Former Commander Says Troops Were Instructed to Defend Territory, Not Attack

Former regiment commander Ieng Phan testified about the armed conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam. He was stationed at Svay Rieng in mid-1978 before being injured and sent to a hospital. He repeatedly told the court that they received instructions to defend their territory when Vietnamese combatants attacked, but not to attack the enemy. He said that they could only briefly stay at the Vietnamese side of the border to attack the army as a counterattack, as they otherwise would be defeated. He also spoke about the treatment of those who were affiliated to former Lon Nol officials and said that they were re-assigned to do other tasks and not executed.

 

Assignments

All parties were present, with Nuon Chea following the hearing from the holding cell. Witness 2-TCW-1046 Ieng Phan was born on 28 March 1952 in Ang Tnao Village, Ang Tasom, Tram Kok, Takeo. He had testified in front of the Chamber before. The floor was granted to the Co-Prosecution. Assistant Prosecutor Andrew Boyle started his line of questioning by asking when Mr. Phan joined the Khmer Rouge; the witness had joined them in July 1970 in Ang Tasom Commune. After one and a half months, he was promoted to the district military, and a year later to the provincial military. He was then promoted to become a “regular force” of the Southwest Zone army. He started as a squad leader, was promoted to a group leader, and worked his way up through being a deputy chief of battalion, commander of battalion, deputy commander of regiment, until he reached his highest position as commander of regiment that he served as on liberation day.

During the attack on Phnom Penh, he was commander of a Special Battalion 203 in Regiment 2. The spearhead of their special army was between National Road 3 and National Road 4. The attack point was Pochentong Airport. Battalion 203 was supervised by the division.

Mr. Boyle quoted the testimony that he had given in front of the court, in which he had said that Battalion 203 was under the supervision of Brigade 2, which the witness confirmed now.[1] Sam Pith was the leader of this brigade. The task of his battalion was to attack and retreat quickly. Mr. Phan was responsible for the area where the ammunition was stored. When Mr. Boyle asked about the evacuation, Nuon Chea Defense Counsel Victor Koppe interjected and said that these questions were not relevant anymore and that they were part of Case 002/01.

Mr. Boyle said that he wanted to evade leading questions and skipped a line of questions. He asked whether he had heard of the screening for Lon Nol soldiers as a primary reason for evacuating Phnom Penh. The Khieu Samphan Defense Counsel Anta Guissé objected and said that this segment dealt with the armed conflict; the questions of the Co-Prosecutor were out of scope. Mr. Boyle moved on. His Special Battalion was assigned to work at Prey Sar Village after the fall of Phnom Penh for three months. They were moved to Takeo Province afterwards. He was then transferred to the border at Division 12.

There was an announcement of his promotion at the headquarters of the brigade at Phnom Klaing on National Road 2 in late 1977. Mr. Boyle read his interview, in which he had stated that he became the chairman in October 1976.[2] He replied that the date in the document was correct. Regiment 12 had been posted at the border already and he was sent to the location to supervise those soldiers. Regiment 12 was stationed at the border already. The structure was changed: There was no longer the initial division, but brigades 210, 230, 250 and 270. This took place in late 1976 or early 1977. He said that Division 2 became Division 210. Regiment 2 remained the same. To his recollection, the four brigades were posted along the border. Brigade 250 was posted close to Kampot’s border. None of them were posted at the border. Brigade 210 consisted of 1800 to 2000 soldiers. The duties and obligations were to defend the territory. The instruction came from the division. He was part of the regiment. “Every country had their own soldiers along the borders.” In mid-1977, there seemed to be a dispute in Takeo, he said. Cambodia and Vietnam started to exchange fire at that stage.

Mr. Boyle asked whether Regiment 12 was every stationed in Angkor Borei along the Vietnamese border, which the witness denied. He said his division attacked the Vietnamese at the border. In 1977, the fighting “was not yet intensified”, he said. “It was sporadic.” To his recollection, the Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia into Takeo “very far from the border.”

Mr. Boyle quoted his testimony, in which he indicated that conflicts began in early 1977, which Mr. Phan confirmed. ^[3]     The fighting intensified in mid-1977. They received information from other soldiers about the situation in Kampot.

He was wounded while engaging into the battle. This was “typical,” he said. He explained that Vietnam was larger had more weapons. Thus, the Cambodian side experienced more casualties. Some soldiers died. In a battalion under the regiment, 170 soldiers were killed. They were hit by tanks and aerial bombardment. At that time, not many bombs were dropped by large planes, but some small planes dropped rockets on them. They had tanks and artillery. He believed that Vietnamese troops were more superior to the Cambodian troops. He left Takeo Province in mid-1978 and went to Svay Rieng Province. He had to gather soldiers for these brigades. He was able to mobilize these forces by mid-1978, after preparations had started in late 1977. By the time they arrived, two trucks of soldiers were left. Prasat District was located in Svay Rieng. By that time, Vietnamese incursions took place. “It is the strategy of war that if Vietnamese entered our territory, we would not be able to sustain the heat, and for that reason we had to hit them from behind. Our intentions were not to liberate Kampuchea Krom […] but to defend our territory.”

Mr. Boyle asked whether he was familiar with An Giang Province in Vietnam. He replied that he knew Can Tho Province, also known as Co Mochruk

Mr. Boyle quoted a news report that mentioned Regiment 2 of Division 2. He asked whether this was his division.[4] Mr. Phan answered that he “did not think that our regiment attacked Vietnamese citizens.” They did not enter Vietnamese territory, he said. They could only enter around 100 meters into the Vietnamese territory, he said, and never reached the inhabited areas. He then said that they could only enter around half a kilometer.

At this point, the President adjourned the hearing for a break.

 

Attacks on Civilian Population

After the break, Mr. Boyle read two excerpts regarding Chau Doc District. The first one was a book by Stephen Morris who had said that they attacked Vietnamese civilians.[5] The second one was Ben Kiernan, who also talked about this attack.[6] Mr. Boyle asked whether this refreshed his memory. Mr. Koppe objected and said that the International Judges had not asked him for the sources that Morris and Kiernan relied on. It was also outside the scope of the trial and there was no outside evidence for these attacks. Mr. Boyle responded that the source for Kiernan had been mentioned in the quote, and that Mr. Koppe himself had quoted the sources previously. As for the scope, he said that it was not outside of it. Mr. Koppe said that they should provide sources outside of Vietnamese propaganda. The objection was overruled. The witness answered that the report was not true. “I was there at my base. We did not attack into An Giang. My Special Force had no right to attack into An Giang, the territory of Vietnam. We had no right to attack deep into the territory of the other country. We could only attack close to the border.” He did not have information on negotiations of the upper echelon with Vietnam. Mr. Boyle read an excerpt of a Vietnamese press release of 31 December 1977, in which Vietnam had apparently urged for negotiations.[7] Mr. Boyle asked whether he was aware of conflicts at the border of June 1977. He replied that there were continuous attacks since mid-1977. He could not recall attacks on Vietnam.

Mr. Boyle then wanted to know whether he had heard of an aspiration to bring back Khmer Krom. He replied that he did not know about this. “The instructions of our superior was to defend our existing territory.” Moreover, “the Kampuchea forces did not go and capture the villages.”[8] The order to combat followed penetration of Vietnam into Kampuchea. “Our forces never went into Vietnamese territory.” If they dared to stay on Vietnamese territory for long, they would have lost all their resources, he said. “The order was to defend our territory.” They received these orders through meetings and telegrams.

 

Upper Leadership

As he was the commander of the regiment, he participated in the meeting with Sam Pith and Ta Mok. The soldiers never had time to return home, he said.

Mr. Boyle inquired about his statement that he had heard the names of the upper leadership, such as Nuon Chea, in meetings.[9] Mr. Phan replied that the leadership was secret. Only the one who was in charge of a certain task would know about this specific matter. “I myself never met them.”

There were around 1,800 soldiers and four regiments. This number referred to the combined forces for the regiments. Mr. Boyle quoted the witness’s testimony and asked whether there were forces that had been sent to Svay Rieng before he was sent there in late-1977. He replied that his assignment was “for the second round.”[10] The previous group was sent by Ren. He did not know

Mr. Boyle then sought details about Sok Chean. He replied that he died since 1979.

Mr. Boyle said that he had told that he belonged to a division that was part of an intervention brigade. The president said that they spoke about the Intervention Brigade 221. He replied that there were five brigades that formed a division. They were formed by Ren. Under this regiment, there were Brigade 221, 460, 340, 703, and 805. Mr. Boyle inquired whether there was a separate unit of artillery and tanks attacked to his division. Division 703 was headed by Dy and Division 805 by Phorn. He replied that there were five “of them” altogether attached to the units.[11]        The artillery and tank unit were under the supervision of Ren. He said he did not know whether it was under the supervision of the center. Mr. Boyle said that he had referred to these five divisions as “a central division.” He said that there may have been a spelling mistake. He went there in mid-1978, but was hospitalized in Phnom Penh because he was severely wounded. He could not understand the situation when the Vietnamese entered the country, because he was hospitalized. When he went to Svay Rieng, Vietnamese were there already. “They were no longer at the border, they actually entered Cambodian territory.” The role of the Special Intervention Brigade was to be flexible. “The role of the Intervention Brigade was to deal with any situation that was hot.”

The upper echelon was Ren, as he was in charge of the four or five brigades. The Vietnamese engaged in the battlefield. There was no office, as they were mobile. Mr. Boyle asked whether he ever heard of a place called Kraol Kou, which the witness confirmed. The logistics office was there, he said. The commander of the division would have deputies who were in charge of the ministry, finance and logistics, who may have been the ones who were stationed at the logistics office.

The commanders of the brigades would usually meet every three days. By that time, there was “no talking of policy,” as Vietnamese soldiers were “everywhere” in Svay Rieng. “He said that there were this traitor or that traitor in the East Zone. However, the main focus would be on the fighting […] and not delve deeply into treason.” One of the topics was to be careful with food supply. He repeated that the “instructions from the upper echelon was absolute. There would be no compromise.”[12] Ren was not the most senior person, “so he had to receive information from the upper level.” He did not know where he got his instructions from. Mr. Boyle asked whether it was accurate that Ren was disseminating the information after meetings with the upper echelon, which the witness confirmed.[13] He used to attend a meeting at Kraol Kou that Son Sen attended. Son Sen said a few words to the commanders that there were cadres in the East Zone that were traitors, but had not given more details. He did attend any further meeting. Mr. Boyle referred to his interview, in which he had said that he attended “many” meetings with Son Sen in Svay Rieng. They received instructions via telegrams and meeting.

At this point, the President adjourned the hearing for a lunch break.

 

 

Civilian Population

After the break, Mr. Boyle asked about the Cambodian civilian population in the battlefield area. He replied that there were no people in the location when he arrived at the battlefield. No one lived in the area between Kraol Kou and the border. The people had been evacuated already when he arrived. Mr. Boyle read a quote which related to the evacuation of civilians from the border to the rear basis.[14] Mr. Phan replied that if they had not evacuated the people, they would have run away, as there was “heavy shelling” at the location. Mr. Boyle asked whether he had anything to add to the description on what the combat was like in Svay Rieng. He replied that during the combat, the Cambodians pushed the Vietnamese back and could only keep control of Prasat for one or two days. After this, the Vietnamese attacked again. The combat occurred on a daily basis and Vietnamese forces came on a large scale. He was engaged in combat in a small Village and was injured by the ammunition from a tank. He was later injured by a mine that exploded.

 

“Many soldiers disappeared,” he said, but did not know whether they were captured by Vietnamese soldiers. He could not be moved close to Bavet, as the Vietnamese had already taken control of Prasat. The Vietnamese had entered beyond the location of Pchum Ptea. The Cambodian forces did not succeed in pushing back the Vietnamese forces to the border. Mr. Boyle read an excerpt of a newspaper report of 28 June 1978, who had said that Vietnamese forces “wiped out” two Cambodian battalions.[15] Mr. Boyle inquired whether this reminded him of a major attack that took place in June 1978. He replied that he had not arrived at that location in June. To his understanding, the combat occurred between Division 703. Almost all forces were destroyed by the Vietnamese forces.

A new brigade was formed to reinforce the army. They were sent to the location in order to attack the Vietnamese forces. The “Vietnamese troops used a lot of planes at Svay Rieng,” and more than at Takeo. They also used “a lot of artillery” at Svay Rieng. Upon his arrival in Svay Rieng, they had no time to focus on laying spike traps or mines, since this would cause injury to people who were fleeing the area.

Mr. Boyle read an excerpt of a recent witness, who had said that spike traps were laid along the border.[16] Upon his arrival, he did not think of laying traps. “I don’t think there were traps or spikes laid.”

Mr. Boyle read an excerpt of a report of Sector 23 and 24 of May 1978 that said that there were almost 2 million spike traps being used in the area.[17] At this point, Ms. Guissé objected and said that she did not understand the question. She said he should ask where the spike traps should be present to find out whether the witness was in that area. Mr. Boyle rephrased and said that the report indicated that 1.635.380 were used in Sector 23 and wanted to know whether this refreshed his memory. He replied that he was not aware of spike traps. Both sides used mines, he said. “In order to win the battle, we needed to use different tactics or tricks.” He stayed in Svay Rieng for a very short time in mid-1978. “I did not use a lot of tactics or tricks. I was injured.” After he got injured, the Vietnamese entered into the country. Division 703 could only enter the Vietnamese territory for “a very short time.” A lot of soldiers did not return from these missions.

Mr. Boyle quoted a statement that indicated that the Cambodian troops entered between 15 to 20 kilometers into Vietnam.[18] Mr. Phan replied that he had not heard of this.

Mr. Boyle read an excerpt of 12 October 1978 that spoke about a cross-border attacks conducted by Division 830 and the Special Division. He asked whether Mr. Phan was already at the hospital at the time, which the witness confirmed.[19] He had, however, heard about a cross-border attack. One brigade was assigned to assist Brigade 703 in Tay Ninh area. Asked about captures of Vietnamese soldiers, he said that “our unit never captured anyone.” To his knowledge, they did not capture any Vietnamese soldier.

Mr. Boyle read another excerpt of a report and referred to a confession of a Vietnamese soldier.[20] When Mr. Boyle asked whether this refreshed his memory that occasionally Vietnamese soldiers were captured. He replied that he did not keep up with the developments at the time, as he was in the hospital.

There were daily reports about food supplies and ammunition. There was a report between upper and lower levels also regarding combat.

Mr. Boyle read an excerpt of a Democratic Kampuchea radio report of October 1978 that explained the types of ammunition that they had succeeded at capturing.[21] Mr. Boyle asked whether he would put these details into his reports. He replied that he did not know this report. The number of casualties and the like were beyond his knowledge, he said. He met the troops in Prey Veng and then left to Svay Rieng.

He was reunited with his troops between the first of January 1979 and the fifth. They arrived at Sala Leak Pram on the twelfth of January.

 

 

Former Lon Nol Officials

Mr. Boyle wanted to know what happened to those who were re-assigned, because they had been affiliated with high-ranking former officials. “I do not deny that and I support it. In my unit, people who were affiliated with high ranking former officials of the Lon Nol regime were reassigned to raise poultry and grow vegetables. They were not taken away and killed.”[22] He said that there were investigators in his unit who “conducted thorough investigations” before someone would be reassigned. This happened in 1976. “When the Vietnamese attacked, they were all reassigned to be soldiers.” Their positions were reinstated “so that we could reinforce the forces.”

Mr. Boyle asked about his previous testimony, in which he had talked about screening and removal of people and where he had mentioned that he was “scared at the time.”[23] The witness confirmed that he was scared at the time. He replied that he did not show anyone that he was afraid, because some of his former relatives were Lon Nol officials. He replied that his relatives were low-ranking officials, which was he was “safe”, he said. Those who had relationships with high-ranking officials had a “concern”, because they would be reassigned. “The only thing is that they were not allowed to carry arms.”

Mr. Boyle asked whether he understood it correctly that “you were scared, and they were scared, and everyone was scared, because they would be assigned to raise poultry.” At this point, Mr. Boyle concluded his line of questioning. The Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers did not have questions.

 

Information by Chhouk Rin

The floor was granted to the Nuon Chea Defense Team. Mr. Koppe inquired whether he knew a person called Chhouk Rin, who was also a member of Division 703. Mr. Phan said that he was from Division 705.

Mr. Koppe quoted Chhouk Rin’s statement, who had said that Ieng Phan was a Brigadier General with one star.[24] He replied that he was a two-star Brigadier General and Deputy General. Mr. Koppe asked whether it was correct that he and Meas Muth were reintegrated into the Cambodian Royal Armed Forces sometime in 1987, which the witness confirmed. He replied that he was promoted to Major General after performing his duty. Meas Muth’s rank was the Major General and an advisor to the defense.

Asked about possible prosecution, the witness replied: “I have been informed that there will be no prosecution against me.”

Mr. Koppe then inquired whether Sok Chean was still alive today, which the witness confirmed. He was currently Major General of the infantry. Mr. Koppe then quoted the statement of a person called Sok Chean, who had said that the East Zone troops under Sao Phim had committed treason.[25] When Ren convened a meeting, he had talked about the some East Zone soldiers having been traitorous. That division was based in the East and “people spoke about that from one another.” He had heard about it from the division which was based in the east. He did not know further detail about the sources.

 

 

Treason

After the last break, Mr. Koppe inquired what acts Sao Phim’s treason consisted of. The witness replied that he did not know about this. When Mr. Koppe read an excerpt of this statement, Mr. Phan did not know about this.[26] Mr. Koppe said that the Western press reported about Sao Phim’s plans in August 1978 and wanted to know why he had not heard about this. Mr. Phan replied that he did not follow these news.[27] Mr. Koppe asked whether he had heard of Chan Chakrei, which Mr. Phan confirmed. However, he had not met him. He did not know whether he was involved in overthrowing the regime. Mr. Koppe read out Chhouk Rin’s statement to the investigators, in which he had talked about Chan Chakrei’s involvement in overthrowing of the regime.[28] Mr. Phan replied that he did not know. Mr. Koppe asked how he could explain that he did not know about this, despite having held a higher position in comparison to Chhouk Rin. He answered that he did not travel much and that Chhouk Rin seemed to have travelled much.

Chhouk Rin was at Bokor Mountain in Kampot and a commander of a regiment under Division 405. Mr. Phan said that he never came to Svay Rieng. He did not know whether Chhuk Rin attended a specific meeting or not.

Mr. Koppe said that Chhouk Rin had said that he was sent to Svay Rieng and inserted in Division 703, before raising to commander of Division 402.[29] Mr. Koppe asked whether it was possible that Chhouk Rin was in Svay Rin in 1977 and not 1978. “I’m wondering how he could be in Svay Rieng with 703 in the East Zone,” he said. He did not know whether they were talking about the same Chhouk Rin.

Mr. Koppe asked about a prisoner of war rule.[30] Mr. Phan replied that when they fought with the Lon Nol soldiers, they captured them, but did not kill them.

Mr. Koppe inquired about the capturing of Cambodian soldiers by Vietnam. He replied that he did not know about the Vietnamese policy. He said members of his unit were captured. “They disappeared and never returned.” However, he did not know whether they were in captivity or died elsewhere. He learned this through Vietnamese people. They learned this information about radio when they were over the border. He did not see them again after the regime.

“Do you know whether they were systematically executed by Vietnamese troops?” Mr. Koppe asked. He replied that he did not know this.

Mr. Koppe quoted a book, in which it was said that “Khmer Rouge soldiers who fell into their hands were systematically killed.”[31] He replied that he arrived by mid-1978 and that the event seemed to have happened in late 1977. Thus, he did not know about this.

Mr. Koppe asked whether the witness engaged in combat with Khmer insurgents coming from the former East Zone. Upon his arrival, he mostly saw Vietnamese troops. “How could I identify the distinction between Vietnamese troops and Khmer insurgents? They were wearing the same uniform and hats, so I assume they were all Vietnamese.”

He learned of the Cambodians who had assisted Vietnamese troops after the Vietnamese invaded the country. Mr. Koppe asked whether they told him whether the camps in which they trained was already before he went to Svay Rieng or after. He replied that some of them had told him that they had left by the end of 1978 and were still military commanders at present. “Indeed they are,” Mr. Koppe said.

He did not follow the radio broadcast, since he was “very busy arranging my forces to defend the country.”

Mr. Koppe quoted Nayan Chanda, who had written about events that took place in early September, in which he had said that Vietnamese forces tried to get into contact with Heng Samrin’s forces.[32]

 

Kampong Chhnang

He had heard of the construction of an airfield at Kampong Chhnang.[33] He said that he did not know about the internal affairs, however.

Mr. Koppe asked whether he was aware of any Democratic Kampuchea attack on 30 April 1977 exactly two years after Saigon had been liberated. He answered that it happened in a sporadic way. He said that there was no intensified fighting in 1977.

The instruction of the upper echelon to soldiers in general was that the population of Democratic Kampuchea was small in comparison to Vietnam and that Kampuchea had “just been liberated. How could Kampuchea wage the war against Vietnam?”

 

Instructions to Remain Patient

He never met Son Sen, he said, but he did meet Ta Mok, who told him that Vietnam had larger forces, population, and better equipment.

Mr. Koppe quoted Meas Voeun, who had said that Ta Mok had said that they had to remain patien.[34] Mr. Phan said that Ta Mok had instructed them to remain patient. [35] He said that this was the policy at the time.

If the upper echelon would make ten points in meetings, his superior would only convey seven or eight points, he said. He did not elaborate much. “He said: do not provoke. Do not fight them.” They were asked to just defend their territory.

Mr. Koppe asked whether he was aware of magazines called Revolutionary Magazine or Revolutionary Youth.[36] He said that was he was given a Revolutionary Flag.

Mr. Koppe then asked about broadcasts from Vietnamese radio that accused Kampuchean armies of aggressions. He replied that those who were there could see who lost the territory. Mr. Koppe asked whether he agreed with him that the accusations by Vietnam were false and unjustified. Mr. Phan answered that he could not say whether they were true or false. The radio broadcasts accused each other. “So this is still a question for consideration.”

 

The president adjourned the hearing, which will continue tomorrow morning at 9 am.

[1] E1/193.1, at 9.35:02.

[2] E3/419, at answer 1.

[3] E1/193.1, at 15:28:11.

[4] E3/1257, at 00008675 (EN), 00416717 (FR), 00224846 (KH).

[5] E3/7338, at 001001765 (EN), p. 98.

[6] E3/15,a t 01150185-86 (EN), 00639136-37 (FR), 00637903-04 (KH).

[7] E3/5883, 31 December 1977, at 00419879 (EN), 00656624-25 (KH), 00819087 (FR).

[8] E3/1593, at 01150219 (EN), 00639212 (FR), 00637997 (KH).

[9] At 14:35:25.

[10] At 11:35:04.

[11] E3/4593, Written Record of Interview of Chhorn Thy, at answer A15.

[12] E3/428, at 00374950 (EN), 00485476-77 (FR), 00373485 (KH).

[13] At 10:23:00.

[14] E3/862, at 00185207 (EN), 00021019 (KH), 00814597 (FR).

[15] E3/8234.

[16] 26 October 2016, 10:55.

[17] E3/862, at 00021020 (KH), 00814598 (FR).

[18] E3/376, at 00486094 (FR).

[19] E3/1608, at 00013179-80 (EN), 0081014-15 (KH), 00793493-94 (FR).

[20] E3/8403, at 00749682 (EN), 00744492 (KH), 00419636 (KH).

[21] E3/294, at 00170239 (EN).

[22] At 11:13:54, 11:17:40.

[23] At 10:07:10.

[24] E3/361, Chhuk Rin, at 00766452 (EN), 00268884 (FR), 00194466 (KH).

[25] E3/428, at 00374949 (EN), 00373484 (KH), 00485476 (KH).

[26] E3/362, at 00268898 (EN), 00210213 (KH), 00268906 (FR).

[27] E3/2376, at 00192626 (EN), 00191793 (KH), no French translation.

[28] E3/361, at 00766455 (EN), 00194470 (KH), 00268887 (FR).

[29] E3/361, at 00766451 (EN), 00194466 (KH), 00268883 (FR).

[30] 11:09.

[31] E3/9, at 00396585 (EN),

[32] E3/2376, at 00192440 (EN), 00237111 (FR), 00191597 (KH).

[33] E3/361, at 00766453 (EN), 00194468 (KH), 00268885 (FR).

[34] E3/8752, at 00849511 (EN), 01309292 (FR), 00733339 (KH).

[35] E3/799, at 00184781 (EN), 00323916 (FR), 00083160 (KH).

[36] E3/749, at 00532686 (EN), 00399114 (KH), 00593942 (FR).

 

Featured Image: Witness Ieng Phan (ECCC: Flickr).