“Life Had No More Value than the Smallest Atom Floating in Space in the Stars” – Expert Says

Today, expert witness Henri Locard (2-TCW-90) continued his testimony under questioning of the Co-Prosecution. He gave information on the meaning and importance of slogans that were used during the Khmer Rouge regime. Moreover, he told the court about the role and functioning of Angkar, the prison system, the principle of secrecy and treatment of former Lon Nol officials.  The expert argued that the regime became so violent because they wanted to “catch up” with other communist regimes and because they felt the need to inflict terror on the country to control the population.

 

Role of Slogans

All parties were present, with Nuon Chea following the hearing from the holding cell. Before continuing expert witness Henri Locard’s testimony, the Chamber issued an oral ruling to admit the 2013 edition

The floor was granted to the Co-Prosecutors. International Senior Assistant Prosecutor Vincent de Wilde inquired about the Pol Pot’s Little Book.[1] He wanted to whether there were many local cadres with a low level of education. Mr. Locard said that he could not give much information, since he rarely spoke to people who were illiterate.

As for the importance of slogans for the ideology of the regime, he said that there were a great number of slogans. They were highly simplified to bring these ideas particularly to young people. The youth also learned revolutionary songs. The songs and slogans were the “main means in education the youths”. Slogans were used in all ceremonial meetings. He said that he could not answer the question whether they made it easier to grasp the ideology. However, he pointed out that they had no access to other media and information. Thus, he argued that it was possible that the slogans had a “significant impact”.

 

“No gain in keeping, no loss in weeding out.”[2]

He said that this slogan was one of the thirty to fifty slogans that was used all throughout the country and related to the enemies. Duch had cited it in his testimony. It was likely that it was used in interrogations all over the country. “It was used to talk about those people who had a true opposition”.

Mr. Locard had said in his book that the metaphor of the second word implied the image of the field to take out the harmed weeds before planting new seeds, which pointed to extermination. [3] Mr. de Wilde asked whether he would write the same, which the witness confirmed. He compared the situation to China, where enemies were not executed but held in prison instead. In Cambodia, the enemies were exterminated.

 

“You can arrest someone by mistake, never release him by mistake.”[4]

Mr. Locard answered that this was exactly the opposite of a legal meaning that included safeguards. He explained that the Khmer Rouge were told not to uphold these legal safeguard. They were told: “The goals of the revolution are so noble that the end justifies the means”. As for the legal safeguards such as the right to have a lawyer, to contest the charges, and the like, he said that: “None of these legal safeguards that we have in the democratic world existed under the Khmer Rouge”.

Mr. de Wilde asked why they had built such a system. Mr. Locard recalled that Ieng Sary, when he was interviewed abroad, had said that there were “no prisons” in Democratic Kampuchea. He said that technically this was true, since they had a different system. He then explained the “brutality of the regime”:

I think that the brutality of the regime is due to two causes. […] They were the last in line. It’s the last and very tragic chapter in the book of the Cold War. And they were trying to catch up with the others who started 40, 50, 60 years before […], so they had to rush through all the phases of development. That was the first thing.

Second, to the contrary to most countries that became communist, there wasn’t a communist minority as there was in Soviet Union or even Vietnam. The true communists, in Cambodia, never represented more than one percent of the population. So in order to see that they were obeyed the only method they had their disposal was extreme violence and terror. They were such a minority that they could only develop their policy by using terror.

On the one hand they were very hurried and on the other they were a very small minority. And finally, they were so full of this nationalism chauvinism of the greatness of their regime and ideas, that in their ideology, that […] they thought they were going to launch the global revolution.

Mr. de Wilde wanted to know whether the interrogators could say that a person was innocent. He answered that there were people who were released in the beginning. Most of the ones who had been released were proletarians: simple workers or peasant. These could, in the beginning, show their innocence. They would be taken to their original villages and if their claims seemed to be true, they could be released. However, it was difficult to generalize this. Moeung Sonn was in a group of about fifty who were released.

As for the decisions about arrests, he said that there were annotations in Kraing Ta Chan, and decisions for arrests and releases had to be taken by superiors at the district level. He said that he did not interview any of these persons, so he could not give information that was certain. He gave the example of Moeung Sonn and his wife, who were seen as New People. He had been educated, but was released at first nevertheless. Many people were arrested for minor offenses, such as stealing a banana, falling asleep during working hours, and the like. During the self-criticism sessions, one was forced to admit to these accusations, and if this happened again, one could be arrested.

He did not consider those people who were kept for working in a prison to have been released. For example, Vann Nath was not released but instead his skills were used.

Mr. de Wilde pointed to former S-21 interrogator Prak Khan, who had testified in front of the court.[5] He said that “anyone who was arrested and brought to S-21 was considered an enemy”. Mr. Locard reacted to this by saying that it was “an absolute fact in the country that Pol Pot and Nuon Chea were always right”. S-21 was a special case. Nevertheless, he had found two or three prisons in the provinces that were reserved for cadres. He had been told that all of the prisoners had been executed there.

 

“When you pull out weed, you must pull out all the roots.”[6]

Mr. Locard said that they had the same slogan in Mao’s China. “It was well known that when a man was arrested, his wife would be arrested”, as well as his children. They might not have been killed as under Democratic Kampuchea, but they were arrested nevertheless. He gave an example of a person who was arrested together with his wife and children. The children were not killed, but died of hunger.

Mr. de Wilde wanted to know what the purpose was for arresting also wife and children. The expert explained that the leaders had to be “absolutely protected” so that the revolution could “last forever”. They were convinced that the children of traitors could take revenge in the future and had to therefore be killed as well.

Next, Mr. de Wilde asked whether he could find out whether children as well as wives were systematically registered. He replied that it seemed to be the same as at S-21. In the case of Moeung and his wife, children and his wife were not shackled. The children were not killed immediately sometimes. They were given little tasks to do.

“You feel like crying when you look at what happened to them”.

He did not believe that wives and children were registered. As for Kraing Ta Chan, only six and eight adolescents were registered out of all prisoners.

Mr. de Wilde asked how he would explain that there were less women and children at security centers per se if wives and children were always arrested. Mr. Locard replied that when men were arrested, women were not automatically arrested. The tribunal, he said, focused on the extermination of former Khmer Republic soldiers. At least 96 percent of all prisoners in the prisons were men, he said, which meant that there were more women alive at the end of the regime.

 

“Angkar has the pineapple eyes”[7]

He said that it was a popular slogan. It gave rise to counter slogans, such as “Angkar has the pineapples eyes, but it is incapable of seeing the people’s misery”. Cambodians tried to mock the leaders. This slogan was meant to cause terror.

“There are many ways of terrorizing people with words, and also using the Kalashnikov, that is weapons. It was one of the means to keep the people enslaved”

 

“Do you love your social class? Do you love your race? Do you love Angkar”?[8]

He said that he pointed to a central problem there. He said that chheat could mean both race and nation. People wanted to make it seem as if the Khmer Rouge were racist, which he did not believe. Nevertheless, the term was mostly translated as race instead of nation. The Khmer Rouge were chauvinists and nationalists, but he said that it was subject to debate whether they were racist.

Mr. Locard said that the Khmer Rouge were “very chauvinistic”. As for pouch sas, he said that Khieu Samphan should be asked about this.

As for Ben Kiernan claiming that the extermination rate was around 40 percent of ethnic minorities in Ratanakiri, he said that this was speculative. He said that it was more around five and seven percent, which was less than the rest of the population. “This placed them on the very summit of the population”. They were autonomous and they had not used money before. All the people who went there had to read a book on the life of people in Ratanakiri.

They had to link modern to traditionalist communism.

As for the language, he pointed to a paradox: on the one hand, the Khmer Rouge said that the minorities lived the ideal way of life, but conducted genocide or ethnocide in practice. They prohibited them from living according to their traditions. They had to learn the Khmer language, “which was barbaric”. Phy Phuon, for example, could not read Jarai, but read and speak Khmer. Ethnic minorities were not allowed to use their language. In Ratanakiri, they had brought together villages of some ethnic minorities and authorized them to use their languages. In summary, however, the Khmer Rouge committed ethnocide.

Mr. de Wilde then asked about the Cham and Vietnamese who stayed after the deportations. Mr. Locard said that he did not have primary sources. It was well known, nevertheless, that every language except the Khmer language was prohibited during the regime. Some Cambodian families spoke French and even spoke it at home. It was important to hide this fact, since they would be seen as capitalists and belonging to the bourgeoisie. One risked being arrested if it was found out that they spoke French.

 

“Angkar is mother and father of all young children as well as all adolescent boys and girls”[9]

As for this slogan related to children being the property of Angkar, he said that children were not considered children of their parents, but of The Organization – Angkar. From the age of six or seven, they were removed from their mother and father from an early age on and were taken care of by older people. When reaching 11 or 12 years old, they were put into kom chalat.

“They did not eliminate the family, it was more like they blew it up, exploded it.”

Children were considered property of the Khmer Rouge and were meant to spy on their own parents. There was a slogan that said that “If you want to really know, ask children.”

 

“Useless to argue where the Angkar’s motives are perfectly pure”[10]

The expert elaborated on this concept by saying that the idea of purity (borisot) was repeated “again and again” in the literature, such as by David Chandler. It was used as relating to ideology. “Anyone who wasn’t so fervent in their faith I the revolution, were considered impure.

 

 

“It is better not to get lost in reasoning that is too subtle. It is even better not to think at all.”[11]

Mr. de Wilde asked about his analysis that “Khieu Samphan had an obsession to cleanse” people to obtain racial purity. Mr. Locard said that he would not write “racial purity” anymore. Nevertheless, cleansing of the society was still applied. He recounted that one of Khieu Samphan’s students, a French girl of Indian origin, had been asked by Khieu Samphan why she pursued higher education in Cambodia instead of France. This had led Mr. Locard to write this paragraph about racial cleansing. At this point, the President adjourned the hearing for a break.

 

 

“A hand for production, a hand for striking the enemy”[12]

Mr. Locard said that they had to increase the production. On the other hand, they had to denounce each other to indicate traitors in the population

 

“We have to smash Vietnamese enemies who guzzle territory”[13]

Mr. de Wilde wanted to know whether the slogan targeted all Vietnamese or a specific part of the Vietnamese. He replied that they were talking about clearly defined categories. It referred to “Vietnamese who swallow up territory”. Moreover, there were problems with Vietnamese who refused to leave Cambodia. In this case, however, they talked about Vietnamese from abroad. “This was indeed the imperialism of the Vietnamese”.  A large part of Vietnamese residents in Cambodia were expelled.

 

“Vietnamese head with Cambodian body”[14]

“It is well known that following the bloody attack in 1977, […] it was a threat to control the Cambodian Revolution.” They trained special troops at the border to invade the country and then “killing anyone they came across”.

There was an initial invasion from the Vietnamese in 1977 to “give a lesson”. Pol Pot proclaimed that it was a symbolic victory against the Vietnamese. However, the Vietnamese entered Cambodian territory in Takeo Province. It was considered that all troops at the east were traitors, since they had let the Vietnamese enter.

Son Sen was in charge of the Cambodian army. Sao Phim was in charge of the East Zone and was therefore accused of being a Vietnamese with Cambodian body. There were two versions of what happened subsequently: one that he was executed by Pol Pot and two that he was killed by rebellious troops. Sao Phim was really close to Pol Pot. He believed that he was faithful to Pol Pot until the end of his life.

 

“Monks are parasites// Monks are intestinal worms // You bow before Buddha, you bow before cement”[15]

He replied that it was part of the doctrine of the fundamental Marxist and Leninists. Marx himself had claimed that religion was the opium of the people. As for the cement, he explained that many

 

“The sick are victims of their imagination // We must destroy all imaginary sick people and throw them out of society // The sick do not need to eat, because disease deprives one of appetite and farming will cure them “

He said that this was “a very cruel fact” to target the sick. The second slogan could mean that you pretend to be sick, but it could also mean that you had a “bad ideology”.

One of Moeung Sonn’s nephews fell on the worksite and died of exhaustion. “They wanted a super leap forward, so they didn’t want anyone who would fall sick”. “

“Sleep and hunger were a very classical recipe of being sick”, but it was not allowed during the Khmer Rouge.

 

“Whoever protests is an enemy, whoever opposes is a corpse”[16]

Mr. Locard explained that this slogan showed how oppressive the revolution of the country. He said that “From a rhetorical point, it is excellent, poetic, element, had an alliterations […]. So it’s a good slogan”. It was brief and precise.

Mr. de Wilde then asked what the elements were that constituted the totalitarian nature of the Democratic Kampuchea regime. Mr. Locard replied that “a scholar can give a series of lectures on this”. John Stuart Mill wrote his book On Liberty making a distinction between private and public sphere. Totalitarianism meant that “everything belonged to the State” and that no private space existed. This even applied to sexual life. A group of people steered this. “He looked very stern […]. He didn’t have the charming smile of Pol Pot. […]. I believe that Nuon Chea was the shadow of Pol Pot for a very long time. I believe that Nuon Chea played a very important role, since in the education sessions, Pol Pot was the main speaker, and both of them spoke for days. […]. During sessions [for visitors from abroad] Khieu Samphan was the speaker”.

 

 

Totalitarianism

Mr. de Wilde quoted the expert, in which he had said that Nuon Chea and Pol Pot functioned as two parts of the same brain, and Nuon Chea having said Pol Pot and he “were equal”.[17] Mr. Locard confirmed that this was the source for his saying that Pol Pot always consulted Nuon Chea before taking decisions. Angkar could refer to both Pol Pot and Nuon Chea.

Nuon Chea succeeded in remaining in the shadow “almost throughout the entire regime”. Ieng Sary was seen as the “Beijing Man”. He was given a Chinese name. He was also the man who “brought the millions of dollars” from China to Democratic Kampuchea. The other two leaders, Pol Pot and Nuon Chea could become friends with Vietnam. The Prime Minister of Vietnam was considered a friend of Nuon Chea. The latter spoke Vietnamese and was trained in Vietnam. Heng Samrin accompanied Nuon Chea in the negotiations to Vietnam to be seen as “a friend of the Vietnamese”.

Mr. de Wilde steered the discussion back to totalitarianism, he said that this was a Marxist or Leninist rhetoric. Pol Pot wrote an autobiography that he “came from the rubber plantations”, although he had a “very privileged life” by a wealthy peasant. “He was absolutely not of proletarian origin”. Having “purified” their mind, they saw themselves as acting on behalf of the proletarians, which Mr. Locard described as an illusion.

“The first freedom was removed was freedom of movement. […] Second, the mass displacement of the population began to take place. […]. Phy Phuon explained to the court that it was in order to protect the population […]. Third, their [solidarity teams] were organized. [..] They only controlled the agricultural areas. […]. What they eliminated, which is quite horrible, was money. Why did they do away with money? Because money is a tool of extreme freedom. Behind a piece of paper is freedom […] If you lost this paper, you lost all your freedom. […]. All freedoms were lost. All property was lost.”

For the entire year of 1975, they were “emerging from a horrible civil war. From bombing. From hundreds of thousands of refugees. And it was clear that many of the fields had not been cultivated.” They had the least to eat that time, but that was the time when they had the right to hunt and collect food themselves. “No one died of hunger in 1975. When there was very little food indeed, no one died of hunger”. They could eat frogs, fish and wild mushrooms, for example.

All cooking instruments were collected and everyone just kept one spoon. “We went to complete famine. The next three years, there were wonderful rice harvests […] Why did so many people die of hunger? Because the Khmer Rouge took the rice from the population.”

They had no control over time. “Everyone had to go to work at the same time”. Thus, “this was a reduction to complete slavery. This went so far as an enslavement of thoughts and beliefs. So it was a complete dehumanization.”

“As everyone knows, if one wasn’t happy, one had to close one’s eyes, close one’s ears, and keep the mouth shot. […] And especially hide one’s thought.”

It was “very dangerous” if there were slightest doubts about thoughts. Without the Chinese Communist Party and the Russian Communist Party, he argued, there would not have been a Cambodian Communist Party. “Angkar means The Organization, society”.

As for the question of why the leaders stayed in the shadow in contrast to Stalin or Lenin for example, he said that they were obsessed with secrecy. If they were unknown, they were completely safe. “It was a great success for them” in the civil war. Koy Thuon had prepared a secret base just between Kampong Thom and Kampong Cham in the forest, where Pol Pot could stay until 1974. “And the Americans were bombing, bombing, bombing, but they were never successful in bombing the Khmer Rouge. […] The Americans were very poorly informed”. However, when they came to power, Angkar became a symbol of terror instead of love and affection, as it was supposed to be.

 

Angkar as God

Mr. de Wilde then wanted to know what he meant when writing that Angkar had taken the place of God. Mr. Locard said that Angkar had the same meaning as God in Christian religions: invisible, and eternal, and could mean love. Most Cambodians did not even know the name Pol Pot, they only knew “Angkar”. There were also celebrations for Angkar. He argued that there was the image of the unknown Angkar as well as the “saints” who had died for the countries. There were speeches, songs and celebrations as sermons. This meant the exclusion of all other religions.

The Trial Chamber President Nil Non adjourned the hearing for a break.

 

 

Illiterate Cadres

After the break, submissions were heard concerning a request to admit the table of contents of Mr. Locard’s thesis and other articles. No objections were raised by any party. The floor was granted to the Co-Prosecution. The Senior Assistant Prosecutor quoted a part of the book Pouquoi les Khmer Rouges? [18] Mr. Locard had said in this extract that illiterate people could be appointed to obtain ranks within the Khmer Rouge. He wanted to know whether this was not a dangerous strategy. Mr. Locard replied that it was indeed unreasonable. Moreover, Nuon Chea for example tended to put the responsibility of the killings and deaths on the local leaders, whereas the leadership had intentionally put uneducated people into these ranks. “It was an absurd decision”. He had heard from “many parties” that the Khmer Rouge leaders could barely read and write. Those who wanted to flee created fake laissez-passer, and were successful with this, because the leaders could not read these letters. “The policies of Democratic Kampuchea are full of contradictions”. The people were judged on the level of their obedience.

Mr. de Wilde inquired whether there was an undifferentiated obligation on all regions to harvest the same amount of rice of three tons of rice per hectare. Mr. Locard answered that the same policy applied everywhere regardless of the fertility of the land.

There was a plan to increase the yields from 1976 to 1980. David Chandler’s team had translated this plan. “It was an unrealistic plan, it was a utopia”. There were quite large reserves of rice in for example Battambang.

Mr. de Wilde read an excerpt of the witness’s book, in which he had said that the Khmer Rouge leaders said that the children were “happy to work for Angkar”.[19] Mr. Locard answered that some children had to build dams and dykes, which he said was adult work.

“I consider this to be completely monstrous.”

His research was mostly focused on prisons and not the psychological effect of “broken childhoods”. There were long working hours. “Certain witnesses had the tendency to exaggerate working hours”. In some periods, the work could have been 12 or 13 hours, but not usually, since otherwise everyone would have died, Mr. Locard argued. “But I do believe they worked longer than eight hours”. At the plantations, people were eating normally and working normally. In some areas, life could almost be normal. “It was possible to go and swim. The technicians had completely acceptable living conditions, except every now and then they could be arrested and sent to prison”.

The cruelty and severity of the Khmer Rouge leaders varied in the areas. The leaders who were “too kind” were often seen as the traitors.

 

Nuon Chea

Turning to his next line of questioning, Mr. de Wilde asked whether he had the opportunity to interview him, which the expert denied. Teth Sambath was an exception for being able to interview Nuon Chea. The latter spoke “perfect Thai” and was interviewed by a few people in Thailand. He interviewed Khieu Samphan, who received him in “a very humble house”. He was “one of the few leaders who did not take advantage of the regimes to become richer”. As for Nuon Chea’s personal history in Thailand, “we see that he was simply a very good student, and amongst the leaders, he had the highest degree of education. He almost had a law degree”. In that sense, “he was extraordinary”. He had Thai citizenship and was considered a Thai citizen. He had almost finished his Bachelor degree. “What happened wasn’t expected”. He described him further and said that he stayed in Vietnam for two and a half years, where he learned Vietnam. Thus, “he was very very bright”.  He spent a few years in a pagoda as well. Thus, “we can imagine he would have become very influenced by Buddhist culture”. Steven Heder had reported that they found books on Buddhism in his house.

He was initiated to using violence by the Viet Minh. “He learned all of these techniques and real Communism with the Viet Minh”.

Nuon Chea was in charge of education and training cadres on the one side. As for January 1976, starting with the new constitution, he became the president of the National Assembly. He might not have held many official functions, but his actual power extended much further. “It was total improvisation. It was chaos. […] It was impossible to know who was Number 2, 3, 4, 5. Nobody knew”. The theoretical powers did not correspond to the actual facts: “Everyone did what had to be done”.

He said that Nuon Chea himself, Chuon Sambath, and someone else were his sources to determine that “chasing the enemy is main task of the party”.[20] Mr. Locard referred to an interview by Nuon Chea and quoted an excerpt of it. There was a permanent rotation between the different leaders, “so when Pol Pot was at a meeting or traveling to China, or at Angkor to receive someone, Nuon Chea would hold the power in Phnom Penh.” Basically “he was the vice roy”. He compared Nuon Chea’s role to the one of a obarach , the future king.

In his book, Mr. Locard had talked about a massacre at S-21 and in Pursat in the first days of 1979.[21] Asked whether this was a general policy or an exception, Mr. Locard submitted: “I believe that this directive was general”. Condemning this, he said that “it was a chain slaughter that lasted the entire night.” However, sometimes the prisoners were released or the guards fled. Sometimes they would leave the prisoners shackled. Nuon Chea criticized Duch for not having destroyed the archives.

Mr. de Wilde asked for his sources for saying that Nuon Chea was most responsible for the purges and the purification. In answer, he quoted another excerpt of the article. “There can be no comparison between losing two or three leading cadres or two or three hundred members” – the latter was to be preferred, according to this speech.

 

 

Khieu Samphan

Mr. de Wilde sought more details about his meeting with Khieu Samphan and asked whether he had recorded it and taken notes.[22] “I’m a bit embarrassed by this question, […] I searched and searched and searched […] so I did not find any notes of this interview”. They talked a lot about his training, adolescent and his time in France. Suong Sikhoeun had introduced him to Khieu Samphan. Khieu Samphan received him “with open arms”. Son Sen, Koy Thuon and the others were leading the revolution during the civil war.

Hu Nim was “very charismatic” and a person of the cooperatives. He came to Angkor Wat and Kulen in 1973.

Mr. de Wilde asked about Khieu Samphan’s ties to the clandestine communist party. Mr. Locard answered that although Khieu Samphan denied it, there was evidence that he did have links to them. The principle of secrecy prevailed. “It would surprise me very much, that […] he didn’t have any contact with Pol Pot and all those other people”. Moreover, he had to go into hiding in 1967, since he was on the list of suspects. Khieu Samphan had not explained how he could go into hiding with them without having been in contact with them before.

 

At this point, the President adjourned the hearing for a break.

 

Mr. de Wilde said that the expert had said that Khieu Samphan played the role of secretary in Office 870 and asked about his sources.[23] Mr. Locard said that this was a topic of controversy and of denial by Khieu Samphan. “I think that kind of question is not very important, because it is necessary, as I said an hour ago, to understand that the regime was constant improvisation. The small group running Democratic Kampuchea had no experience whether administrative, whether governmental, or in any regard whatsoever. And no experience in the field of administration, even administering a private company. They said themselves that they did not have enough experience. So such and such role was not clearly defined.”  He knew that Khieu Samphan was with the leadership until the very end and not until 1979. “Why did he become the nominal head of resistance? Why did he only join the current government in 1998?” He argued that he could not have been as marginal as it often was presented.

Mr. de Wilde read an excerpt of a speech by Khieu Samphan that had also been included in the book by Mr. Locard.[24] Mr. de Wilde asked what the meaning was of “smashing resolutely all categories of enemies” and “annihilating enemies.” He explained that the speech was made in a “ceremonial context”. The vocabulary clearly meant to exterminate. He said that what terrified him most were the last words of the speech: “Everything must be thoroughly and cleanly accomplished”.

Asked whether Khieu Samphan might have been ignorant of these crimes, the expert submitted that unless his mouth was shut, his eyes were completely closed and his ears were shot, Khieu Samphan must have been aware of the acts, Mr. Locard said. “What you’re telling us is completely impossible”.

The policy was to hunt down the enemy. “It is true that the more the regime would grow, the more it became clear that the regime was far from reaching its objectives. And instead of questioning themselves […], they preferred turning against their victims of their policies.” They claimed that the revolution was failing because of traitors. He said that this resulted in a atmosphere of paranoia.

 

Lon Nol Officers and Civil Servants

Mr. Locard pointed to the numerous testimonies with regards to the targeting of Lon Nol officials. “I regret that the tribunal only focused on Tuol Po Chrey. The tribunal could have focused on Battambang or Phnom Penh instead.” For Battambang, the junior officers were grouped together and sent to Thmar Kol, where they were all executed. They started an “enormous work camp” and Kamping Puoy. When the high ranking officers arrived in a district to the east of Battambang, they were told to go to another location, where they were all executed. “On top of that, I found witnesses who pretended to be dead, but who in fact did not die”. The bodies were left there to terrorize the population.

Mr. de Wilde then asked whether there was another wave of former Lon Nol servicemen, high ranking or junior and whether their families were also tracked down. Mr. Locard answered that some of the prisons already existed during the civil war, but that the network of prisons was set up only in 1975. These arrests took place during 1975, but especially at the end of this year. Amongst these prisoners were administrative officials and soldiers who had not been killed at the beginning of the regime. The wives of the soldiers who had been executed in 1976 were only searched for at the end of the regime in 1978. “There was chaos and anarchy. Therefore some of the soldiers managed to hide”.

As for Tram Kak District, there were 477 prisoners that they had information on. These archives were very partial, but seemed to indicate that there were not many former soldiers.

Mr. de Wilde then referred to the expert’s analysis of the Kraing Ta Chan prison.[25] Mr. Locard had referred to lists of former Lon Nol soldiers. The document was from the administrative structures from Kraing Ta Chan. Mr. Locard answered that former soldiers were persecuted for the entire time of the regime. Some had to write their own biography, but mostly previous interrogators had established a biography already. Mr. Locard replied that autobiographies were taken that were “extremely bureaucratic” for a country with oral traditions. “There was a file that followed you”. The prisoners would usually arrive with the record already. He did not know whether this happened at S-21, but this happened in the provincial prisons, such as Kraing Ta Chan.

Mr. de Wilde sought leave to present a document to the expert, which was granted. This document showed the excerpts of three pages that related to the arrests of Lon Nol soldiers in 1977 in Tram Kak.[26] He asked to react to these documents.

Mr. Locard did not recall these documents. They showed very well, he argued, that the Khmer Rouge who acted as policemen, did not decide on arrests. The scope was extremely broad. It showed “very well” how the extermination came from a central policy.

“A good civil servant was supposed to produce rice and produce enemies”.

 

Next, Mr. de Wilde asked about the common characteristics concerning Security Centers in terms of organization, interrogation, and torture.[27] Mr. Locard pointed out the procedure that prisoners usually underwent:

First, almost all arrests were carried out during the night. Second, they were taken to the local police station. Third, the first question that was asked was “why are you here?” They were automatically treated as guilty. Fourth, they were brought to prison, mostly at night time, where they were shackled and had, in some of the prisons, their hands tied back. They slept directly on the floor. After two or three days, the prisoners would be interrogated for a few days. “And everywhere there was torture. Or at least threats of torture”. There was variation between prisons. Some prisoners were told that it was more dangerous to deny accusations than to admit to all accusations.

Mr. de Wilde read an excerpt of an article by Mr. Locard, in which he had said that for the Khmer Rouge leadership “life had no more value than the smallest atom floating in space in the stars” and that they had “lost all sense of humanity and reality”. Mr. de Wilde wanted to know whether this was because the reality was hidden from them or they could not see it.[28] Mr. Locard responded that he would write this sentence again and that it corresponded to reality. It was difficult to say why the leadership thought like this, and they had refused to be examined by psychiatrist. In his country, Mr. Locard said, these people would be said as being “deranged” and “completely cut-off” from reality. “This is true for Khieu Samphan, this is true for Duch”. They were model family members, so it seemed to him that this was schizophrenic behavior.

With this, Mr. de Wilde handed the floor to the Civil Party Lawyers.

 

 

Violence

National Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyer Pich Ang started his set of questions by asking why many people died during the Khmer Rouge time. At this point, Mr. Locard switched to English to answer the questions.

He said that this was a very fundamental question. “Basically to answer simply, there was a big gap between uptopia and reality. The utopia was wonderful”. The leaders thought that communism was paradise, but in reality it had turned into hell. “In the beginning, when they began to use the legal means and the illegal means [the non-violent and violent means] […], all Cambodians were in favor of independence”. However, they disagreed on the methods. The Khmer Issarak chose violence, whereas the Khmer Democratic chose diplomacy. They could not operate by consensus, but had to operate by violence. Moreover, “they were in a hurry”. Although the goals were good, Mr. Locard said, the means were unjustified. Further, some people were “hungry for power”.

He said that it was a “mistake to lump all Khmer Rouge together as cruel”. Many who joined the revolution were idealistic. He said Suong Sikhoeun was an example of this. Many youths were highly politicized “in contrast to today”. Once taken into the movement “it was like a whirlwind, from which you could not be taken out”. “It is difficult to lump them together, because there were traces of humanity in quite a few of them”.

At this point, the president adjourned the hearing. It will resume on Monday, August 1, 2016, with Henri Locard’s testimony.

[1] E3/2812, pp. 173-175.

[2] Numbers 220 (French), 258 (English)

[3] E3/2812, at 00395158.

[4] Numbers 21 (French), 255 (ENG)

[5] E1/423.1, at 14:30.

[6] Numbers 42 (French), 50 (English)

[7] Numbers 87 (French), 99 (English).

[8] Number 88 (English).

[9] Numbers 77 (French), 89 (English).

[10] Numbers 80 (French), 92 (English).

[11] At 00395067 (FR), 00394740 (EN).

[12] Numbers 148 (French), 169 (English).

[13] Numbers 157 (French), 197 (English).

[14] Numbers 163 (French), 202 (English).

[15] Numbers 175, 176, 178 (French), 185, 186, 188 (English).

[16] Numbers 210 (French), 245 (English).

[17] E3/10640, Chapter Angkar¸ p. 94, 01303581-82 (FR).

[18] E3/10640, p. 136.

[19] E3/10460, at p. 176.

[20] E3/10640, Angkar, 05, p. 105.

[21] p. 240.

[22] p. 271.

[23] E3/10640.

[24] E3/826, at 00168205 (EN), E3/200, and E3/201, at S0004165 (EN), 00292805-06 (KH).

[25] E3/8299, Kraing Ta Chan Archives.

[26] E3/2048, at p. 224 (French), 00079089-91 (KH), 00376562-64 (EN).

[27] E3/10640, p. 231-232 (French).

[28] E3/2811, at 00822607-08 (KH).

 

Featured Image: Expert Henri Locard (ECCC: Flickr).