Chronology of a War
The Co-Prosecutors and Khieu Samphan Defense Team presented their approach to the segment on armed conflict between Democratic Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in their key document presentations. While the Co-Prosecution stressed that Cambodia acted as an aggressor, the Khieu Samphan Defense Team argued the opposite and presented documents that seemed to indicate that Cambodia was acting in self-defense. Over a hundred documents were presented in court today.
Co-Prosecution: A Timeline of the Armed Conflict
All parties were present, with Nuon Chea following the hearing from the holding cell, except National Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyer Pich Ang, who was absent for personal reasons for the morning session, and Nuon Chea, who was absent without reasons. The key document hearings in relation to the segment of the armed conflict were then heard.
The presiding judge Nil Nonn advised the parties to adhere to their rulings.[1] The two morning sessions were used by the Co-Prosecutors to present their key documents.
To open the session, International Senior Assistant Prosecutor Dale Lysak presented two documents that showed conflicting accounts of the armed conflicts: one by Democratic Kampuchea and the other by the Vietnamese government, both of 31 December 1977. Both addressed the reasons and history of armed conflict and seemed to indicate conflicting information. The first was a Democratic Kampuchea statement that indicated that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam have launched consecutive attacks on the East Zone and that they launched more attacks in November 1977.[2] They further stated that Vietnam had “clandestinely invaded Cambodia” on an island in 1975, while “Democratic Kampuchea had always had the stance to make friends with Vietnam.” The statement alleged that in May 1976, Democratic Kampuchea had invited Vietnam for negotiations, but that Vietnam came “with unfriendly behavior” and that the conflicted escalated from there.
The response by the Vietnamese government of the same day was that Cambodia attacked Vietnam and had conducted incursions into their territory, that they again attacked Vietnam in December 1975 and occupied territory in Vietnam. The response by the Vietnamese government said that in April 1977, Cambodia fielded “great force made up many divisions”, shelled civilian and economic centers, including far behind the border and had also burned houses, pagodas and schools, as well as conducted “utterly inhumane crimes.” Nonetheless, the document read, the Vietnamese delegation wanted to meet in June 197, but the preparatory meeting in Phnom Penh that was scheduled for May 1976 had to be postponed at Cambodia’s request and the actual meeting never took place, after which the conflict escalated.[3]
Mr. Lysak said these were two dramatically different accounts and that he would present documents that reflected what actually took place. He then presented a total of more than 60 documents that can be divided into five groups of documents.
Initial Stages of the Conflict
The first range of documents related to the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia relating to the islands at the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. He cited Nayan Chanda, Ben Kiernan, Khieu Samphan and telegrams and pointed out that the Khmer Rouge group had “evacuated at gunpoint 500 Vietnamese inhabitants” on an island who “were never heard of again”, an event that was followed by a counterattack by the Vietnamese. He said that Pol Pot had admitted to this invasion.[4] Mr. Lysak read excerpts of documents that seemed to indicate that Cambodia took a provoking and aggressive stance toward Vietnam with regards to the islands, leading to retaliations.[5]
End of 1975/Beginning of 1976 until Mid-1976
Moving to what he defined as the next stage of conflict, Mr. Lysak turned to the period of end of 1975 and beginning of 1976. He pointed to several telegrams and minutes of Standing Committee meetings that both indicated aggressions by the Cambodian side towards Vietnam – f including towards Vietnamese civilians – and communication between the border regions and the Center. The information provided in these telegrams included the burning of houses and property of civilians in a village on the Vietnamese side, as well as instructions by the center to use mines. Some of the telegrams were sent from unit and zone leaders and requested instructions from the center, particularly with regards to Division 920.[6]
Another group of documents referred to clashes that took place in mid-1976 and that Cambodia was accused to have initiated these, but that overall there was still a “pleasant atmosphere” and a “relatively calm period”, even if the Standing Committee, according to the documents presented by Mr. Lysak, decided not to resume the meetings with their Vietnamese counterparts and despite the presence of “small clashes” that continued to happen.[7]
End of 1976 until End of 1977
Mr. Lysak then turned to the next stage of the conflict that saw an intensification of armed clashes, namely to the end of 1976. This period, he said, was marked by instructions of the Cambodian side to “destroy any vulnerable” part of the enemy “when there is a chance”, as well as instruction to use bamboo pits. According to Ben Kiernan, the period of end of 1976 remained relatively calm, but that this atmosphere changed in March 1977. Several documents seemed to indicate that Democratic Kampuchea launched attacks and shelling on border villages in Vietnam from that time onwards. Mr. Lysak based himself mainly on accounts of Ben Kiernan, who had cited refugee accounts, as well as telegrams and reports. According to Stephen Morris, an expert who had testified a few weeks ago, 800 villagers were killed in an attack on a village in Vietnam, for example. Another account allegedly showed that Democratic Kampuchea committed aggressions in mid-1977 over 40 kilometers into the Vietnamese territory “slaughtering and torturing residents.” Mr. Lysak relied on reports by Son Sen, Sao Phim, alias Chhorn, and other telegrams. Khieu Samphan himself had said in his Cambodia’s Recent History that “the events recounted are irrefutable; there is no doubt that the Khmer Rouge […] [committed] appalling crimes against the Vietnamese civilians.” He seemed to condemn these actions that, he said, went against their own reflection of military capabilities and wondered whether they had embarked on a “policy of military hostility against Vietnam.” Several documents referred to an attack that occurred on September 24, 1977. Hence, while the beginning of 1977 was relatively calm, it seems that the conflict intensified in mid-1977 and escalated at the end of the year.[8]
End of 1977
At the end of 1977, the conflict seemed to intensify further. According to the documents read out by the assistant prosecutor, Cambodia increased its pressure on the border by encroaching onto Vietnamese territory. To support this claim, Mr. Lysak cited Stephen Morris’ Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, and Kiernan’s The Pol Pot Regime, as well as telegrams, newspaper reports and a speech by Pol Pot. He also pointed to requests by regional commanders, such as Sao Phim, for the central forces to intervene and give advice. An “intense propaganda campaign” presented the voluntary retreat of Vietnamese troops of January 1978 as a “great historic victory.”[9]
1978 Until the Fall of the Regime
Mr. Lysak then turned to the last period, namely 1978 until the end of the regime. He pointed to a range of telegrams that indicated the nature of the armed conflict, dealing with prisoners of war and the locations of armed conflicts – for illustrative purposes, he pointed to telegrams from a variety of locations that spoke about armed conflicts.[10] At this point, Judge Lavergne asked for a reference to verify that Chhorn was Sao Phim, which Mr. Lysak did. He later also gave references for Brother Son Sen being referred to as Brother 41 when sending telegrams from the East Zone.[11] Lastly, Mr. Lysak referred to the end of the conflict when the Vietnamese invaded the country and seized Kratie town.[12]
Khieu Samphan Defense Team: A Timeline of the Armed Conflict
It was then the Khieu Samphan Defense Team’s turn to present their key documents in relation to the armed conflict. She presented a total of approximately 50 documents.
Initial Stages
Defense Counsel Anta Guissé first presented a document in relation to border problems that showed the existence of a border conflict over the border demarcations. As the Co-Prosecution, she pointed to disputes related to the islands, but stressed that Cambodia attempted to maintain friendly relations with Vietnam, despite provocations and aggressions from the Vietnamese side. She also highlighted the threat of an Indochinese Federation that would submerge Cambodia under Vietnamese control if it became reality. Ms. Guissé relied on reports, studies, minutes of Standing Committee meetings, newspaper reports, as well as on research done by Philip Short. She stressed in particular that the Cambodian side alleged that they “should be the model of friendship” toward Vietnam, that bilateral negotiations could only take place between “equal and sovereign nations” and that “there should be no attack unless there was an incursion.”[13]
1977: Intensification of the Conflict
Ms. Guissé then proceeded to present a range document that related to the intensification of the conflict in mid-1977. She pointed to reports that indicated that the Vietnamese side had provoked the conflict and attacked Democratic Kampuchea’s territory, the testimony of expert Stephen Morris and his assistant Dimitri Moussiakov. She highlighted documents that seemed to indicate that Cambodian attacks were counterattacks to Vietnamese aggressions. Moreover, she pointed out that both parties in the beginning concealed their conflict on the international arena and that Vietnam withdrew once the conflict reached “unwelcome publicity” and that Vietnam was “banking on an internal coup d’état” in Cambodia. Moreover, there seemed to have been secret camps to train Cambodian defectors in Vietnam.[14]
International Relations
In another group of documents, Ms. Guissé laid out Vietnam’s and Cambodia’s foreign relations. One of the countries she looked at was the Germany Democratic Republic, who had indicated on 2 January 1978 that Russia and East Germany would not accept Democratic Kampuchea’s position. She also listed several reports that referred to attacks by Vietnam onto Democratic Kampuchean territory in 1978. She said that in January 1978, Vietnam made its decision to support a possible overthrow of the Democratic Kampuchea regime.
The encouragement by the Khmer Rouge leadership to fight against the Vietnamese in a proportion one to thirty “was not a call for genocide”, she said, but showed a military strategy. “On the contrary, an urge to encourage an army that was weak and less well-armed.”[15] The boasting about the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in January 1978 served to boost the morale of military, she said. She said that Cambodia maintained its position throughout 1978 that, due to its weaker military position, it was irrational to “pick a fight” with a country that was bigger than them. As done by the Co-Prosecution, she highlighted reports and telegrams that showed locations of armed conflict.[16]
End of 1978 and Beginning of 1979
As the next part of her key document presentation, Ms. Guissé listed (expert) reports, press releases, and interview with Pol Pot, publications in the Far Eastern Relations Magazine, as well as Philip Short’s book and other descriptions of Democratic Kampuchea. She highlighted Douglas Pyke’s appearance before the National Congress, who had said that there was an intensification of conflict in October 1978, that no rapid solution to the conflict was in sight and that there was a lack of visibility what was actually happening. For example, the US government had deemed it safe for Elizabeth Becker to visit Cambodia and had stated that there was no risk of an armed conflict there. Moreover, she pointed to reports of internal rebellions at the end of 1978. More specifically, she said that documents confirmed 2-TCW-1065’s statements that Vietnamese troops had moved into Democratic Kampuchea’s territory. When Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia in January 1978, Ieng Sary had sent a telegram to the president of the United National Security Council asking for intervention and asking to condemn the Vietnamese encroachment. She quoted Philip Short, who had said that the “overwhelming majority welcomed” the Vietnamese as their “liberators”, even if they had previously seen the Vietnamese as “the hereditary enemy”. Short said that Vietnam used this notion of humanitarianism as an excuse to the international community as to why they had invaded the country and presented the case as if their motivation was to liberate the Khmer people, which was, according to Short, clearly not the case.” Ms. Guissé continued quoting the scholar “human gratitude is nevertheless ephemeral”, and the gratitude towards Vietnam quickly faded when they did not withdraw from Cambodia.[17]
With this, Ms. Guissé concluded the presentation of the Khieu Samphan’s Defense Team’s key documents. Monday, November 7, 2016, responses will be heard, followed by the remainder of 2-TCW-1065’s testimony.
[1] E3/15/2.
[2] E3/1393, at paragraphs 1 and 7.
[3] E3/267, at S00008731-33 (EN), S00847596-601 (KH), S00858046-49 (FR).
[4] E3/2376, at 00192197-98 (EN), 00191318 (KH), 00236922 (FR).
[5] E3/1593, at 00637513 (KH), 00638840 (FR), 01150049 (EN); E3/18, at 00103847-48 (KH), 00595443 (FR), 00103758 (EN); E3/1025.
[6] E3/1150; E3/893; E3/218, 00000751 (KH), 00334967 (FR), 00182651 (EN); E3/866; E3/1020; E3/8373; E3/923; E3/218, at 00000757 (KH), 00334971 (FR), 00182657 (EN)..
[7] E3/221; E3/1593, at 00637521 and 541-43 (KH), 01150052 and 058 (EN), 00638845 and 860-62 (FR); E3/221, at 0000823-825 (KH), 00182703-05 (EN), 00386188-90 (FR); E3/760, at 00062849 (KH)), 614 (EN), 00487759 (FR); E3/9289, at 00021505 (KH), 00233965 (EN), 01248462 (FR); E3/799, at 00083159-61 (KH), 00323916-17 (FR), 00184780-81 (EN); E3/804.
[8] E3/805, at 0052334 (KH), 00315068 (FR), 00923961 (EN); E3/1593, at 00637902-03 (KH), 00639136 (FR), 01150185-86 (EN); E3/742; E3/7338, at 01001937 (EN); E3/143, at 00168725 (EN); E3/878; E3/1593, at 00637924 (KH), 00639153-54 (FR), 01150193 (EN); E3/23, at 00237083-84 (FR), 00192405-06 (EN); E3/981; E3/8369; E3/18, at 00103849-50 (KH), 00595446-47 (FR), 00103759-60 (EN).
[9] Page 111-112; E3/8190; E3/1593, at 00637926-27 (KH), 00639154-55 (FR), 01150194 (EN), p. 274-275; E3/982; E3/897, 7 December 1977; E3/8372; E3/908; E3/1265; At 01150194 (EN), 00639155 (FR); E3/2376, at 00191547 (KH), 00237077 (FR), 00192397-98 (EN); E3/215, at 00064595 (KH), 00524073 (FR), 00488622 (EN).
[10] E3/243; E3/920, of 15 January 1978; E3/1593, at 00637940 (KH), 00639167 (FR), 01150200 (EN); E3/1076; E3/1269, at S0009871 (EN); E3/791, at 00079296 and 299 (KH), 00721427 and 430(EN), 00747882-83 and 855(FR); E3/892; E3/890; E3/932; E3/1009; E3/245; E3/516; E3/250; E3/1030; E3/978; E3/986; E3/8371; E3/1012; E3/157; E3/943; E3/853, E3/1062; E3/997; E3/928; E3/181; E3/867.
[11] E3/920, of 15 January 1978; E3/1593, at 00637940 (KH), 00639167 (FR), 01150200 (EN); Stephen Heder: 7 Candidates, E3/48, at footnote 119; E3/64, at 00334060 (EN), 00328043 (KH), 00411710 (FR).
[12] E3/2376, at 00191685 (KH), 00192527 (EN), 00237172 (FR); E3/1593, at 01150232 (EN), 0039239 (FR).
[13] E3/2373, at 00809211 (FR), 00324867 and 77 (KH), 00157764 (EN); E3/9, at 00639837 (FR), 00396504 (EN); At 00290697 (FR), 00019133 (KH), 00183413 (EN); At 0029868 (FR), 00019134 (KH), 00183413 (EN); E3/9723.
E3/229; E3/9, at 00396506 (EN), 00639839 (FR); E3/217, at 00334964 (FR), 00000737 (KH), 00182635 (EN); E3/221; E3/794, at 00611617 (EN), 00000785 (KH), 00182675 (FR); E3/1019; E3/799at 00323915 (FR), 00184779 (EN), 00083158 (KH).
[14] E3/853; E3/852; E3/854; E3/232, at 00021481 (KH); E3/9644; E3/882, at 001313132 (EN), 00001248 (KH); E3/9644, at 01125320 (FR), 01058997 (EN), 011203096 (KH); E3/1586, at paragraph 49; E3/9, at 00639949 (FR), 00396585 (EN). At 00639951 (FR), 00396587 (EN).
[15] At 01246939 (EN).
[16] At 00639952 (FR), 00396587-88 (EN).
E3/1773, at 01246921 (EN), 01320164-65 (KH).
E3/267, at S00068574 (KH), S00008724 (FR); E3/293, at 00721195 (KH), 00169689-90 (EN), 00756543-48 (FR); E3/1369, at 01303409 (KH), 01218822 (EN), 00701766-67 (FR). At 00337187 (EN), 00087630-35 (FR); E3/540, at 01246938 (EN), 01320191 (KH); At 01246939 (EN); E3/744, at 00538948 (FR), 004604067 (EN), 00006445 (KH); E3/913; E3/860; E3/946, at paragraph 20; E3/862.
[17] E3/2370, at 00344747 (FR), 00187396 (EN); E3/1583, at 00334930 (KH), S00011305 (EN), S00763961 (FR); E3/9378, 00224493 (KH), 00337920 (FR), 00076146-48 (EN); E3/7306; E3/726; E3/2370, at 00251353 (KH), 00187375-97 (EN), 00344726-48 (FR); E3/7310, at S00013294 (FR), S01137152 (KH); 00081490 (EN), 00224425 (KH); E3/11; E3/9, at 00639988 (KH), 00396625 (EN); E3/247.
Featured Image: Public Gallery (ECCC: Flickr).