Former Medic Testifies about Attacking Khmer Rouge Soldiers
Former head of a military hospital 2-TCW-1065 (who remained anonymous due to ongoing investigations in another case) testified about his role in fighting against Khmer Rouge soldiers from mid-1978 onwards. He provided information about his cooperation with Vietnam and confirmed having met several high-ranking politicians when hiding in the forest to plan attacks against the regime.
Questions by the Bench
All parties were present. The floor was handed to Judge Jean Marc Lavergne, who asked about his unit. He replied that he was chief of Hospital 156. It was attached to Division 4 and a military hospital. Judge Lavergne asked whether it was correct that he became chief of a regiment and if yes, when this took place. He replied that he was no longer chairman of the hospital from 25 May 1978 and engaged in the battlefield. At this time, a coup d’état took place in the East Zone, so many soldiers fled. “At the time, no one was above me.” Thus, he organized forces to attack the Khmer Rouge. “There was no other military commander besides me.” He had two direct superiors. They were commanders of the regiment. The headquarters of the division was based elsewhere. He was at the front battlefield and soldiers would also be sent to the hospital when they were wounded. The battlefield was fifty meters to the front. They were not engaged in the upfront battlefield, however.
Judge Lavergne inquired whether he personally ever participated in incursions of Vietnamese territory. He replied that they were medics and responsible for treating wounded soldiers. “For that reason, I did not directly go into the combat.” They lost some of the villages for the border demarcation. The UN representative had worked with him to mark the map. Some of the Khmer Villages were no longer there. He heard that instructions came from the Zone, but he was not certain.
Judge Lavergne read an excerpt of his interview regarding disagreements of border demarcations.[1] The regiment leader would disseminate information to all of them after meetings. He obtained knowledge through regiment commanders.
Judge Lavergne inquired about a military campaign that was launched against Vietnam to show them that Cambodia was not as weak as they thought. He replied that there was a campaign launched in 1977. The purpose was that they had to warn the Vietnamese side to respect the border demarcation.
In his statement, he had said that Cambodia was not as weak as Vietnam thought and that there was an attack by Cambodia. There was no “limit or restriction” after the campaign was launched. Their targets were all military.
He did not know which unit attached the Smach Market. He did not know details about this. The main focus were the military targets, he said.
Judge Lavergne presented a map to the witness.[2] At this point, Ms. Guissé interjected and said that the questions were out of the scope of the trial. Judge Lavergne said that this related to armed conflict. Ms. Guissé said that this related to incursions into Vietnam and that questions were too detailed.
Judge Lavergne inquired about the villages Tnao, Smach, Svay, Pal, and Chas. He replied that he did not know about the villages.
Judge Lavergne referred to a telegram of October 1977 signed by Chhun.[3] He replied that he reviewed some of the documents. Chhun, he said, was not in the East Zone. He did not know the typed names either.
There was a five minute interruption of the proceedings, as no sound was heard.
He said he, too, wondered who initiated the coup d’état.[4] The president reminded the witness to answer the questions and not beyond his knowledge.
He did not know how far from the border Barrack 27 was. Judge Lavergne sought further clarification regarding its role. It was located on the territory of Vietnam. He met Sao Phim personally, but did not discuss the issue of Vietnam with him. “We did not discuss politics or any military strategy.”[5]
Chhun, he said, was not part of the cadre’s group in the east. The president repeated his instruction to be precise. He repeated that he did not know the details of the plans. Judge Lavergne said the telegram had mentioned toxic gases.[6] He replied that there were wounded people at the hospital. There was a small number of fatalities. He had never seen the use of toxic gas.
As for Sao Phim’s alleged plan to visit Vietnam, he said that Sao Phim had not mentioned this.
Judge Lavergne asked whether there was some form of collaboration between Ke Pauk’s and the Vietnamese forces. He replied that at later stages, Vietnamese attacked Cambodia and the Central Zone forces were stationed at the rear, while the East Zone forces were at the front. At that time Central Zone forces attacked its own sources. The president instructed the witness to give precise answers to the questions. “You are not an expert,” he said.
The Witness’s Collaboration with Vietnam
Judge Lavergne asked how many forces were under his command as of 25 May 1978. He replied that they were from Brigade 4. He said that there were 300 soldiers from the infantry and 40 soldiers from the Special Unit. The attacks started from 25 May 1978 until November of that year. He was not aware of cadres having fled to Vietnam at that time. In November 1978, he had contact with the Vietnamese troops.
“They were all my enemies.” At the initial stage, they fought against Vietnam. “Then, there was a coup d’état […] and we started to attack our own forces.” He remembered two persons on the Vietnamese side: Koy Vieng and Tit. He met Heng Samrin and Uk Bunchhoeun. He also met Pol Saroeun.
At this point, the President adjourned the hearing for a break.
Judge Lavergne asked what his role was in the front that was created at the time. He replied that he left Cambodia and went to the police station in Long Xuyen after being transported by an airplane to Phnom Penh. He was then brought to the military station at Long Giao. He then returned to Cambodia. He went to receive prisoners of war at Kampong Thom. He had to educate them about the policy of the front.
They were sent from Siem Reap and Kampong Thom. The purpose of the education was to instruct those people “to do good deeds.” The chief was a Vietnamese person and he was a deputy chief. The education was in accordance with a policy of the front. Vietnam handed over the task to Cambodian people to be in charge to educate about the policy. They were under the supervision of Vietnam and he was the only deputy chief.
They collected 400 people from the provinces that previously had been civilians. They were civilian cadres from platoons and companies. He was at the camp educating cadres. There was a disagreement regarding the policy.
Imprisoned
He was with five soldiers on the way to Pursat. He was later imprisoned for eight months in 1980. He went to Pursat in 1979 to search for his family members who had been evacuated by Pol Pot. “I was under accusation that I was attempting to flee by the foreigners.” He was repeatedly questioned why he went to Pursat. “Vietnam no longer trusted me.” He was accused that he wanted to flee to Thailand. “The conditions in the prison were so bad. I did not have rice to eat. […] Some time I had salt to eat, but some other time I did not have. The prison was under the supervision of Vietnam. […] I was so disappointed. I could get out of one regime and I fell into the other.”
Minorities
He did not recognize leading cadres visiting the area. He said that no policy was disseminated to him regarding former Lon Nol soldiers, since he was, as a medic, in charge of treating people. He knew that some people disappeared, but he did not know where they went to. “I did not know their policy at the time.” In Democratic Kampuchea, there were no Vietnamese people, he said. He did not know about policies regarding Cham people.
With this, Judge Lavergne concluded his line of questioning and the floor was handed to the Co-Prosecutors.
Sao Phim
National Deputy Co-Prosecutor Seng Leang asked how many close bodyguards Sao Phim had. He replied that he had five. He could only remember the names Cheung and Yeuk, and not Nong Sim and Chey. Cheung and Ung were the witness’s nephews, but they died.
Mr. Leang referred to Nong Sim’s 9 September 2015 interview with DC-Cam[7] and then asked about the date that he was sent to the battlefront in 1978. He replied that he was sent to the battlefront as a medic in late 1977. He could not remember how many hours they were there before the Vietnamese attacked.[8] The commander of Regiment 156 gave the instructions. They were six people in the medical unit.
Mr. Leang asked why the medics were sent to attack a barrack. The regiment was divided into 154, 155, and 156. Before Regiment 156 engaged into the battle, they sent their “reconnection team” to “do the survey.”
Mr. Leang asked about deputy commander Chhoeun. He said that Chhoeun was sent to P-2 Hospital, which belonged to the zone. There were four people in the leadership. When forces of 165 retreated, their goal was to contain the Vietnamese advancement into Cambodian territory. Each commander had to learn their own tactics. His unit did not use mines or spike traps. They were “busy at the battlefront” when the Vietnamese broke through. All forces were sent and no one was left behind.
When Vietnamese entered, there were no forces to contain them along Road 7, which was 155 and 156 had to contain them. Vietnam used heavy artillery when they penetrated. “They used their main regular forces to make that push.” There were also sector forces to counter Vietnamese advancements. If Vietnamese troops had advanced further, other forces from the center would have protected the territory and defeated the Vietnamese in these areas. Vietnamese troops were “aware of the situation”, which was why they withdrew.
Cadres
After the break, Mr. Leang presented to photographs to the witness to find out whether he knew these two individuals.[9] There was a discussion amongst the bench in relation to presenting the photographs, which was allowed. The photograph showed a man in front of a hut. Mr. Leang asked whether he recalled who this individual was. He replied that it was Nhim and may have been the driver for Sao Phim.
The next photograph showed Ung, who worked with Nhim.[10] Mr. Leang read out the interview with Nong Nhim that DC-Cam had conducted and asked for the witness’s reaction. He said that he only knew that Nong Nhim was Sao Phim’s driver and that Nhim “knows a lot.”
The witness said that he had not discussed for a long time with Ung.
Mr. Leang read an excerpt of Ung’s interview.[11] At this point, Judge Lavergne interjected and asked for the references. This excerpt referred to a letter sent.
The floor was granted to International Co-Prosecutor Nicholas Koumjian. He said there were 120 soldiers under his order. He became a soldier in the company, but was never a party member.
There was an exchange between Kampuchea Krom and Cambodia. He then clarified that he did not refer to population exchanges, but economic exchanges.
Mr. Koumjian asked whether his unit had a radio. Before the coup d’état in 1978, there was no military radio at the hospital, he said.
Mr. Koumjian asked whether he had heard of any kind of policy. He replied that his “unit was supposed to save lives” and that they therefore never received any kinds of magazines. He was never based in Prey Veng Province. He was stationed in Lor Village before 1977 in Tboung Khmum Province.
They would treat lightly wounded soldiers at the battlefield and those who were more seriously wounded in the hospital.
Vietnamese troops were stationed at Barrack 27. He was taken by the helicopter to Ho Chi Minh City in November 1978.
Mr. Koumjian asked whether he knew someone called Lay Ieng, which the witness did not. Mr. Koumjian read an excerpt of that witness’s statement, in which he had said that they burned Vietnamese houses and attacked military hospitals.[12] Barrack 27 was located “at a far distance” from any villages. He did not know whether any Southwest groups attacked Vietnam.
There were many wounded soldiers at the battlefield, but not many people were killed.
Purges in the East Zone
Mr. Koumjian referred to the arrests of many soldiers on May 25, 1978. He replied that the people who were arrested were military commanders in the East Zone. If the commanders were arrested, the forces would become weak, he said. Mr. Koumjian asked what he meant when describing the 25th of May as a coup d’état and that Pol Pot was a traitor. He explained that they sent the Central Army, led by Ke Pauk, to arrest many personnel. He said that this was why he considered Pol Pot a traitor.
Initially, the East Zone forces were stationed at the border to fight against Vietnamese troops. Ke Pauk’s troops stayed at Steung and two other locations. They were sent there supposedly to assist the East Zone forces, “but this is not what happened.” Instead, “they arrested people.” The arrest of cadres happened in 1978.
Sao Phim asked him about the situation at the front, and he had replied that the situation “was not good”. He explained that he wanted to convene to his soldiers that “The wind is not really strong but the trees fell down” and that there “was a storm in China.”
When he left the battlefield, it was “within the full moon season.” He mentioned the military situation to Sao Phim. He never heard about a statement by Sao Phim to overthrow Pol Pot. He did not discuss Sao Phim’s loyalty towards him. Mr. Koumjian asked whether Sao Phim ever tried to recruit him, as he was an East Zone soldier and a relative. The witness said that he had not heard about this.
He never witnessed the arrests, he said. When Mr. Koumjian inquired about Thieu-Ky soldiers who fled over the border, the president interjected and said that the translation was not “Turkish soldiers.” The witness confirmed that there were Thieu-Ky soldiers during the Khmer Rouge regime. He said he did not know whether they flew to his location.
The commanders were invited to a meeting in Kraing, and only the witness stayed behind, because he had to stay at the battlefront. “The invitation to the meeting was not real. They were all arrested. There was a man from the platoon, named Som, was asked to kneel down at the well. He saw the well and jumped across the well and ran away. And fire was shot at him and he got injured in his hand. He fled to see me and told me that they called me to tell me they all got killed.” Following this, the witness invited his subordinates to a meeting. Some of the platoon soldiers did not agree with him to engage in an attack. “I convinced them to engage into the fighting against the soldiers of the Central Zone.” 300 soldiers came with him.
Staying in the Jungle
He lost communication at some point. Those who were with him were all soldiers from the battlefield. Mr. Koumjian asked whether he had understood it correctly that his group attempted to protect civilians. He said that some civilians fled into the jungle. “If I did not attack, I would have nothing. We absolutely had to engage into the fighting against Pol Pot, in order to get rice, salt, and medicine.”
They had to flee to “avoid the arrest”, so he had to help them to feed them. The Central Zone forces were sent to arrest soldiers and civilians. “Civilians and soldiers were fleeing, because of the arrests.” He saw pits and graves and saw remains, but not corpses themselves. This was in the fields in Tboung Khmum District, Tboung Khmum Province.
His children were sent to live in the zone area. His grandmother-in-law, his wife and his three children were in the agricultural office of the Zone. They fled to Svay Rieng to reunite with his father. “They were further transferred to Leach, Pursat.” However, “all of them had been killed.” Those who were from the East Zone were executed, regardless of whether they were civilians or not.
He was in the jungle when the Vietnamese sent soldiers to contact him, because “Pol Pot killed people continuously from time to time.” He was in the jungle to attack Pol Pot. If he did not cooperate with Vietnam, “Pol Pot would kill all the people.”
With this, Mr. Koumjian concluded his line of questioning. The Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers did not have questions for the witness and the floor was handed to the Nuon Chea Defense Team.
Current and Recent Politicians
Nuon Chea Defense Counsel Victor Koppe said he had not expected to start questioning until Monday. He asked the witness whether he knew Heng Samkai, which the witness confirmed. He was the brother of Heng Samrin. Heng Samkai joined him to join forces. He did not know Heng Samkai’s specific position and functioning.
Mr. Koppe said that Heng Samkai was described as the chief of the messengers in the East Zone.[13] He replied that he did not have communication with the military in the zone and that he only met him in the jungle. He therefore did not know his role or functions.
Mr. Koppe said that an American had interviewed Heng Samkai in 1981.[14] He had said that it was “impossible to overthrow Pol Pot on our own” and that they needed support by Vietnam. He replied that he met Heng Samkai for “a brief moment.” They had “only cooking pots” in the forest.
“He did not have many many soldiers at the time, he was fleeing for his life.” Mr. Koppe asked whether he had heard of attempts to overthrow Pol Pot in 1978. He replied that it were Heng Samkai’s own words. However, “it was first me who contacted the Vietnamese at K’tout Village.” The front was organized with the assistance of Ho Chi Minh City.
Mr. Koppe said he had mentioned Pol Saroeun and wanted to know who he was. He replied that he did not know his position during Democratic Kampuchea, and only met him in the jungle. He did not know which military unit Pol Saroeun was in. He works with the military staff at present, he said.
Mr. Koppe inquired whether he knew Kun Kim. He replied that he got to know him when living in a pagoda after the liberation. He did not meet him in 1978. He did not know the person Hem Samin. He met Pen Sovann one time in Memot. He saw him driving in a vehicle and asked his name.
The presiding judge asked whether he knew Yuk Pao. The witness answered that he had heard his name but never met him. He heard the name Bu Tong, but had never met him. He knew Chea Sim. “I know him very well,” the witness said. His native name was Chea Salath. He was a deputy chief of a district. He was also known as Ta Tmeng Sor and became known later as Chea Sim.[15] He asked about Chea Sim’s wife. He replied that Chea Sim’s wife was not related to Sao Phim.
Mr. Koppe asked whether he knew Keo Chanda. He replied that he had heard of his name after the liberation, but never met him. Mr. Koppe asked whether he was the Presiding Judge in the in absentia trial against Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. He knew Uk Bunchhoeun “very well.” They were “in the jungle together” and worked together. When the witness was in the helicopter to form the army, Uk Bunchhoeun was with him. He knew Mat Ly, but did not have any relationship with him. He was Cham and a former member of the National Assembly. He passed away by now.
Mr. Koppe then inquired about meetings that they had to establish the front. He replied that both the Cambodian and Vietnamese side agreed.[16] Mr. Koppe asked whether there were two meetings: one in Snuol and one in Ho Chi Minh City. He replied that they held a meeting in Ho Chi Minh to prepare front strategies. In Snuol, there were monks and civilians who supported the 2nd December decision. The main content of the meeting in Phnom Penh was that it had to be agreed by both sides: Cambodia and Vietnam. Mr. Koppe asked whether any of the names that they had just discussed were present in Ho Chi Minh. He replied that the person of the second December meeting in Snuol was to disseminate information. There were “many people”, ranging in the hundreds or thousands. He confirmed that it took place in a rubber plantation. At that time, a new national anthem was composed by Chan. He was part of the arts performance in the East Zone. There were new flags. There were high-ranking officials, but he did not know their names.
Mr. Koppe asked whether the name Le Duc Tho meant anything to him. He replied that he had heard of this name and that the person was Vietnamese, but that he never met the person.
Mr. Koppe asked whether he saw Hun Sen walking to Le Duc Tho congratulating him. He replied that he did not see this.
Moving on to his next subject, Mr. Koppe inquired about telegrams that had been presented to him by the bench and that were signed by Chhun. The witness denied that Sao Phim’s alias was Chhun. Sao Phim’s alias was Sao Chan, he said. “I don’t believe you,” he said.
Mr. Koppe asked whether Vietnamese cadre Hay So meant anything to him, which he denied. He did not speak see Sao Phim speak to any Vietnamese person. At this point, the President adjourned the hearing. It will continue tomorrow, November 2, 2016, with the key document presentation. The witness will return on Monday, November 7 2016.
[1] At answer 2.
[2] E3/10669.3.
[3] E3/891.
[4] E3/891.
[5] E3/10669.1
[6] E3/922.
[7] E3/10717.
[8] E3/10668, at answer 9.
[9] E3/10714; E3/10715.
[10] E3/10714, at 01327930 (KH), 01327936 (EN).
[11] E3/10716.
[12] E3/376, at 00278690 (EN), 00270173 (KH), 00486094 (FR).
[13] E3/10716, at 01340542 (KH); E3/10717, at 01340511 (KH).
[14] E3/2376, at 00192440 (EN), 00191596-97 (KH), 00237111 (FR).
[15] E3/10717, at 01340448 (KH).
[16] E3/10667.
Featured Image: Anonymous Witness 2-TCW-1065 (ECCC: Flickr).