Expert Describes Khmer Rouge Leadership As Paranoid
Expert Stephen Morris continued his testimony today. He told the Chamber about Vietnamese and Cambodian incursions on the other’s territory, an atmosphere of paranoia and purges of cadres. He also testified about the relation between the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and Cambodia.
Vietnam as an Aggressor
All parties were present, with Nuon Chea following the hearing from the holding cell. The Nuon Chea Defense Team then continued their questioning by inquiring about Late King-Father Sihanouk. Mr. Koppe quoted yesterday’s assessment by Stephen Morris: “I think that he, the King-Father Sihanouk was someone who acted very rationally.”[1] He then quoted a speech, in which Sihanouk had compared Vietnam to a “hungry boa constrictor” that attempted to swallow Cambodia as well as advances by Vietnam to the Nazi invasion of Poland.
Mr. Morris said he could not recall these speeches. Mr. Koppe then read out further speeches by Norodom Sihanouk, in which he had talked about Vietnamese aggressions.[2] Mr. Koppe asked whether there was “really no difference” of Sihanouk’s position before the invasion and Democratic Kampuchea’s position with regards to Vietnamese aggression. Mr. Morris replied that it seemed so according to what Mr. Koppe had just read out. However, “differences that existed may have been papered over because of common interests.”
Relation Between Vietnam and the Soviet Union
Mr. Koppe asked what Vietnam’s position was towards the Soviet Union after the 4th Congress in December 1976. He replied that the Vietnamese position was that the Soviet Union had the “correct position” in the communist worldview and that it was to be followed. Moreover, the Soviet Union protected Vietnam from China, which was why it was “necessary to follow the Soviet line.”
Marie Guiraud requested that counsel should give relevant ERNs, which Mr. Koppe did.[3] Mr. Koppe said that there was a key moment: The Soviet invasion into Czechoslovakia in 1968.[4] Mr. Koppe asked why this was a landmark event. He replied that this was because “it made clear that the Soviet Union would not tolerate a domestic policy reorienting itself.” The Vietnamese supported the invasion.
Mr. Koppe quoted Nayan Chanda.[5] Mr. Morris said that he could not find evidence of this in the Soviet archives. Mr. Koppe said that he had quoted someone, who had said that counter-revolutionaries in Czechoslovakia had overthrown the existing government and that outside forces had to therefore intervene.[6] Mr. Koppe wanted to know whether this may have been the advice by Russia. Mr. Morris said that the argument needed to “be fleshed out further”. He said that Stalin was the de-facto head of Comintern and that Vietnamese communists believed that Stalin had created a unified communist movement that did not tolerate divergence and independence.[7] “The Vietnamese were very unhappy with what we call this centrism in the communist world.”
There was no political necessity in terms of the security interests in Vietnam to celebrate Stalinism and that it reflected that “true ideological beliefs.”
Mr. Koppe quoted an excerpt of Mr. Morris’ book, in which he had talked about the “cultural contempt” of the Vietnamese towards Cambodia.[8] He then quoted words with which the expert had quoted Vietnamese policy as being described by various people, including Kissinger and Philip Short, in a negative way: arrogant, deceitful, condescending, untrustworthy. He asked Mr. Morris to expand on this. Mr. Morris said that they did not reveal what their persistence was going to be used for. When Vietnam was planning the biggest offensive against South Vietnam, a major Soviet delegation came to Hanoi to negotiate further Soviet aid, but the Vietnamese did not reveal that the offensive was imminent. Mr. Koppe said that Chanda had described the Vietnamese as “tricky” and asked why Americans would have described it this way. Mr. Morris replied that the Americans had been upset that the Vietnamese communists would not “follow the normal rules of the great game of secret negotiation.”
Mr. Koppe then asked how Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping should be seen. He replied that he was a Chinese nationalist and pragmatist who wanted to reorient the foreign policy to secure Chinese interests towards the threat of the Soviet Union.
Mr. Koppe quoted Chanda, who had quoted a Thai diplomat who had said that Deng Xiaoping hated the Vietnamese “the most passionately” and that he felt a “visceral hate”.[9] Mr. Morris replied that the Chinese leadership was angry with Vietnam, since they had provided assistance. “This perceived ingratitude towards China was pervasive in Chinese leadership.”
Aspirations towards an Indochinese Federation
Mr. Koppe said that he had distinguished eight methods of implementation for the policy. These included: Establishing political control and influence over the Cambodian insurgency and revolution[10], subversion, sabotage, and infiltration in Cambodia, continuous encroachment into Cambodian territory, presumably provoking Democratic Kampuchea forces, removing Pol Pot through assassination, plans for a coup d’état, and lastly, a military invasion.
International Lead Co-Lawyer Marie Guiraud interjected and said that these seemed to be his own interpretation. Precise sources should be given. Mr. Koppe replied that he would give them subsequently. When Judge Claudia Fenz said that Ms. Guiraud was correct and that these were the rules, he replied: “Don’t be so fetishist on little rules, Judge Fenz,” to which she responded that “there’s a reason behind these rules.”
Establishing Political Control and Infiltration into Cambodia
Mr. Morris said that the Vietnamese forces attacked Lon Nol forces. To control the insurgency, they had liaison committees. Second, they had the Khmer Viet Minh. These were the Cambodians who retreated to Vietnam in 1954 and these were re-infiltrated into Cambodia. Hanoi believed that the Hanoi-trained communists would be a means to control Cambodian communism. Mr. Koppe asked what he meant with the “blatancy” with which the Vietnamese attempted to control Cambodia.[11] Mr. Morris replied that the two ways – liaison committees and infiltration – made it very clear. He said that the Vietnamese communists could not secure communist victory in Cambodia.[12] Thus, the situation would have to wait until Vietnamese anticipated that their agents of influence would be able to assert themselves and a friendly policy toward Vietnam. The Vietnamese, he said, underestimated the extent to which Pol Pot had eliminated the Viet Minh.
Attempts to Assassinate Pol Pot
When Mr. Koppe moved to the alleged attempted assassination of Pol Pot, Judge Jean-Marc Lavergne interjected and said that the information seemed to be coming from confessions and could therefore not be used.[13] Mr. Koppe said that the implication of Judge Lavergne was that no public statements by Democratic Kampuchea regarding assassination plots against Pol Pot could be used. He alleged: “Couldn’t it be true that Nuon Chea had an extremely well-informed intelligence service” and that the knowledge he had received through there about plans for a coup d’état was confirmed in confessions. Judge Lavergne said that the black book should be referred to instead of secondary sources. Mr. Koppe shot back: “That doesn’t make any sense what you’re saying.” Judge Lavergne told Mr. Koppe to “please refrain from these comments.” Mr. Koppe refused this: “I certainly will not.” He then repeated his question. The expert had not heard about these attempts.
Attempts of a Coup D’Etat
International Co-Prosecutor Nicholas Koumjian said that it was possible that refugees had heard this account through confessions. This did not seem to convince Mr. Koppe, who said “whatever Mr. Prosecutor.” Mr. Koppe then wanted to know what he had heard about the involvement of the Politbureau in staging a coup d’état in Cambodia. Mr. Morris replied that he did not know about this. Mr. Koppe referred to a mid-1978 meeting of the Politbureau. Mr. Morris confirmed that he had not referred to it in his book. The expert said that he had only very vague memories of this. Mr. Koppe read out an excerpt of Chanda who had said that preparations started already in 1977.[14]
Judge Lavergne asked him to specify which persons Chanda was talking about. Mr. Koppe replied that Chanda did not disclose his sources, and that this was why the defense team wanted him to testify.
Mr. Morris said that he came across the attempts of insurgency, but not of attempts for coup d’états in the Russian archives. Mr. Koppe said that the expert himself had said that Heng Samrin had attempted a coup against the government.”[15] Mr. Morris said that the question had referred to the Soviet archives, and this was why he had denied the question. He was not in a position to say who the official was who had said this and that he had relied on an AFP report. He thought that this coup would have been in 1978, but he was not certain.
At this point, the President adjourned the hearing for a break.
Mr. Koppe read an excerpt about a Mid-February 1978 meeting. The expert said that this did not refresh his memory.[16]
Nuon Chea
Mr. Koppe moved to his next topic, in which Le Xuan had said that “Nuon Chea was our man” and that he felt sympathy towards Vietnam. Mr. Morris said that this was the only quote he read in the Soviet archives related to Nuon Chea.
Mr. Koppe said that Heng Samrin was quoted as “Pol Pot simply knew too much”. Mr. Koumjian interjected and asked for references. Mr. Koppe dropped the question.
Mr. Koppe asked whether it was possible that Nuon Chea had a favorable position when it came to the implementation of the Vietnamese ambitions, which the expert confirmed.
Democratic Kampuchea: Reactions to Vietnamese Incursions
Mr. Koppe then referred to several documents and asked the expert to describe how his book qualified Democratic Kampuchea reactions to Vietnamese incursions.[17] Mr. Morris replied that he was not aware of major incursions into Cambodia after 1975 until 1977. Mr. Koppe referred to the expert’s book, in which he had said that Democratic Kampuchea behavior was “irrational”.[18] Mr. Morris recounted that in April 1977, Democratic Kampuchea attacked a Vietnamese village causing a substantial number of civilian casualties. He said it was irrational, because Cambodia was “much weaker” than Vietnam and that he did not understand the interest that was served by doing that.
Mr. Koppe asked how it was possible for a political scientist to conclude that Democratic Kampuchea’s behavior was “bizarre” or “irrational” if he had not studied contemporaneous documents. Mr. Morris said that it there were events leading up to this event, such as provocation by Vietnam, invading a Vietnamese village did not seem like the appropriate response, he said. Mr. Koppe quoted William Duiker, who had, in contrast, said that the reaction was rational.[19] Mr. Morris said that his conclusions about these two cases were not based on these cases alone and that in general there was a disparity of strength between both sides.
“Toward Vietnam we take the following stances: We won’t be the ones who make trouble. But we must defend our territory absolutely. If Vietnam invaded, they would ask them to withdraw before defending themselves.[20] Mr. Morris said that he did not know the context of the document and that it suggested that there were not serious problems between the two countries at the time, but that there was a fear there might be. Following a question by Mr. Koppe, he denied that this sounded irrational, but pointed out: “People who behave bizarrely or irrationally don’t necessarily behave bizarrely or irrationally all the time”, he said.
When Mr. Koppe presented another quote, Ms. Guiraud asked whether the expert was made aware of the documents prior to the testimony.[21] The expert said that said it was the first time he saw these documents. He said it was not an irrational instruction to young cadres, but that it was in 1975 and there were not high tensions.
Mr. Koppe pointed to a telegram from Brother 05 – Saroeun – to Brother 89, in which it was indicated that “we have not fought back yet” and were awaiting Angkar’s instructions. [22] Mr. Koppe asked whether this sounded like irrational behavior at the border, which he denied. The Defense Counsel then read another document that talked about the border conflict.[23] Mr. Morris said that it had to be taken into context of what happened at the border at the time and that he did not know whether the events described took place or not.
Foreign Relations with Thailand and Laos
Mr. Koppe then asked whether it was not true that until 1977 the relations with Thailand were very good. He replied that “the Thais are not aggressive” and preferred to negotiate settlements. They may have thought in the beginning that a local commander acted on his own, but that the consistencies of attacks in 1976 may have led them to regard this as a central policy. “It seems strange that they persisted if there was no authorization.” Mr. Koppe asked him to compare the situation between Thailand and Vietnam and that Democratic Kampuchea’s behavior towards Thailand was “very rational” and “not bizarre at all”. [24] The expert disagreed and said that “the last thing [they] needed” was a conflict with their neighbor in the West and that Phnom Penh would have needed to immediately prevent the attacks.
Miscellaneous Topics
Mr. Koppe then referred to his book, in which the author had described the CPK as “hyper-Maoist”. Mr. Morris said that the notion of a great leap forward and the fact of evacuating everyone out of the city was a Maoist notion. There was Vietnamese influence, he said, but that the Maoist influence was greater. “[Nuon Chea] would be very upset if he were ever to be called a Maoist”.
As for Truong Chinh, he said that he was the Secretary General of the communist party of Vietnam and was demoted after uprisings took place. The Vietnamese leadership was “always factionalized” between a pro-Chinese, a pro-Soviet, and a more neutral faction. Truong Chinh was representative of the pro-Chinese faction. He said he was perhaps a “soft core Maoist”, while the leadership in Cambodia were “hardcore Maoists”. The Vietnamese ceased to follow the Chinese example in 1956 and stopped emulating the Maoist-Chinese policies.
Mr. Koppe said that Nuon Chea had said that “by far the biggest influence” on his ideology was Truong Chinh. He said that he found it “very hard to avoid the conclusion” that there was a Maoist influence, but that he did not know whether there were disagreements between Pol Pot and Nuon Chea.
Mr. Koppe then asked about a meeting between Vietnam and a Soviet department delegation.[25] Mr. Morris said that he could not remember this detail. Mr. Koppe referred to Douglas Pike addressing the US congress.[26] He said that the Vietnamese had a long history of training by the Soviets than the Chinese. Mr. Koppe asked whether he was still studying Russian foreign policy today. Mr. Morris said that he was “paying close attention” to the disinformation campaigns in particular with regards to Ukraine.
Vietnamese Military Intervention
As for 1978, he said that the Vietnamese were “skillful in their own right” to conduct propaganda and that they did not need to be taught be the Soviets. Mr. Koppe said that one thing seemed to be puzzling to him: “Why were they believed when they said that Democratic Kampuchea were the aggressors? […] Why on earth would you believe these pro-Soviet Vietnamese?” Mr. Koppe asked whether it was correct that this was accepted, and if yes, how this was possible. Mr. Morris answered: “Look, we have limited information on what was actually going on between Vietnam and Cambodia.” Based on “the little we know” that was the conclusion that was drawn, and not because of Vietnamese propaganda.
The Vietnamese did not simply overthrow the Democratic Kampuchea government, but occupied the country for around ten years. Thus, many people viewed it as an offensive and not only a defensive move. He confirmed that votes increased after 1979 condemning the Vietnamese invasion and occupation. He did not believe that humanitarian intentions were part of the motives of the Vietnamese acts, even if there were humanitarian consequences.
At this point, the President adjourned the hearing for a break.
Questions by the Co-Prosecution: Khmer Rouge as Irrational Players
After the lunch break, the floor was handed to the Co-Prosecutors. Nicholas Koumjian wanted to focus on the crimes charged: murders, executions, extermination of enemies, at places like S-21 and other security centers, purges of East Zone soldiers, and the like. Mr. Koumjian quoted Thet Sambath and Gina Chon that “Nuon Chea doesn’t apologize for S-21.”[27] He then asked whether he came across evidence that people who were executed were put on trial in any court, which the expert denied. Mr. Koppe interrupted and asked for the French and Khmer ERNs.
Mr. Koumjian then quoted a speech given by Nuon Chea.[28] He had said that the USA, KTB, and Vietnam had a common plan. Mr. Koumjian asked for his reaction. Mr. Morris said that it seemed to him a “bizarre and paranoid explanation of what was happening”. This seemed, he said, “absurd” to him.
When Mr. Koumjian put more questions about the speech, Mr. Koppe interjected and said that they meant CIA and KTB agents and not the CIA and KTB as such. Moreover, the speech was translated into Danish first and then into English and was therefore not the exact words of Nuon Chea. Mr. Morris said that there was no cooperation between the US and Vietnam. “There was no closeness between the Vietnamese government and the US government.”
There was a conflict relating to aid that had been promised. Mr. Koumjian quoted the expert’s book, in which he had said that the Vietnamese thought that the Khmer Rouge undertook attacks on Vietnamese territory.[29] The expert could remember this, but did not know the reasons. He was not aware of any reports about Vietnamese attacks before July 1977.
Incursions into Vietnamese Territory
Mr. Morris knew about the organization FULRO.[30] He said that some internal problems in Vietnam may have influenced Pol Pot. However, he acted in a “rather paranoid way” towards perceived enemies inside the party. At this point, Mr. Koppe interjected and said that the book by Nayan Chanda had been translated into Khmer. Judge Claudia Fenz told him that the bench had given him “a lot of leniency” during his examination regarding references and that he would be held to the same standard in the future.
Khieu Samphan Defense Counsel Anta Guissé objected to the line of questioning and said the questions seemed to be not relevant. The objection was overruled. Mr. Koumjian then inquired about the targeting of civilians in an attack on villages in Vietnam.[31] Mr. Morris said that he believed that “civilians were deliberately targeted by the Khmer Rouge.” Mr. Koumjian quoted Nayan Chanda, who had said that the attack on villages on April 30 was “rich with symbolism”. [32] He replied that it was the anniversary was the one of victory of North Vietnam over South Vietnam. He did not know the Hungarian journalist who had visited Vietnam at the time. His experience had been reported by Chandler and was then supported by information Mr. Morris found in the archives.[33] Mr. Koumjian then inquired about the experience from the journalist. He replied that his notes and photographs were confiscated and that he was not allowed to report on this. The notes and films were returned later. Mr. Morris said that it was in reference to events that took place in October 1977.
Mr. Koumjian quoted Chandler, who had talked about atrocities that villagers had reported to him.[34] Mr. Koumjian asked whether he knew why Vietnamese would suppress evidence, at least for a while, that showed the Khmer Rouge coming into the territory and committing authorities. Mr. Morris replied that he thought that the Vietnamese did not want to get involved into a public conflict with Cambodians at the time and would rather solve this issue in secret. Next, the Co-Prosecutor asked whether the attacks on civilians at the border were reasonable in his view, which the expert denied.
Mr. Koumjian referred to a document that indicated that Khieu Samphan had talked about attacks on villages in Vietnam and that evidence for this was “irrefutable”.[35] The expert agreed that this was irrefutable.[36]
Vietnamese Reactions
Mr. Koumjian then said that he had written that in September 1977 that Pol Pot openly declared the existence of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and that Vietnam congratulated them, despite the fact that massacres of Vietnamese civilians had taken place briefly before. Mr. Morris confirmed that he thought that this showed that Vietnam attempted to de-escalate the conflict.
Mr. Koumjian “after noting the massacres of Vietnamese children and women by the Khmer Rouge”, Le Duan had the “capacity to rout the Cambodian army quickly”, but that patience should be displayed instead. Mr. Morris agreed with this assessment. Mr. Koumjian said that Khieu Samphan had read a speech regarding Vietnamese aggressions and wanted to know whether there had been an attack by the Cambodian side prior to this.[37] Mr. Morris confirmed this. He said that some civilians were taken by the Vietnamese to Vietnam after the Vietnamese launched an attack.
Mr. Koumjian then asked the expert to comment on the strength of the army, the quality of weapons, the quality of experience and quality of the leadership.[38] Mr. Morris said that the Vietnamese had a large number of tanks, better leadership and air force. “The disparity of force was massive both in quantity and quality.” Vietnam had obtained most of its weapons from the Soviet Union and some light weaponry may have come from China. The North Vietnamese had obtained the majority of weapons. Some of the weapons were provided to the Soviet Union, however. Mr. Koumjian quoted Chandler who had said that the “Vietnamese easily were able to overcome any DK resistance.”[39] The expert agreed with this. They were trying to “teach the Khmer Rouge a lesson”, he said, instead of defeating them.[40] This was not successful in altering the behavior of the Khmer Rouge. The attacks of the Khmer Rouge into Vietnam continued. Kheang, alias Chean. Mr. Koumjian quoted several documents that indicated that Cambodia had invaded Vietnam burned down houses.[41] The expert had not come across evidence that indicated whether or not this was a policy or not. At this point, Ms. Guissé objected and said that the issues were not within the scope of the trial and that the expert had not conducted specific research on the contemporaneous documents. Mr. Koumjian replied that the Nuon Chea Defense Team had posed questions regarding the attacks.
Mr. Koumjian then quoted Ben Kiernan and asked whether he was familiar with an offer by the Vietnamese to negotiate in February 1978. Mr. Morris said that he was not familiar with this.
Interview with Late King-Father Sihanouk
After the break, Mr. Koumjian asked about the interview Mr. Morris had conducted with King-Father Sihanouk.
He said he had asked him about various historical events and not contemporaneous issues. What Sihanouk told the expert was new to the expert. He had a tactical relation to the Khmer Rouge to repel a potential Vietnamese invasion. He had a set of political goal and tried to achieve them as best as possible in the most practical way. He wanted to keep Cambodia independent and achieve this practically. Mr. Morris said that he wanted to contrast this with Democratic Kampuchea policies that he described as “not practical”. He understood that Vietnam had imperial ambitions and that to prevent Vietnam from expanding, he was careful not to provoke Vietnam. Contrasting the expert’s assessment that Sihanouk was not racist, Mr. Morris explained that ethnic diversity were an obstacle to ambitions, even if they did not necessarily had a deep hatred towards the Vietnamese.
Leadership in Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea
Asked about his assistant he explained that he was an expert in Cambodian affairs and that he had hired him to screen the pages.[42] Mr. Koumjian asked about a quote that related to Nuon Chea and Pol Pot.[43] Mr. Koumjian inquired what he thought about the quote and the saying that Nuon Chea was more positively inclined toward Vietnam than Pol Pot. Mr. Morris said that this showed that the Vietnamese had poor intelligence in the party. The supreme leaders, he said, may always have used such justifications for leadership. “It’s a product of paranoid mindset, which was a characteristic of revolutionist elites”, Mr. Morris put forward.
Mr. Koumjian read an excerpt of Behind the Killing Fields, which talked about Nuon Chea’s relationship with Vietnam.[44] Mr. Morris said that he had only little knowledge about his relationship.
Mr. Koumjian inquired what the relationship was between the coup and the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese. He replied that the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese had different objectives between 1968 and 1970. The Khmer Rouge wanted to overthrow the government of then Prince Sihanouk, while the Vietnamese wanted him to remain in power.
Mr. Koumjian asked whether the Khmer Rouge sought assistance by the Vietnamese and whether they received them. He replied that they would have received support in 1972 and 1973 after the coup d’état by Lon Nol. The Vietnamese who had been told to leave Cambodia by Lon Nol launched an attack against Lon Nol and expanded the war into the territory of Cambodia. They set up communist organizational structures that they tried to dominate by the Khmer Viet Minh. Pol Pot and the other leaders of the Vietnamese were aware of this and had the Khmer Viet Minh removed from their positions. They obtained their ammunition mostly from China.
Relationship between Vietnam, Cambodia, China and the Soviet Union
Mr. Koumjian wanted to know whether he had heard of Michael Vickery, which Mr. Morris confirmed. The International Co-Prosecutor then quoted several documents, including the book by Elizabeth Becker When the War Was Over, who had said that there was no hint that Sao Phim was a close friend of Vietnam.[45] Mr. Koumjian inquired whether there was a rational belief that the ranks of the Khmer Rouge were infiltrated by agents of Vietnam. Mr. Morris replied that this was correct during the time of the war against Lon Nol. Not all Hanoi-trained cadres were loyal to Hanoi, but many were. However, most of these people had been killed by 1975. The “purges and terror campaigns that took place after 1975” were directed against loyal members of the Khmer Rouge. This showed, he said, paranoia and weakness in relation to the conflict with Vietnam. Mr. Koumjian quoted Heder, who had said that some of the actions against Vietnamese were partially aimed at proving their loyalty to Pol Pot.[46] Mr. Morris said that he thought this was correct.
He confirmed that he believed that the Khmer Rouge fired a missile into the Soviet embassy. The relations were poor, because the Soviet Union had not broken relations with the Lon Nol government. Moreover, the Khmer Rouge saw the Soviet Union as a revisionist power. Relationships between the Soviet Union and China were “bad” he said and had were at their lowest point in 1979. The relationships “continued to sour throughout the 1970s”.
The Khmer Rouge were still sympathetic to China until 1976 when Mao died. The Khmer Rouge became “somewhat disillusioned with China” when Mao died. China and the Soviet Union had border disputes. China saw Vietnam’s relationship with the Soviet Union as a sign of “ingratitude” of their support. They also perceived the Soviet Union as using Vietnam against China. There were disputes about islands. China was a regional power at the time, while the Soviet Union was a global super-power, Mr. Morris said. China regarded Cambodia as a possible buffer against Vietnamese expansion.
Mr. Koumjian read two more excerpts of the expert’s book and asked whether the Democratic Kampuchea policies, particular the internal purges of East Zone armies, helped to ensure the independence of Cambodia or whether this weakened the country towards any potential foreign invasion.[47] Mr. Morris said that it was the latter and that it weakened Cambodia’s potential to engage into conflict with neighboring countries. He said that this was a common pattern of behavior amongst “revolutionary totalitarian dictators.” He pointed to Stalin in the Soviet Union, and Mao in China, who had carried out internal purges. Although he wanted to resist what he saw as the Vietnamese threat, Pol Pot undermined his power by conducting these purges. Mr. Koumjian then inquired how the Vietnamese were welcomed or not welcomed in Cambodia in 1970 when they established their bases there. Mr. Morris explained that they were not popular especially during the reign of Prince Sihanouk. “Most Cambodians were hostile to Vietnamese and would not have embraced any Vietnamese military presence.”
Mr. Koumjian said that there was a lot of opposition toward Lon Nol. He asked to what extent the presence of Sihanouk in the government affected the popularity of the Khmer Rouge in the population. He replied that his role was “vital” in gaining popular support. Sihanouk helped to soften to some extent the opposition that the Khmer Rouge would have faced otherwise.
Badges were used to gain popular support when there was still Vietnamese presence in Cambodia in the period of 1970 until 1975. Pol Pot threw these badges away in order not to grant too much credit to Sihanouk.[48] As his last question, Mr. Koumjian inquired what Le Duan meant that it was a “slave-holding communism”. Mr. Morris replied that it was a form of slavery consisting of unpaid work and insufficient food rations. “The situation in Cambodia was very extreme, of course, in ’75 until ’78.”
At this point, Trial Chamber President adjourned the hearing. It will continue tomorrow morning at 9 am.
[1] E3/7335, at 01001643 (EN)
[2] At 01323954 (EN).
[3] At 00192449 (EN), 00233179 (FR); 00192472 (EN), 00191634-35 (KH), 00237136 (FR).
[4] At 01001817 (EN).
[5] At 00192401 (EN), 00237080 (FR), 00191580 (KH).
[6] 01001773.
[7] 01001795.
[8] At 01001692 (EN).
[9] E3/2376, at 00192246 (EN), 00237116 (FR), 00191604 (KH).
[10] 01001721 (EN).
[11] At 01001773.
[12] At 01001734.
[13] E3/2376, at 00192266 (EN), 00236977 (FR), 00191395-96 (KH).
[14] At 00192381 (EN).
[15] At 01335197 (EN).
[16] At 00191552 (KH)
[17] E3/799; E3/221; E3/749; E3/887; E3/884; E3/882; E3/994; E3/974; E3/8752.
[18] At 01001779 (EN); 01001674 (EN); 01001675 (EN).
[19] E3/2370, at 00344747 (FR).
[20] E3/1407, at S0008683 (EN), S00687052 (FR), 00657406 (KH).
[21] E3/221, at 0000813 (KH); E3/749, at 00399114 (KH).
[22] E3/887.
[23] E3/884, at 00182762 (EN), 0001237 (KH), 00386257 (FR).
[24] At 01001748 (EN).
[25] At 01001881 (EN).
[26] E3/2370, 00187389 (EN), 00344740 (FR).
[27] E3/4202, at 00757521 (EN), 00849415 (FR).
[28] E3/196, at 00762402 (EN), 00224473-74 (KH), 00280674 (FR).
[29] 01001765-66 (EN).
[30] At 00192282 (EN), 00236990 (FR), 00191415 (KH).
[31] 01006765.
[32] At 00191402 (KH), 00236981 (FR).
[33] 01001766 (EN).
[34] At 00192405 (EN), 00191555 (KH), 00237083 (FR).
[35] E3/18, at 00103759-60 (EN), 00103849 (KH).
[36] At 01001765 (EN).
[37] At 01001769 (EN).
[38] At 01001770 (EN)
[39] E3/2376, at 00191539 (EN), 000237072 (FR), 00192391 (KH).
[40] At 01001769.
[41] At 00784584 (EN), 00086738 (KH), 00810094 (FR); E3/878, at 00001264 (KH), 00182770 (EN); E3/880, at 001258 (KH), 00623013 (FR); E3/882, 00386527 (FR).
[42] E3/9644, at 0112504 (FR), 01120075 (KH).
[43] At 01120098-99 (EN), 01125322 (FR), 01085999 (KH).
[44] E3/4202, at 00757511 (EN), 00858293 (KH), 00849403 (FR); 00858279 (KH), 00849394 (FR), 00757506 (EN).
[45] E3/1757, at 00396945 (EN); 01001773; E3/20, at 00237970 (EN), 00232350 (KH), 00638524 (FR).
[46] E3/2376, at 00191527 (KH), 00237063-64 (FR).
[47] At 01001739 (EN); 01001900 (EN)
[48] 010017774.
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