune level although he “did not hold any position.” Nothing was explained to him about the revolution, however, at this point, he said.

Mr. Vi clarified that while he dug canals and built dams alongside civilians, he did not work with them directly as he worked in a military unit. Elaborating further, he said, “As far as I remember, in the morning, we would start work at about 7 or 8 a.m. We would continue working until a moment before midday. Then we had lunch. By 6 p.m., we already stopped working.”

Moving to his experiences during the evacuation, the witness testified that he had cycled to the area where people were being evacuated as he was curious to see what happened. He added, “No one informed us [that these people were evacuees]. We just saw an influx of people to the area, and we were told that these people were coming from Phnom Penh.” The witness denied seeing anyone “being offered any food or water. I did not see any medical staff providing any assistance to the people. … They were not received or treated by the local people. They came by themselves.” Nor did Mr. Vi see any soldiers there at the time.

Evacuees were taken to live at “pagodas, schools, and some were made to live with the local people at local houses,” Mr. Vi explained. He did not, however, pay attention to the conditions facing particular groups, for example women or people suffering illnesses such as diarrhea. In general, the witness added, “I do not recollect every detail.” Echoing previous questions, the civil party lawyer asked whether Mr. Vi received any instructions as to the treatment of the evacuees. Mr. Vi denied this again.

Mr. Kimsuon asked the witness what he did as an “ordinary combatant.” Again, Mr. Vi said that he had to perform various tasks, elaborating that they included “carrying dirt and so on and so forth.”

As for his knowledge of the purges or surveillance performed on the “new people,” Mr. Vi said that soldiers and civilians lived separately and would only see each other when they worked together, “but there was no such tasks [for the military] such as spying on the people, for example.”

Mr. Vi also testified that pagodas still existed at that time, although there were no monks. He added that someone told him that “all Buddhist monks were defrocked by 1973 or 1974 already.”

Further Details on Witness’s Time and Training at Office K-1

Moving on, Mr. Kimsuon asked Mr. Vi to to provide more details as to the nature of Office 870, Mr. Vi explained that 870 “was not an office. It was a ministry to me.” He continued, “‘Office’ would refer to K-1. 870 was comprised of a lot of ministries, but I don’t remember the detailed information about all subordinate departments under the ministry of 870. They would be classified into different sections.”

As for whether Mr. Vi was ever subject to political training, the witness confirmed:

We had to learn on the job and be provided some education. The education was not very substantial. It was mainly about our practical duty. We had to work our hardest to gain trust and confidence from our superiors. We received some training in small and big meetings. To us, it was part of our daily life as a guard. However, I cannot exactly remember the content of the training because I was rather young and the items of the agenda were more relevant to vegetable production. The most important part of the content of the meetings that I remember is the effort by the presenters to ask us to work hard. But I don’t remember everything.

Expanding on the definition of an “enemy” from his training, Mr. Vi said, “An ‘enemy’ was someone who could be armed, who could attack, but to put it simply, during the regime, there was no such enemy who tried to attack the enemy.” He explained further, “We learned [] the term ‘enemy’… referred to someone … who would attack us, who would destroy us, who would be armed. We were asked to be very careful to look for them. But at that time, anyone who … brought trouble to the workplace at that time, they would be regarded as an enemy.” Mr. Vi denied being instructed on the specific definition of someone who would be in the KGB or CIA, however.

Referred by the counsel back to his guard duties, the witness stated that the perimeter of his guarding boundary depended on the occasion. Usually, he said, they walked around to protect ceremonies and celebrations. However, he also testified that the guards “were afraid of asking permission from their superiors” to go home, even though they missed home. Asked why they were afraid, the witness said they were “simply afraid.”

Moving on, Mr. Vi confirmed that some people from his unit “disappeared, and some were removed.” Regarding the reasons for these removals, Mr. Vi said that “the nature of the offence was not that serious” and that rather, “the serious mistake was that they could not be refashioned after several attempts.” Indeed, he stated, from an initial group of 50, “by the end of the regime, only a handful remained,” though “some were transferred out because of their specialty or the nature of their work.” However, he concluded by clarifying that only some were transferred out, and this would be after several failed refashioning attempts.

As to what happened to senior leaders who disappeared, the witness never saw them again and “so it was my understanding that they died.” Mr. Kimsuon asked if this made the witness afraid. Mr. Vi responded, “I was cautious in my manner and my speech. The only thing was that I had to be vigilant. I did not want to make any mistake or I would be transferred out. Based on that, I did my best to work.”

After a prolonged mid-afternoon break that was delayed by nearly 10 minutes, Mr. Kimsuon asked the witness whether he could recall the names of the senior leaders who attended meetings. Mr. Vi said he could not recall either their names or their ranks. Finally, Mr. Kimsuon asked Mr. Vi whether he ever heard the senior Khmer Rouge leaders mention the late King Father Norodom Sihanouk’s good deeds. The witness denied this.

Final Clarifications from the Civil Party Lawyers on the Evacuation and Other Issues

Mr. Kimsuon then ceded the floor to his colleague, International Co-Lawyer for the civil parties Beini Ye, who put a short series of questions to the witness to clarify certain issues. She first asked the witness to provide an estimate of the number of evacuees he saw coming to Po Angkrong commune. Mr. Vi said that he was not sure and the people he saw could have been evacuated to several locations. Asked whether people could choose where to be settled, Mr. Vi denied any knowledge of this. Ms. Ye pressed on, asking whether families were able to stay together or were forcibly separated. Mr. Vi replied, “So far as I know, they were not separated. They stayed together.”

The civil party lawyer inquired as to the kinds of tasks evacuees were assigned to do. Mr. Vi advised, “The evacuees were assigned to perform the same tasks as the local people did. … The village chiefs and the commune chiefs would be the persons assigning tasks to them.” However, Mr. Vi did not know if there was an “order from above” directing these assignments.

Turning back to the witness’s time at K-1, Ms. Ye asked the witness about the frequency of disappearances of people from this location and the period in which these disappearances occurred. Mr. Vi instead responded by reiterating his earlier testimony that people were removed because they failed to be refashioned despite several attempts. He then confirmed, when pressed, that disappearances occurred “throughout the entire time” he was at K-1, “all the way through to 1979.” However, he said, disappearances “were not very frequent, and there were not many cases either.”

Finally, Ms. Ye asked the witness whether he ever heard speeches from senior leaders other than Pol Pot during the DK regime. Mr. Vi denied this and said he had only heard a speech from Pol Pot that was made directly to the bodyguard unit.

Khieu Samphan Defense Team Questions Witness on His Role as Guard

The floor was then ceded to Mr. Sam Onn to begin the defense’s cross-examination of the witness. He first asked the witness when he began working at K-1 and when he finished up with this work. Mr. Vi responded that he started working in “early 1976” and stopped by “early 1979 when we fled Phnom Penh.”

Directing Mr. Vi back to his role as a K-1 guard, Mr. Sam Onn asked what Mr. Vi could see from his guard post. The witness said he could not see inside the building premises, just “a few stories from higher above; … we could see only from one angle of the building. The building was a square concrete building.” As for whether he frequently changed his guard post, Mr. Vi confirmed that they would “take turns to station at different [guard] towers every now and then,” explaining that he and his colleagues would change posts “once every two weeks or 15 days.”

The defense counsel turned to a series of questions concerning the Lambretta vehicle Mr. Samphan took when he came to K-1. Asked to describe this vehicle, Mr. Vi advised that the vehicle had “four small tires” more like the size of car rather than motorcycle tires. Mr. Vi could not describe, when pressed, the size of the Lambretta’s engine but did state that he thought it very “humble” of Mr. Samphan to take this vehicle while other senior leaders drove “fancy cars.” Mr. Vi advised that Mr. Samphan’s driver was, to his knowledge, a person named Soeun.

Mr. Sam Onn asked the witness whether he knew a person called Hoeun. The witness denied this. Asked to describe the person named Soeun who Mr. Vi knew, Mr. Vi said that “he was a few years older than me, he had a lighter complexion, but he was shorter than me.” Did Soeun, Mr. Samphan’s driver, have better experience than other drivers? Mr. Sam Onn asked. Mr. Vi denied this, stating he thought it to be “inferior” to others since he had only begun driving for Mr. Samphan and thus perhaps “had less experience than drivers of other leaders.” Finally, on this issue, Mr. Vi advised that he did not see anyone in the Lambretta other than Mr. Samphan and Soeun when Mr. Samphan came in and out of the office.

Moving on, Mr. Sam Onn noted that he had earlier objected to a question from the prosecutor on the ground that it was outside the scope of the trial, but this had been overruled.[33] He then asked Mr. Vi for his personal observations as to the change in leadership during the DK regime between 1975 and 1979 and after the DK regime was toppled. Mr. Vi replied:

I knew very little regarding the matters at that time. I knew, however, that the style of leadership was different from the time that the regime was toppled. When they were in power, they had full administrative structure from the top level to the village level. … I did not have the details of how they managed the regime from 1975 to 1979. When they lost their power from 1979, when they fled to the jungle to form another resistance, the leadership form was different, the way they led. They had different approaches in tackling the issue of leadership in how they managed to survive in the jungles as there were no longer vehicles for them to use, no big offices for them to survive. … That style of leadership was different from the 1975 to 1979 period.

Mr. Vercken then took over questioning of Mr. Vi, asking the witness to provide further details on the frequency of meetings held by senior leaders. The witness advised that these meetings “were held frequently,” although “it was impossible to tell” how frequently. The defense counsel noted, however, that the witness had testified to the OCIJ that these meetings had occurred every three to six months. Mr. Vi agreed that this corresponded with what he remembered. Asked to assess how often Mr. Samphan attended meetings at K-1 in comparison to other senior leaders, Mr. Vi said that according to his observation, Mr. Samphan “went there more frequently than other leaders.”

Mr. Vercken sought Mr. Vi’s recollection of particulars of the physical structure of K-1. Beginning with the roof, Mr. Vi said that the roof was not a tiled roof “as we have today” but was made of concrete and was flat. The witness estimated that there were about four to five floors in the building. He did not know where the kitchen was located, however, as he “did not enter the building or look around the compound” since this was prohibited. He reiterated that he was situated on the “second layer,” and although there was no prohibition to go to the “first layer,” he did not do so as there was no reason to do so.

Meetings “were held at the group level,” as organized by the group chief, Mr. Vi continued. These meetings took place “about 10 to 20 meters from the guard post, he explained, noting that they were “sometimes held under the tree and sometimes lasted for about half an hour only.”

The defense counsel then sought to clarify what the witness had meant when he had earlier testified that he had been assigned to “night duty.” Mr. Vi said that:

During the day, we took shifts at the four towers. At night, we were patrolling … on foot. While we patrolled at night, we did not patrol through the entire night. We took shifts. In fact, we patrolled at night for only two hours. Then another team would replace us and then we would rest. During the day, when we were assigned by a group chief to guard a particular tower, then we would take up position there, but mainly, we were assigned to guard the entrance.

Moving on, Mr. Vercken asked the witness to confirm the revolutionary alias of his DK colleague Tan. By way of explanation, Mr. Vercken said that the witness and the Court heard a statement this morning from a person known as Oeun Tan, whom the OCP alleged to be the Tan the witness had referred to. However, Mr. Vercken said, But Oeun Tan had only admitted to one revolutionary alias, namely Chou. Mr. Vi responded that while he was in the jungle, the person was known as Tan, but while working in K-1, the person was known as Khieu.

Mr. Vercken noted that during his testimony before the Trial Chamber, Oeun Tan had been presented with Mr. Vi’s OCIJ statement and had said he did not know Mr. Vi. Asked for his reaction to this, the witness said that he did not believe this could be so since he and Mr. Tan had “lived together for quite a long time.” In fact, Mr. Vi continued, “we lived together for more time than not. It started from 1976 until at least 1996, when I returned to Pailin.” He concluded, “I don’t believe that he doesn’t know me. However, if he stated that he doesn’t know me, that is his own discretion.”

Mr. Vercken stated that when the witness was interviewed by the OCIJ, he said that Tan had denounced his predecessor Sem and had the authority to summon people whose conduct could be criticized. However, the counsel noted, Oeun Tan denied this during his testimony. Questioned on this discrepancy, Mr. Vi said that he still stood by his statement before the OCIJ.

At this juncture, the president intervened, inquiring how long all the defense counsel would need for questions. Mr. Vercken advised that he would need no more than 20 minutes. National Co-Counsel for Nuon Chea Son Arun advised that his team would not require any time, while National Co-Counsel for Ieng Sary Ang Udom advised that he would require approximately five minutes. The Trial Chamber judges huddled in conference at this point, with two Trial Chamber greffiers also intervening at one point. Turning back to the court, President Nonn announced that as there was no more time for questioning during today’s session, the witness would return tomorrow in order to attend the brief conclusion of his questioning.

The hearings were then adjourned for the day. Hearings will resume at 9 a.m. on Wednesday, January 9, 2013, with the continued testimony of Mr. Vi.