“I Started to Attack Pol Pot”: Witness Says He Tried to Overthrow the Leadership
Former regiment commander Ieng Phan concluded his testimony today. He was questioned by the defense teams about the role of current and recent government officials as well as Democratic Kampuchea’s incapacity to penetrate into Vietnamese territory.
In the afternoon, anonymous witness 2-TCW-1065 told the court that he initiated plots against Pol Pot, after the latter had, in the witness’s eyes, committed treason by killing cadres and soldiers where the witness was stationed.
Current and Recent Government Officials
Pich Ang was absent for personal reasons. The floor was handed to the defense team to examine the witness Ieng Phan. Nuon Chea Defense Counsel Victor Koppe asked whether he remembered how long after his re-integration in 1997 he spoke about first or second star generals about their training in Vietnam. [1] He replied that he did speak to them sometimes during meal times. He replied that it was not reasonable to tell the names. People who told him went from the East Zone, from Svay Rieng, to Vietnam.
He did not know which region in Vietnam they were trained in. They were from various divisions: 330, 339, and 7. He did not know whether they belonged to the 7th Region, though. Mr. Koppe asked whether general Dang Van Quang was ever mentioned, which the witness could not remember.
Mr. Koppe read an excerpt of a book by Nayan Chanda, in which he had referred to a meeting on Cambodian territory in December 1978.[2] Mr. Koppe asked whether he had heard about this. He replied that he was not aware of it. Mr. Koppe asked about Pen Sovann.[3] Mr. Koppe asked whether they had mentioned what Pen Sovann had done. The witness denied this. The Defense Counsel said that he had hoped the witness would have known something about this, since “the tribunal refuses to call people who were present.” He then asked whether he remembered fighting between communist forces of Vietnam and Cambodia before 1975. He replied that he did not know about this. Mr. Koppe read an excerpt of Chhouk Rin’s Written Record of Interview, in which he had said that there were military clashes between CPK forces and the Viet Cong.[4] Mr. Koppe asked whether he was ever involved in military clashes with the Viet Cong in the Southwest. Mr. Phan answered that Chhouk Rin was in Kampot at the time, while he was in Takeo. Chhouk Rin would therefore be aware of issues he was not aware of. He was not aware of the frequency of these clashes.
Telegrams and Reports
Mr. Koppe said that the Nuon Chea Defense Team had sent an e-mail this morning that they intended to use documents that had Ren’s name on there. International Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyer Marie Guiraud objected and said that the witness had not seen this document before.
Mr. Koppe quoted a document dated October 1977 and was signed by Ren.[5] He replied that there were two Rens that had the same spelling. [6] Mr. Koppe asked whether Ren was always copied to. The witness replied that he himself usually did not receive the documents, so he did not know. “I minded my own business,” and he adhered to the principle of secrecy. Mr. Koppe asked whether he had the 30 October 1977 document in front of him that was signed by Ren.[7] The witness said that he did not know about the removal of individuals, but that this document seemed to indicate that the individuals mentioned in the document were taken away. When Mr. Koppe asked about a speech when presenting a telegram, Assistant Prosecutor Andrew Boyle objected and said that the telegram was not directly related to the speech.[8]
Judge Fenz advised him to ask about the three categories of enemies in an open question, which Mr. Koppe did. Mr. Phan replied that he did not know these categories. With this, Mr. Koppe concluded his line of questioning.
Judge Jean-Marc Lavergne asked whether he knew someone called Rom.[9] He replied that he was in Division 117 in the North Zone. In 1978, Division 117 was located in the North East Zone in Anglong Veng area.
Clashes at Phnom Den
The floor was granted to the Khieu Samphan Defense Counsel. Anta Guissé asked about clashes in Takeo Province. He replied that there were armed clashes in 1977 opposite of the Phnom Den Mountain. The location of regiment headquarter was located in the town office in Chau Doc. Other regiments, namely 13 and 14 were located elsewhere. Regiment 11 was involved in the first attack. Initially, he said, there were no major issues. At some point, “they tried to dig into the ground”. A third time, the Vietnamese planted a border post on Cambodian territory with a grenade. When they tried to remove this, the grenade exploded. They tried to negotiate with the Vietnamese, “but they didn’t listen,” he said. “And that was the cause of the armed conflict.”
At this point, the President adjourned the hearing for a break.
High-Ranking Cadres
He said that Brigade 2 had four battalion: 11, 12, 13 and 14. The meetings would be convened on a regular basis. If there was “a special situation” they would convene a special meeting. He met Ta Mok “very often” when Mr. Phan was part of the special brigade. He went to Svay Rieng in 1978. Ta Mok selected forces to send them to Svay Rieng. He met him before 1975 for the first time.
I recognized that he was very strict in his words. He was very straightforward when he spoke.[10] […] They said that over his head there was his hat and over his hat there was only the sky. This meant, he said, that no one could supervise him.
When he arrived in Svay Rieng, Ta Mok was in Takeo.[11] Ren took the responsibility to order the troops. Above Ren, Son Sen held the orders.
Ms. Guissé quoted a statement and asked whether he recalled June 1977 and whether he saw leaflets being disseminated by Vietnamese troops at the time.[12] He answered that he was not aware of the leaflets. As for the digging of trenches at the border of Takeo and Kampot, he replied that Kampuchea and Vietnam “had their respective trenches.” Trenches made by Vietnam were usually built with concrete. The Cambodian side made them from wood.
Ms. Guissé asked whether they had any briefing by Ta Mok on the situation that he was going to encounter in Svay Rieng. They were told, he said, that Vietnam had not penetrated Cambodian territory, but in fact they were already at Prasat. Some of the Cambodian soldiers were killed at the time. There were 35 trucks in the convoy. Soldiers were from four regiments. Three trucks transported soldiers from Takeo to Prasat. They needed to arrange forces. There was a meeting in mid-1977. He could not recall the exact month.
Ms. Guissé asked about his military duties before he went to Svay Rieng. Ms. Guissé presented a document to him, in which Prey Tonlé and Tlok Brigde rang a bell and whether these were places where fighting took place after 1978.[13]
Clashes with Vietnamese Troops
Ms. Guissé showed another document to the witness.[14] He said that he did not know the document. Before he left, the upper echelon explained to them the need to provide their support. The intervention unit needed to be based in Prasat District. Some trucks would arrive early in Svay Rieng. They had to leave during the night time. Thus, some trucks were destroyed. Ms. Guissé asked whether he met with other brigades when he deployed his forces. There were no items on the agenda, he said, due to the urgency of the matters.
They did not have the ability to push them back into their country. They tried to contain them, but even that did not work. “They had more experience than us.” Their armed forces were not strong enough.
For that reason we did not have any ability to invade.
Ms. Guissé then asked him to react to a statement by his deputy Sok Chean, who had said that the Vietnamese troops had laid mines in the rice fields.[15] He confirmed this. However, he did not know for sure whether they were laid by Vietnamese or Cambodian troops. They stepped on a mine in the rice fields. A person in front was killed. Both sides laid mines at night time. “When we were not familiar with the geographical location, we would lay mines at night time.” They would then remove them in the morning.
He attended a meeting with Son Sen in Kraol Kou. He had heard of Ke Pauk’s name, but he never met him, since he was in the Northwest Zone.
He confirmed that he knew the person whose Written Record of Interview was provided to him.[16] He got to know him after 1978 and did not see him in Svay Rieng. He knew him at present. Ms. Guissé said that the witness in question had spoken about Ke Pauk’s involvement in the East Zone forces and wanted to know whether Mr. Phan had heard about this as well. He replied that he only knew Son Sen in the East Zone. He had heard through meetings that he was responsible for the Northeast Zone: Steung Treng, Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri and Kratie. At this point, Ms. Guissé concluded her line of questioning. The president thanked the witness and dismissed him, before adjourning the hearing for a lunch break.
New Witness: 2-TCW-1065
The witness 2-TCW-1065 remained anonymous because of ongoing investigations in other cases.
He joined the revolution in 1970, because of the appeal by Late King-Father Sihanouk. He joined as a soldier. He was a soldier for one year before attending medical training. He was a medic from 1971 until 1976 at the battlefront. He was a medic on the district level. He became the chief of the hospital in 1976. In late 1977, Cambodia and Vietnam started a conflict. His soldiers from the commanders of the division down to the platoon were called to a meeting. “I did not go to attend. Why? […] I had to station at the battlefront.” At around 4 pm one day, cadres were arrested and one left. There was one person led by them. After seeing a well, a cadre jumped over it. “He was shot with the gun and got injured in one of his arms.”
Plotting Against Pol Pot
This injured person told him that all persons who had been convened to the meetings were arrested.
And I realized Pol Pot committed treason.
He called all cadres from Unit 156 and convened a meeting, during which they discussed what to do.
And I arranged a plan to attack Pol Pot. At the time, my soldiers did not only attack Vietnamese troops, but also troops of Pol Pot, because I had to face two opposing parties.
At this time, he had no food and no salt. “But I had to struggle to survive.”
I waged the attacks against Pol Pot two times a day.
He attacked Pol Pot’s medicine, rice and weapons. “They were all enemies to me at the time.” Later, he succeeded in gathering weapons, hammocks and food.
Only I at the time had forces to attack Pol Pot. In 1978, […] I had organized an espionage group to get information. They were on mobile. They did not stay in one specific place. One day, they could find a letter with red ink. The letter said that they wanted to contact us.
He asked his soldiers who wanted to contact him. They wanted to cooperate with the espionage group, the Khmer soldiers said. He did not trust this yet. He discussed the matter with twelve of his people.
Cooperation with Vietnam
He negotiated with Vietnam and was invited to get equipment. He brought 60 soldiers with him to collect ammunition. “I cooperated with Vietnam in order to seize back one thousand people.” He continued: “We started to attack Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge [were] confused. During the attacks with the Khmer Rouge, I was walking on one side and Vietnamese were walking on the other.” He was sick later and Vietnam asked him to organize a front, but he told them that he could not. There was a helicopter that took him to Ho Chi Minh where he arrived at around 5 pm and stayed for around one week.
There was a decision to change his function and role. “I was transferred to be part of the coordination committee with Vietnam. The affairs in relation to Vietnam had to go through me. Ta Chhun was part of the organization committee for Cambodia.” There was a three day course studying the resources of Cambodia.
He then went to Long An and rested with commanders of Region 7.
We needed to find a strategy to attack, because at the time Pol Pot attacked people and hurt people.
By 1979, he was reassigned to be in charge of region 2. “They assigned thirty Khmer and thirty Vietnamese to protect me. “We had Kampucheans as the mastery of the country.”
Cadres
Trial Chamber President Nil Nonn interrupted the witness and asked which military unit he was attached to. The conflict started in December 1977, he said, and he was attached to Hospital 157 that was under the division. Initially, the commander of the division was Ta Phorn and Heng Samrin was in charge of the military. Khum and Kry were the deputies. The commanders were at the battlefront, but called to a meeting. Heng Samrin had been re-assigned to a staff office elsewhere. The rest were arrested. Phorn also disappeared.
There were two cause roots of the conflict. “The conflict initially started in 1973. It was about materials that the superpowers provided to these countries and they were not equal. And the second conflict that led to war were the border issues, because of the unclear border demarcations.”
As for the conflict in 1973, he explained that the “material” was “all from the same source”, namely China. They were all supplied through Vietnam. However, through this they would not receive all material that China had sent for them. “There was a meeting held that we no longer worked together. The Khmer people should move to the Khmer side and the Vietnamese should move to the Vietnamese side.”
Conflict with Vietnam: Attacks and Counterattacks
The president then asked who started to violate the territorial integrity of the other country. Some villagers tried to “feel lost”, “because they were on the Vietnamese side.” Investigators had to examine the situation on the ground.
They could not solve the issue however. There were meetings, but there was no solution.
Thus, he said, “the only thing we could do was to resolve to an armed conflict.” The conflict started on both sides, he said.
He did not know the exact distance. “They were close to the house of the current house of the national assembly, and they disappeared. […] And that is the root cause of the conflict. And if you don’t believe me you can go and see the situation on the ground.” The president explained that in some parts of the East Zone, the conflict seemed to be not as intense as in others.
Division 4 was stationed on National Road 7 and Division 5 was newly formed. There was one more, so there were three divisions in the East Zone. There were around 120 soldiers in one company and around 500 soldiers in one battalion.
Choeun was the commander of Division 3. Heng Samrin was the commander of Division 4. The division headquarters were based in Svay Rieng, but he did not know where exactly. Division 4 was based on National Road 7 after the Vietnamese attacked. Chhoeun was based with him in Division 157 initially. Prior to 1977, there was no central army, he said, and only the East Zone army that controlled the zone.
The presiding judge then asked whether the Cambodian side in any point in time use their forces to penetrate Vietnamese territory. He answered that he could not testify about other zones, but that there was a “back-and-forth” in 1977, after which they “did not have any force to push them back.” “We could not fight against the Vietnamese troops.” There were different units who entered the territory. As for his unit, he said: “Our task was to attack barrack 27”, he said. “We had to destroy this barrack.” However, they were increasingly pushed back and had to retreat. “Wounded soldiers had to be carried away under the ground. We could not carry them in them open. That happened to both sides. […] We did not fight each other from a long distance.” Barrack 27 was not far from “the Iron Bridge.”
Judge Nil Nonn asked how deep the Vietnamese side entered into the territory. He replied that he could not remember the exact date, but that the Vietnamese attacked them via Road 7 in late 1977. “They were about 20 kilometers deep into our territory. They reached Khnar Village in Sra Lop Commune in Tbong Khmum District. They tried to go further to the West, but they could not.”
The Vietnamese side had heavy artillery, aerial support and tanks. “However, when they entered into our territory, there was no aerial support.” The witness’s unit succeeded in burning some of the Vietnamese tanks. After the zone made decisions, the division would deploy battalions to attack.
The president then asked how many times Vietnam entered Cambodia and how extensive the destruction was. The witness replied “There were two types of fighting. One was the stand-off, and the other was the counterattack to liberate the country.” In 1977, the Vietnamese troops attacked Cambodia. Division 2 from the center was sent to assist the witness’s unit. This coincided with “the internal coup d’état.” From that time onwards, cadres were subject to executions. “It was from that time onwards that Pol Pot had conflicts inside the country and also with Vietnam,” the witness explained. “On 25 December 1977 I started to attack Pol Pot”.
Leadership of the East Zone: Sao Phim
Turning to his next topic, Judge Nonn asked whether he knew the leadership of the East Zone. He replied that he only knew one individual: Sao Phim, alias Yan. His grandmother and Sao Phim were cousins, so he had a relationship with him. “Sao Phim had not betrayed all of us, but I said that [Pol Pot] betrayed all of us, because he killed [so many].” Sao Phim had asked him why, if Pol Pot had betrayed them, he had not told him. “Sao Phim himself was not sure, which was why he went […] to ask for clarification.”
He did not know Sao Phim’s birthdate, but knew that he was born in Svay Tiep Commune in Svay Rieng Province. They were related by blood. Some of thy witness’s family members worked in the Ministry of Agriculture. At the time, his grandmother-in-law died. He had no schedule to see Sao Phim, but would see him whenever he had the opportunity. He sometimes visited his family members at the Ministry of Agriculture, where his biological mother, his grandmother-in-law, and another relative worked. The President asked where the East Zone headquarters was based. He replied that it was originally based in Suong in Sector 21 north of national road to Samrong, and then moved to Samraong, south of Do Tey, Tuol Samrong, Tuol Koukey. There were houses and a hospital.
At this point, the President adjourned the hearing for a break.
After the break, the witness said that he met Sao Phim around two or three times a year when the war began. “But we never discussed the nation’s affair.”
The president asked him when and where the meeting happened during which he discussed Pol Pot’s treason with Sao Phim. He replied that this was in 1977. He met him one evening and Sao Phim asked him how the situation was. He said that the situation was not good: “The tree, despite there was no wind, it simply fell down.” Sao Phim answered that “there was a storm in China”, but the effect was felt in Cambodia. Sao Phim said that he built that house in order to receive Chinese guests. “The issue was that we started fighting with Vietnam. At that time, Vietnam did no attack us.” He thought that some people were traitorous, and he told Sao Phim that Pol Pot may be traitorous. Sao Phim replied to him that Pol Pot would have told him, which the witness did not believe.
It was his analysis that it was Son Sen who initiated the coup d’état.
It was his personal opinion that “[Sao Phim] became hopeless” in 1978, which was why Sao Phim had sent messengers to ask why Pol Pot sent cadres to the East Zone to kill the soldiers. “If you were to believe me, and he escaped it, he would be protected.” Thus, Sao Phim went along with his messengers and one of the messengers, Chheu, was arrested. He then sent another messenger, who was also arrested. “So then an army came with tanks to surround him, to arrest him. So that was his fate. He had no choice but to kill himself. […] Before he died, he told people who were nearby him to stand up and rise up.”
He did not know the actual locations where he was, but a messenger told him that Sao Phim shot himself at Arei Ksat. This messenger was fired upon by soldiers from the Southwest, but survived by hiding in a pond. Sao Phim’s nephew was called Oeung, but now worked in Thailand. The president asked whether it was correct that Sao Phim became desperate and first killed his messengers before killing himself, which the witness confirmed. He did not know what happened to the driver.
He did not know the wife’s native name, but had the alias Yeay Karo. They had a son and a daughter. One of the sons was Ka Sy and her husband was a cousin of Ruos Nhim. He did not know her whereabouts.
Nat was chief of hospital P-2 and the son. Ka Sy was the daughter. Yeay Karo died, but he did not know where. He heard that she was taken away and killed.
Nil Nonn then wanted to know whether he knew Ruos Nhim. He replied that he did not know him personally but only knew that he was chief of the Northwest Zone and that his daughter married Sao Phim.
He did not know Suos No, alias Chhuk, which the witness denied. He heard of Chan Sey Hong alias Chan, but did not meet the person.
Judge Nonn then turned to the matter of rebellions that he had discussed with Sao Phim, the secretary of the East Zone. He did not know whether Sao Phim had contact with rebels.
Telegrams and Reports
The president then turned to a few documents to identify some persons. Judge Nonn referred to a telegram of 6 November 1977, signed by Chhon.[17] The witness said that he did not know Chhon. The president quoted an incident in which a person had fallen unconscious and fallen of a chair when seeing a document. The president asked whether this event had taken place, which the witness denied. He had not heard of anyone falling off a chair during a meeting.
He then asked whether Sao Phim had other aliases. He replied that he was also known as Sao Yan. He had never heard of anyone called Chhon.
He pointed to another telegram of 10 December 1977 that quoted that the Vietnamese intensified their attacks in Svay Rieng, forcing them to retreat. The president asked whether the locations sounded familiar.[18] He replied that he just heard about the document and that there was no person called Chhon. The attack was launched against his soldiers. These people initiated a coup d’état and attacked the witness’s forces.
There were “two situations happening.” They attacked Vietnam in 1977, after which Vietnam pushed back and entered the country. Ke Pauk was sent to assist them, but Ke Pauk attacked them instead. One major general was smashed, the president said, according to the report. The witness said that he did not believe that this event took place. “No major general was smashed.”
Judge Nonn presented two more documents to the witness, in which an attack was mentioned and tanks came onto Cambodian territory.[19] The witness replied that he recognized this document and that it was made to Sao Phim. The second telegram related to the location of Koh Srok and an attack by Vietnamese.[20] The president inquired whether he was aware of the event and who Puong was, who had sent the report. The witness replied that the situation took place like this and that the telegram originated from the East. He did not know Puong well, he said. He did not know Puong’s position. “We had different tasks to perform,” as civilian officials had to perform separate tasks from military officials.
The president read another report that indicated that tanks were driven over handicapped people, who scattered everywhere. They burned down houses in the East Zone.[21] The president asked whether he could confirm that the information mentioned in the telegram actually occurred. The witness said that it had taken place.
The presiding judge Nil Nonn then asked about another attack in which people were arrested for mistreatment and that ammunition was seized by “the enemy” of 24 December 1977.[22] Puong was part of the rubber plantation of the East and not in the army. As his last document, the president pointed to another telegram, in which an attack on Region 21 was envisioned, and asked whether he was aware of this situation.[23] The witness said that he recognized the report and that it was a report to the zone. However, he himself did not witness the event, as it was around thirty kilometers away.
The president then asked what the scope of destruction was in the fighting with Vietnam. The witness replied that based on the experience in his spearhead 156, they “had a lot of casualties”, but that he could not speak for other casualties. They did not lose a lot of property, he said, but Vietnam did. “We could destroy a few tanks. We received news through the radio communication.” They used B-105 and B-130. “We had many casualties. […] So had the Vietnamese side. We had the bloody conflict,” he said. He also said that the war with the US and Lon Nol were bloody.
Judge Jean Marc Lavergne said that several more telegrams would be presented to the witness tomorrow.[24]
[1] At 15:29.
[2] E3/2376, page 239, at 00192524 (EN), 00237170 (FR), 00181682 (KH).
[3] E3/2376, page 373, at 00192558 (EN), 00237196 (FR), 00191719 (KH).
[4] E3/361, at 00766449 (EN), 00194463-64 (KH), 00268880 (FR).
[5] E3/1044; E3/1151; E3/1079; E3/992; at 00020881 (KH), 00324864 (FR).
[6] E3/1044.
[7] E3/1044.
[8] At 00052414 (KH), 00344983 (FR).
[9] E3/992
[10] E1/182.1, at 11:21:16.
[11] 23 April 2013.
[12] E3/853, at 00290267 (FR), 00185283 (EN), 00052825 (KH).
[13] E3/946, at 00332727 (FR), 00185205 (EN), 00021015 (KH).
[14] E3/862, at 00814597 (FR), 00021019 (KH), 00185207 (EN).
[15] E3/428, at 00485477 (FR), 00374950 (EN), 00373485 (KH).
[16] 2-TCW-942, E3/426, at 00403068 (FR), 00364071 (EN), 00357492 (KH).
[17] E3/10669, at 00808443 (KH), 00976867 (EN), 01001377 (FR).
[18] E3/8370.
[19] E3/988; E3/905
[20] E3/905, telegraph 09.
[21] E3/906.
[22] E3/908.
[23] E3/909.
[24] E3/891; E3/983; E3/922; E3/251; E3/901; E3/1069.1; E3/1067.
Featured Image: Public Gallery (ECCC: Flickr).
[…] defend their country. He knew Ieng Pan who had given information to the same effect (see here and here for a summary of his testimony). Mr. Koppe wanted to know what he knew about him and whether he had […]