Brothers Were Watched, Duch Says: Mistrust in the Higher Spheres

On Day 9 of his testimony, Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, was cross-examined by the Defense for Nuon Chea. The witness was interrogated about the chain of command within the party with the perspective that his “mid-level” position did not make him aware of everything that happened in the higher ranks of the regime. Duch, though often digressive, was still able to provide the Chamber with details about the incrimination and surveillance of higher ranked officials, denoting an atmosphere of suspicion within the Khmer Rouge.

 

Matching the dates of Son Sen’s last months in Phnom Penh: who did Duch answer to?

Judge Nil Nonn, President of the Tribunal, started today’s hearing with various questions for the witness. His inquiries confirmed elements of the authoritative structure within the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), namely a few annotations by Son Sen, former Deputy Prime Minister for the Defense, and Nuon Chea, Pol Pot’s former second-in-command. The annotations showed that confessions were sent from S-21 to Son Sen, Phan and Nuon Chea, who looked them over before they made written comments. [1] [2]

Judge Jean-Marc Lavergne reacted to the documents Judge Nil Nonn relied on: they were dated October and November 1977, and “you previously said that Son Sen left for the battlefield on August 15, 1977 – could you elaborate?” he asked Duch. The witness replied that since that date, Nuon Chea’s messengers were coming to collect the documents, not Son Sen’s. Son Sen wrote his replies while on the battlefield.

Co-Counsel for the Defense of Nuon Chea Victor Koppe initiated his own examination of the witness and stayed on the topic of Son Sen’s departure from Phnom Penh. Similarly to Thursday, Mr. Koppe pointed out disparities between the dates indicated by Duch and several pieces of evidence[3]. For example, Son Sen was present in a delegation that saw Pol Pot off at Phnom Penh airport, when the leader of Democratic Kampuchea went to China in September 1977[4]; he was also present when U Ne Win, former President of Burma, paid an official visit to Cambodia in November 1977[5] and when an official from the Chinese Communist Party visited the country in December 1977[6]. Mr. Koppe then asked the witness:

“If it was so easy for [Son Sen] to travel [between the battlefield and Phnom Penh], why did he transfer his duties to Nuon Chea on August 15, 1977?”

The witness replied that Son Sen did not transfer his duties but that Nuon Chea himself, who was higher in the ranks of the CPK, came to supervise Duch at S-21 to replace Son Sen when he left for the battlefield.

Still in the line of trying to show Nuon Chea was not the head of S-21 as early as Duch’s testimony suggests and despite this last answer, Co-Counsel for the Defense of Nuon Chea Victor Koppe reminded the witness about one of his statements to the Co-Investigating Judges related to the “Last Joint Plan”:

“All of this demonstrates that Son Sen still considered himself as my superior, and I acted the same way. The fact that he called me to the training session, that he asked to draft this document and that he continued to deal with security issues by calling me demonstrate this.” [7]

The “Last Joint Plan”, which shows orders by Son Sen, was most likely drafted in April 1978 at the latest. Duch responded that Son Sen gave him instructions before he left, and that the document was drafted on an extended period of time[8].

Mr. Koppe did not give up, and attempted to link the study session when Duch last saw Son Sen to the date Comrade Pin came to this same study session in wheelchair, because his car had been hit by a mine. The witness could not recall the exact date of the study session, though he was positive it was after August 15, 1977 and before 1978. Mr. Koppe relied on a telegram from April 1978 (“Comrade Pin has been injured again” [9]) in vain, as the witness could not confirm this date.

After a short break, Senior Assistant Prosecutor Dale Lysak was granted the floor and clarified that the telegram was sent by Son Sen, coded 47, while he was on the battlefield. Mr. Koppe did not agree these were two separate events.

 

 

Knowledge available to Duch according to his rank in the Party

In contradiction with a statement by witness Lach Mean in April, Duch stated that Son Sen was not in Phnom Penh in 1978[10].

Since the witness was giving rather lengthy and broad answers, Mr. Koppe asked more incisive questions related to Duch’s rank, trying to show that the witness was too far from the upper echelon to have access to information relating to the leaders above him. He had previously stated he was a “medium level cadre”[11], a “party member at its lowest level”[12], the “equivalent of a colonel”, and “distant from those at the high level”[13]. Duch seemingly confirmed these statements by saying he was a “mid-level cadre”.

Judge Lavergne interjected to contest the use of the last quote, as Duch had not made this statement on the merits during Case 001. Mr. Koppe replied: “Et alors”? [“And so what?”]. Before this debate could escalate, Judge and President of the Court Nil Nonn said that the quote was to be accepted as evidence by the Court. Mr. Koppe went on:

“You compared yourself to Prime Minister Hun Sen, Commander of a Regiment [at the time][14]. Is that correct?”

“I only heard of Hun Sen’s name after 1990. […] He and I were at the same level.”

The witness then confirmed to Mr. Koppe that S-21 was part of the military from the beginning, strengthening the parallel between his and Hun Sen’s ranks in the Party[15] [16]. Mr. Koppe mentioning Hun Sen was a loaded reference, as the Defense requested that the Prime Minister come testify before the Court several times, the last being seven days ago, on June 13th.[17]

Mr. Koppe then pressed Duch to discuss his duties at S-21, drawing the limits of his access to information in the structure of the regime:

“My work was only focused on the confessions of the enemy, […] I did not pay attention to the figure of staff at S-21.”

“So let me get this right, Mr. Witness. You were the chairman of Regiment 21 but basically, if this document is correct, you have no idea what 2,000 or 1,900 men in your regiment were in fact doing. Correct?”[18]

The Co-Counsel for the Defense of Nuon Chea insisted on his point, this time shifting to demonstrating that S-21 was part of the general staff of the regime and did not give Duch, chairman of the Regiment, the opportunity to know about the entire workings of the upper echelon.[19] [20] The witness confirmed this, pointing out one difference that highlighted the essential position of S-21 in the Khmer Rouge regime and policy:

“We could say that S-21 was part of the general staff, since we obtain [supplies] from the general staff. […] The only exception were the confessions of the enemy, that had to be exclusively sent to [Committee] 870. That was the organizational structure of S-21. That’s why it is labelled as an ‘independent regiment’. […] Only the enemies’ confessions were sent directly to 870 from S-21.”

The President then announced the break and that the questioning would resume this afternoon.

 

Linking Duch and Son Sen: “how could you have known?”

Koppe quoted a radio broadcast from July 1978 in which Son Sen was said to have been present in Phnom Penh, at another official visit[21]. He was relying on a large number of documents to weaken the credibility of Duch’s assertion that Son Sen left Phnom Penh on August 15, 1977, leaving Nuon Chea to look over S-21, but the witness remained unyielding.

“Mr. Witness, you were party member at the lowest level, far away from the top – you couldn’t possibly know, could you?”

Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, looked around the courtroom with a penetrating gaze when trying to remember details. “I knew the chain of command”, he hammered.

 

Tensions within the Party: Duch

Pushing the questioning even further, Mr. Koppe brought up disagreements the witness was involved in. Duch did indeed recall there was a “broad dispute” between him and Chhit Choeun, alias Ta Mok, former leader of the national army of Democratic Kampuchea.

“Ta Mok detested me since 1973 and he did not want to employ me.”[22]

Then quoting Nuon Chea from Teth Sambath’s book, Mr. Koppe read:

“Nuon Chea later told Son Sen three times about what Ta Mok told him. Son Sen said he would investigate the matter, but he didn’t remove Duch and said that he was good. Nuon Chea also told Pol Pot what Ta Mok had said.”[23]

And Duch replied, visibly irked:

“I knew Nuon Chea; I knew what he was like, and what Ta Mok was like, and what Son Sen was like back then. So do not have anything to explain about the imaginary opinions of Teth Sambath.”

And then directly to Mr. Victor Koppe:

“How can I explain [it] to you if you interrupt me?”

 

Last days of Duch’s work at S-21

Moving on, Co-Counsel Koppe inquired about the exact date when S-21 was transferred to Tuol Sleng, the former Ponhea Yat High School. The witness confirmed it was after April 4, 1976, which tried to tie to an incident with a member of the force, Yim Sambath, who was arrested at that date after throwing a grenade in a building[24]. It was also before May 19, 1976, as former Division 170 Secretary Chan Chakrey was interrogated that day outside the high school compound[25]. Duch reiterated that he became Chief of S-21 in mid-March 1976.

Reminding the courtroom that January 7, 1979 was the day the Vietnamese army arrived in Phnom Penh, Counsel Koppe asked more details about the last days before the S-21 staff left the premises[26]. Duch echoed what he had previously said, namely that Khieu Samphan, or Brother Hem, had said to everyone on January 6, 1979 that there was no need to be panicked or surprised as the Khmer Rouge soldiers were keeping the Vietnamese army from entering the city. Mr. Koppe then had the witness state that he did not recall seeing anyone, including cadres, carrying confessions from S-21[27].

It seemed like Mr. Koppe was trying to get Duch’s take on the estimate number of files, ergo of prisoners, that were at S-21. Quoting from David Chandler’s book “Voices of S-21”, Mr. Koppe stated the number 4,300 and asked the witness if he could confirm such a number[28]. Duch was not sure that could be an accurate estimate:

“Many prisoners were smashed without having given a confession.”

 

Authority to interrogate

Referring back to the incident with former cadre Yim Sambath, Duch was asked to clarify what happened. He explained that Yim Sambath had been arrested because the location where the grenade was thrown (behind the Royal Palace) was under his supervision, and that he was later interrogated by someone higher than him in the hierarchy[29].

Concerning the case of Chan Chakrey, Duch recalled that the decision to arrest him was made by Son Sen, with the instruction that Duch did not interrogate him alone. After the arrest, Duch charged Hor to interrogate him. It was reported after the interrogation that Chakrey incriminated Yim Sambath and accused him of the grenade incident[30].

 

Surveillance and incriminations

The hearing resumed after an intermission, and Counsel Koppe forged ahead. He inquired about what sort of interrogations Son Sen would lead when he had a suspicion, or an incrimination and before an arrest was made[31]. Referring to the document Mr. Koppe showed him about Chan Chakrey accusing Yim Sambath, Duch explained that Son Sen would conduct a proper investigation in order “to find all those relevant elements before a decision was made”.

Upon Mr. Koppe further questioning, Duch stated that “they did whatever they could so that he did not raise any suspicion. […] They sent him [Yim Sambath] on assignments.”

He added:

“He wasn’t the only one subject of surveillance. […] Nath would constantely follow Chakrey.”

Comrade Min, or Chan Chakrey, was already monitored in politics and ideology from the inside of the party.[32]

This surveillance and monitoring seems to show, as we have seen when the witness was testifying about the incriminations inside the party, the strong climate of suspicion that reigned. It seems that any members were closely monitored and maintained in an atmosphere of fear.

 

Investigation method: surveillance of cadres

According to the witness, district and village leaders (and “base people”) had the authority to report on newcomers in the ranks; higher ranked officials were also “monitored very closely before they were arrested”[33]. However, there needed to be more than one confession to implicate a suspected traitor. According to Duch, Pol Pot even said that there needed to be “ten confessions” or “sufficient evidence” for there to be an arrest, ordered by the upper echelon.[34]

After Mr. Koppe’s line of reasoning, the witness had to admit his work at S-21 was separate from the higher cadres, and he did not know of everything that happened in the upper echelon, especially concerning the matter at hand: surveillance within the party. [35] However, some elements of the confessions that Duch examined could incriminate the cadres.

The witness did not have much explanations related to the implications of former East Zone leader Sao Phim and Ruos Nhim in Koy Thuon’s confession, but it was suggested by Counsel Koppe that Phim had been under surveillance, because there was a certain amount of time between the time of his incrimination, and his actual arrest followed by his suicide in June 1978.[36] Phim was suspected of enlisting former Lon Nol soldiers as well as Vietnamese forces in his own troops. Duch attributed the delay in Phim’s arrest to a thorough investigation, but was not aware of more details as to what decided the arrest. Senior Assistant Prosecutor Dale Lysak argued that Counsel Koppe had left out Son Sen’s comment that he considered it a fabrication, which is why it took this much time.

“Hor was so scared that high profile cadres were implicated gradually, he went to seek advice to brother Khieu [Son Sen]. Later he instructed me not to let Hor read S-21 documents.”

Co-Counsel for the Defense of Nuon Chea asked his last questions of the day as the sound of heavy rain resonated in the courtroom:

“Did the upper echelon take your work seriously? Did they take the confessions you provided seriously? Is it true that many confessions were not taken seriously at all?”

Duch, unyielding, reiterated that the decision to arrest a member of the party suspected of treason did not rely solely on the confessions he provided, but also on surveillance.

 

Tomorrow at 9am, Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, will testify for the 10^th day in front of the Court.

 

Featured image: Nuon Chea Defense Counsel Victor Koppe and witness Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch: ECCC (Flickr)

 

[1] E3/3689, at 00174874 (KH), 00221784 (EN), 00326427 (FR).

E3/1831, at 00005463 (KH), 00831455 (EN), 00343398 (FR).

E3/1889, at 00001378 (KH), 00796688 (EN), 00763394 (FR). Confession from 22/10/77. Handwriting of Son Sen. Document from the Northwest zone, indicating “Two copies to Brother Nuon” and “not yet ready”.

[2] E3/3665, at 00174111 (KH), 00224634 (EN), 00386361 (FR). Confession 1977. Gave a copy to Brother Nuon. “PP” by Son Sen and Brother Nuon, means “Central Zone”.

E3/1839, at 00004351 (KH), 00835986 (EN), 00766985 (FR). 1977. “PP” refers to Central Zone.

E3/3683, at 00174734 (KH), 00221781 (EN), 00289876 (FR). 1977. Brother Nuon’s handwriting “not yet ready”.

[3] June 16, 2016, Duch: 15/08/1977: “Son Sen left for the battlefield”; 25/11/1977: “Son Sen’s last signature”.

[4] E3/143, at 00168769 (EN). Report from 28/09/1977. Delegation consisted of Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea, Cheng Ann, Ieng Thirith (Ieng Sary’s wife), Mai Pran, Yun Yat, Comrad Savat and Son Sen.

[5] E3/291, at 00168600 (EN). 27/11/1977. And 00168605 (EN): radio broadcast on 29/11/1977.

[6] E3/1339, at 00168316 (EN). Visit of standing committee member of the Chinese communist party Chen Yung Koy, 3/12/1977 to 15/12/1977.

[7] E3/1579, at 00398206 (EN), 00398197 (KH), 00398214 (FR).

[8] E3/529, at 00285387 (KH), 00069054 (EN). 04/1978. And 00285393 (KH), 00069057 (EN).

[9] E3/1117, at 00434870 (EN).

[10] 26/04/2016. 14h29. “I saw Son Sen 3 or 4 times during the period when he worked as an interrogator 1978”.

[11] E319/42.3.1.

[12] E3/347, at 00002523 (EN).

[13] E3/5725, at 00145457 (EN), 00145434 (KH), 00145476 (FR).

[14] E3/106, at 00177635 (EN), 0017625 (KH), 00177646 (FR). “Hun Sen, at the time, had the same rank as me but he had combatants under his orders as opposed and was at the border, which was not the case for me”.

[15] E3/453, at 00147983 (EN), 00146572 (KH), 00147944 (FR). “S-21 was part of the military”; “we were considered an armed force”[15]

[16] E3/849, at 00183956 (EN), 00334995 (FR), 00052319 (KH).

[17] See Testimony on Cham Genocide Continues, The Cambodia Tribunal Monitor, September 8, 2015.

See also Defense Accuses Tribunal of Ignoring Hun Sen Evidence, George Wright, The Cambodia Daily, September 9, 2015.

See also I did not try to fool the history, Expert Ysa Osman Testifies, The Cambodia Tribunal Monitor, March 23, 2016.

See also NUON Chea’s Second Witness Request for the Case 002/02 Security Centres and “Internal Purges” Segment (Leadership), ECCC, June 15, 2016.

See also Chea defence calls for PM, other leaders to testify at KRT, Erin Handley, The Phnom Penh Post, June 16, 2016.

[18] E3/1136, at 00543743 (EN), 00160081 (KH), 00548764 (FR).

[19] E3/1585, at 00897649 (EN), 0095532 (KH), 00611636 (FR).

[20] E3/2028, at 00021084 (KH), 00185219 (EN).

[21] E3/293, at 00169774 (EN). 29/07/1978: “Son Sen leads military delegation to the People’s Republic of China”.

[22] E3/1564, at 00403892 (EN), 00403981 (KH), 00403902 (FR).

[23] E3/4202, at p.119 (EN), 00858361 (KH), 00849450 (FR), 007057538 (EN).

[24] E3/5748, at 00153458 (KH), 00153567 (EN), 00153444 (FR).

[25] E3/5748, at 00153458 (KH), 00153567 (EN), 00153444 (FR). E3/10085, at 01013478 (KH).

[26] E3/452, at 00147564 (EN), 00146550 (KH), 00147927 (FR). 07/01/1979.

[27] E3/452, at 00147570 (EN), 00146557 (KH), 00147932 (FR).

[28] E3/1684, at 00192685 (EN), 001981835 (KH), 00357268 (FR).

[29] E3/9362, at 00792004 (EN), 00787956 (KH).

[30] E3/356, at 00242900 (EN), 00242889 (KH).

[31] E3/429, at 00403920 (EN), 00403908 (KH). “Son Sen said that Chakrey responded violently when he read the confession and Son Sen decided to continue the investigation before any arrest was made”.

[32] E3/183, at 00183393-403 (EN), 00019108-21 (KH), 00292868-81 (FR).

[33] E3/65, at 00147523 (EN), 00146483 (KH), 00147898 (FR).

[34] E3/451, at 00204339-340 (EN), 00187650-51 (KH), 00186170 (FR).

[35] E3/13, at 00052402 (KH), 00940336 (EN), 00334972 (FR). and 00940341 (EN), 00052405 (KH), 00334975 (FR).

[36] E3/1604, at 00006757 (KH), 00773088 (EN).