Witness Continues Testimony on Armed Conflict
Today, November 7, 2016, responses to the key document presentations were heard. Next, witness 2-TCW-1065 continued his testimony. He was questioned on matters relating to Vietnamese-Cambodian collaborations and the armed conflict.
Submissions Relating to the 2-TCW-953
All parties were present, with Nuon Chea following the hearing from the holding cell. The president instructed all parties to speak slowly due to a lack of interpreters, who would arrive late because of traffic congestions.
Ms. Guissé reminded the Chamber that she had sent an e-mail regarding the Co-Prosecution’s disclosure of documents related to the testimony of 2-TCW-953. She said they sought the delay of the witness’s hearing, as they had heard a new statement and audio recording of the witness. The duration of the recording was more than seven hours fifty. 2-TCW-953 had been on the list since 2014, she said, and the Chamber had announced its decision on who to call for the segment related to the role of the accused. “We are not going to be able to examine this witness [on Tuesday],” she said. She asked to postpone this witness until after the water festival break.
International Deputy Co-Prosecutor William Smith replied that “It’s a very busy trial.” He then explained that the reason for this late disclosure was that the interview was not taken until February of this year. When the list of the witnesses who would be called came out on 14 September of this year, an “electronic search issue” came out. The witness had four different names. The name used in February was slightly similar, but the search did not yield the specific statement. The statement came up through a location search. It was a 23-page document, he said. The audio tape and the statement would “likely” be very similar, since it was not paraphrased and given in a question-answer format. There was a new guideline by the OCIJ in relation to disclosure that made it possible for the OCP to directly make the statements available instead of waiting for the approval of the OCIJ.
Ms. Guissé responded that she was “a bit disappointed” that she would have expected for the OCP to “at least recognize that it’s true” despite the technical issues that led to this.
International Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyer Marie Guiraud responded that the request by the Khieu Samphan Defense Team seemed reasonable, seeing the timeline. Nuon Chea Defense Counsel Victor Koppe agreed and said that there was no particular reason for this segment to be started with this particular witness.
Ms. Guissé responded that she would have appreciated if the International Co-Prosecutor would have “been as elegant as the Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers.”
The Civil Party that was scheduled to be heard on November 10 and 11 would be able to be examined by the OCP, Mr. Smith said. Ms. Guiraud said that she believed that the Civil Party was already in Phnom Penh and would be able to be examined by them as well. The same applied to the Nuon Chea Defense Team and the Khieu Samphan Defense Team.
The president announced that a decision would be heard “very soon” today.
Responses by the Co-Prosecution
Mr. Lysak commented on the use of Philip Short’s History of a Nightmare; he said that it was “fair to say” that Philip Short was not an expert on the relations between the two countries.[1] As for the use of specific quotes, he said that for example the findings in relation to Phu Coc, Short’s findings were contradicted by Chanda, Stephen Morris and Ben Kiernan and was unsourced.[2] Moreover, some interpretations of Philip Short’s were based only on his interviews with Khieu Samphan.
“The essential facts” of what had happened were mostly the same for Chandler, Stephen Morris and Ben Kiernan. Philip Short described the same events, but interpreted it differently.[3] Short had quoted Douglas Pyke, who had described Cambodia as a “risky dog gambit”, which according to Mr. Lysak meant that “a smaller dog will be very aggressive to scare off a bigger dog.”
Mr. Lysak took the parties through several quotes and showed how [4]
Study, Telegrams and Meeting Minutes
Mr. Lysak moved to a US study and said that their point was that there were disagreements about their borderlines.[5] Mr. Lysak agreed with this, but disagreed with the interpretations.
He observed that when looking at the documents that described the incidents at the border, “it is important to ascertain as best as you can” whether these territories involved disputed territories. He said that one of the standing committee meetings related to Au Tabok and that the minutes “made it very clear” that the Vietnamese believed that this area belonged to their territory.[6] The defense had quoted the telegrams for the purpose that the Cambodian side aimed for a peaceful solution and “be a model of friendship.” He said that nine days later, Democratic Kampuchea provided specific instructions to use mines, land mines, and B-40.[7]
Mr. Lysak that there were examples where when negotiations were genuinely pursued, issues could be settled in some locations. Zone secretary Ya, who had been relatively successful in negotiations “seems to have been rewarded by being branded a traitor” and being sent to S-21.[8] Another telegram indicated that the soldiers met with a person called Tu Dich.[9] Other telegrams showed Democratic Kampuchea soldiers opening fire “merely because of believing” that Vietnamese had intruded their territory.[10]
It was also important to consider the time period. “Neither of the side were angels”, he said, and Vietnamese soldiers had also conducted aggressions. It was important, nevertheless, to look at the context.[11] It was important what Democratic Kampuchea troops did in 1977 and 1978 to understand why the conflict escalated.
A witness described the site of “of the September 1977 massacres” shortly after it had happened. There was an “important difference” between intruding someone’s country and taking property, which was wrong, and the disproportionate reaction. “Cambodia knew how to go to the International Court of Justice”[12]
Mr. Lysak said that there was a contrast between what the Vietnamese soldiers did and what the Democratic Kampuchea forces did. They harmed property, but there was no indication that they had killed civilians. Some of the Cambodians used the opportunity to follow the Vietnamese troops and “get out”.
At this point, the President adjourned the hearing for a break.
After the break, the president announced that the Khieu Samphan Defense Team’s request was granted. Deputy Co-Prosecutor then took up his response to the Khieu Samphan Defense Team’s key documents. Mr. Lysak said that “one needs to be careful” in examining the documents, since sometimes correct factual statements were made, while at other times, they were rather “speculative, sometimes uninformed pieces of work.[13] The Cambodian Ambassador to Vietnam, for example, gave his opinion, but also “foreign opinions in Hanoi”, which “reads more like gossip from diplomatic people in Hanoi.” Thus, the probative value should be seen with caution, he said.[14] He pointed to a CPK cadre, who was “kept alive until the very end” and interrogated by Tuy nine months after his capture in December.[15]
The Khieu Samphan Defense Team had used a document as evidence for Cambodia’s peaceful intent towards the Vietnamese. He said that the document used the word “contemptible” for Vietnamese.[16] The same applied to a meeting between Son Sen and Division 920 leaders.[17] He said that there was a racist comment. It was “rather remarkable” that they defense used this document, as this could not be seen other than “a racist view towards the Vietnamese.” With this, Mr. Lysak concluded the responses.
Responses by the Khieu Samphan Defense Team
Next, the Khieu Samphan Defense Team responded to their key documents. It was “very very important” to be “careful” to examine the sources. This applied in particular to Nayan Chanda, Stephen Morris and Ben Kiernan. “It might be a bit naïve to not understand what realpolitik is about,” Ms. Guissé said. She said that there were not many books in which documents from Democratic Kampuchea were used. This is “a real issue”, she said.[18] She reminded the Chamber that the specific events that took place in Vietnam were not part of the Closing Order. The Prosecution based itself “heavily” on sources “that do not fall within the scope of the trial.” She continued “people do indeed communicate to serve their interests.” Pointing to history being written by the victorious, she cited a proverb: “As long as the lions will not have historians, the history of hunting will always glorify the hunters.” Thus, the Vietnamese version of the conflict had prevailed. “Popular wisdom is always interesting to look at, isn’t it?”[19]
As for the book by Khieu Samphan, the sources for him were Nayan Chanda. “This is indeed its snake biting its tail.” She said that they were “too much aware of their material weaknesses” to engage with aggressions against Vietnam.[20] Thus, Democratic Kampuchea had not necessarily been “an angel” but that this related to realpolitik. “Everything is based on national interest, as we can see.”
As for telegrams, she first pointed to a telegram addressed to Ya of 11 November 1975.[21] She said that the telegram read that they instructed Ya to “please contact them”. Another telegram indicated that there were accusations of territory accusations that “their soldiers could not stand this any longer” and that the “map has been drawn by imperialists” and that the Vietnamese side had recognized that there might have been an error.[22] The telegram indicated that the Cambodian side “remained calm” despite Vietnamese aggressive reactions.
Minutes of the Standing Committee of March 1977 had been used by the Co-Prosecution. “They omitted […] elements of complaints from DK which follow or precede complaints from the Vietnamese side.”[23] She said it was important to understand that they were speaking about bombing along the Mondulkiri border and that the Vietnamese side had acknowledged that mistakes were made. The Prosecution had quoted another paragraph, but not read out another paragraph, which indicated that the Vietnamese “entered five kilometers into our territory” and that they built roads in Cambodian territory.[24] Moreover, it indicated that they had planted more than 200 spikes in Cambodian territories.
Another telegram related to requests for ammunition, but had not mentioned the factors that led up to this.[25] The arming of the Cambodian soldiers followed incursions by the Vietnamese side and had to therefore be seen in context.[26]
At this point, the President adjourned the hearing for the lunch break.
After the break, Ms. Guissé referred to several telegrams. She said that the “issue of Vietnamese propaganda” did not only take place in diplomatic circles, but also through loudspeakers and pamphlets. She said that the Vietnamese were moving border markers inside the territory.[27] She then pointed to an article by the Bangkok Post, in which it was said that the Cambodian forces were “a bit outdated” and could not fight the Vietnamese.[28] Ms. Guissé then pointed to another telegrams that related to the “issue of airplanes”. Chhin made reproaches about airstrikes on agricultural land.[29] Another telegram talked about the discussions with the deputy director.[30] Another telegram explained the diplomatic position by Democratic Kampuchea. Another telegram of October 1977 was quoted by the Co-Prosecution and she said that the portion quoted did not exist in either French or Khmer.[31] She said that it pointed out that the attacks were meant to push back the Vietnamese troops out of Cambodian territory.[32] She read out another telegram, which talked about the shelling of the territory.[33] This showed that in January 1978, the Vietnamese troops were coming into Democratic Kampuchea territory.[34] The Prosecution also quoted an excerpt that was written by VNA. She said that there was “also an information war” waged.[35] Following this line, Ms. Guissé said that there was “a great number of people” who attacked Democratic Kampuchea.[36] She continued citing several documents that indicated that the Vietnamese attacked Democratic Kampuchea.[37] Another document mentioned that “enemies planted mines.”[38] “Many of the works [by the Co-Prosecution] were essentially based on Vietnamese sources,” she said. Thus, they “needed to pay attention of the sources that were used.” With this, she concluded her response.
Witness 2-TCW-1065
Next, witness 2-TCW-1065 was heard. International Nuon Chea Defense Counsel Victor Koppe referred to Hay So, who had wrongly been referred to in the transcript as He Sok. Mr. Koppe then presented a document to the witness that referred to several names.[39] He asked whether the name Ba Hai was a Vietnamese name that “somehow rings a bell.” He replied that he did not know this name. Mr. Koppe inquired about the name Tu Can, but the witness did not know this name either. He did not know the fourth and fifth name either.
Mr. Koppe asked about Ta Tmenh Sar (Ta White Teeth) and who this person was. He replied that this was not Chea Sim, as written in the English transcript. Ta Tmenh Sar was a chief of a district. He did not see either Ta Tmenh Sar or Chea Sim meet with any Vietnamese. MR. Koppe asked whether he either saw Khmer cadres talk to Vietnamese communists in 1978 or 1979. He replied that he did not.
Mr. Koppe asked whether Sao Phim was also known by a number, since he had denied that Sao Phim was Chhorn. The witness answered that Sao Phim was at the zone level and that he did not know whether he had a code name. Mr. Koppe asked whether he had ever heard that he was ever referred to as Brother 18, which the witness denied.
Mr. Koppe said that an English journalist who had been called as an expert talked about Sao Phim and referred to him as a “quintessential warlord.”[40] Mr. Koppe asked whether the witness would agree that Sao Phim was a warlord. “For a foreign journalist who had that view, that is his business. Personally, he was the chief of the zone, and I could not say whether he was a warlord or not,” the witness replied. When Mr. Koppe pressed on, he said that he only knew about issue within his military division.
Mr. Koppe said that he had asked last week whether he knew Hem Samin, to which the witness had answered that he did not know him at the time.[41] Mr. Koppe referred to Samin’s interview, in which he had said that Hem Samin was a “Hanoi trained communist” who blamed Sao Phim for the execution of Cham people.[42] Mr. Koppe asked whether he knew whether Sao Phim was involved in the crushing of the 1974 Cham rebellion. The witness denied that he did not know, since he had “nothing to do with the Cham people,” as he was with Division 4. Nor did he “did not know who killed the Cham people.” Mr. Koppe asked him to react to the statement that Sao Phim was “nasty,” as stated by Hem Samin. He replied that “he was an ordinary person” during their personal conversations. However, they did not speak about work related matters. “I did not know whether he was a nasty person.” Mr. Koppe referred to Ben Kiernan’s book and asked whether the witness knew the village Pa’Ao.[43] He replied that he did not know in which commune it was located.
Mr. Koppe asked whether he had ever heard of a secret meeting that Sao Phim called for in March 1978, two or three months before he died. The witness replied that he did not know “much” about the Zone affairs.” He continued: “In my capacity I would not be called to such meeting.” Mr. Koppe replied that a woman was an eye-witness to this meeting and paraphrased by Kiernan. This woman had told Kiernan that Phim had told them in this meeting that the situation had changed “drastically” and that they had to be “careful.” The witness denied any knowledge of this. “I only involved in the battlefront.”
Mr. Koppe asked whether it was “not a bit awkward” that either Son Sen or Pol Pot staged a coup d’état as alleged by the witness when they were the ones in power. He replied that he was in the preparatory line on the battlefield. “To me, there was no one besides Pol Pot, while others said that it was Son Sen, who staged the coup d’état.” He said that it was not difficult to see who staged the coup d’état when they made plans to kill them. Mr. Koppe asked whether it was his own conclusion or something he heard from other people. He replied that he made his own conclusion. Mr. Koppe asked whether it was not rather Sao Phim’s conclusion. He replied that it must have been Pol Pot or Son Sen: “They did not kill the enemy at the front.”
Mr. Koppe referred to his statement, in which he had said that Sao Phim’s deputies were Kim and Kry.[44] Mr. Koppe then quoted Stephen Morris, who had talked about Heng Samrin having attempted a coup against the government in April 1978, but that the second-in-command warned the government.[45] Mr. Koppe said that it seemed that it was Heng Samrin and others who staged the coup d’état. He replied that “the fact is different from what you said.” Heng Samrin would have been dead if he had done this. “He was lucky that he was re-assigned.” He tried to flee with a few soldiers, while the witness attacked the troops. Mr. Koppe asked whether Kim or Kry had ever informed the center about any coup d’état plans. He answered that the deputy commanders were not entitled to report to the center and only to the zone. “Who were the traitors if these people were killed?” the witness asked. Thus, “the other side was the traitorous troops.” Mr. Koppe said that “maybe Heng Samrin knows.”
Mr. Koppe said that Heng Samrin had testified that they had a “secret struggle” and that there was no opportunity to struggle.[46] He asked whether he knew of a “secret struggle against the center,” which the witness denied. “If I had known, I would have told you.” Mr. Koppe confronted the witness: “Would it be fair to say that you didn’t know anything about any plans that happened before the 25th of May 1978.” He replied that “I would like to inform you, Mr. Lawyer, frankly. People were killed, I mean chiefs in the division were killed, and I conclude that those people who killed those people were traitors. We defended the border and why we were killed?” Trial Chamber President Nil Nonn instructed the witness that he should answer precisely.
Mr. Koppe said that Heng Samrin had “talked about a plan to take Sao Phim to the east” to bring him to Vietnam and asked whether he had heard of this.[47]
Mr. Koppe asked whether he attended a meeting on 25 April 1978, which the witness denied. Mr. Koppe asked about other fights after May 25, 1978. He answered that the situation was “confusing” and that he was the one who attacked something and seized a vehicle. At this point, the President adjourned the hearing for a break.
Cambodian Resistance
After the last break of the day, the floor was handed back to the Nuon Chea Defense Team. Mr. Koppe said that Ben Kiernan had talked about “many civilians” in the proximity of Heng Samrin’s troops.[48] The witness replied that he had heard about it, but did not see it. He was assigned to be stationed to the north part of the road, but did not know whether there were many civilians to the south. There were civilians who fled from massacres, he said. As for Division 4, when the commanders were removed, some soldiers were at the defense lines to counter the Vietnamese troops. Later on, the East Zone assigned new commanders to those defense lines, which was “the chaotic period”, he said. Mr. Koppe asked whether he also remembered guerilla attacks by the forces of Heng Samrin. At this point, International Co-Prosecutor interjected and said that the witness had consistently stated that he was not with Heng Samrin. The witness’s unit himself “always deployed small forces” to attack big forces. Mr. Koppe asked whether at least since 25 May 1978 until 7 January 1979, “there was a civil war going on in Kampuchea.” He confirmed this and said that there was an internal conflict going on.
Mr. Koppe asked whether he would agree that before 25 May 1978, there was a “secret internal war” going on. He replied that he “just responded to your questions.”
Mr. Koppe moved on. The witness said that he created the combat forces. Mr. Koppe asked whether it was correct that he did not know anything about the Vietnamese trying to set up Cambodian resistance forces. He replied that he did not know about this. Mr. Koppe asked whether he knew about a “string of secret camps that had sprung up” in Vietnam, which the witness denied.[49]
Mr. Koppe said that Chanda had said that the First Brigade of the Khmer Dissident Army was commissioned in a secret ceremony that was founded in April 1978.
Mr. Koppe asked whether he had “no idea” about a “big Cambodian resistance army” that took place in Ho Chi Minh and Snuol. The witness said that he never participated in a meeting in Hanoi. The Nuon Chea Defense Counsel said that the translation seemed to have gone wrong and moved on. He then asked about Smach Market and wanted to know whether there was a secret tunnel located there. He replied that “no one could dig a canal from Smach market to Cambodian territory”. Mr. Koppe asked whether they were attacked by Vietnamese forces from behind and if yes, whether he was surprised. He replied that Unit 155 was stationed on the area and broke through by the Vietnamese troops. The Vietnamese troops then came from behind and attacked them.
Mr. Koppe read a quote and asked why it was that the shelling from behind came as a surprise. He replied that there were two separate events: one in 1977 and one in 1978. He said that the Vietnamese used “large force” to attack Unit 155 and attacked the witness’s unit from behind. This was in 1977. Mr. Koppe asked whether there was a suspicion that intelligence was given to Vietnamese troops in order to attack them from behind. He answered that he did not have this suspicion at the time. They were more superior and could break through their forces, as they were stronger. “That’s the art of war.”
Mr. Koppe requested leave to show two minutes of footage of a meeting to the witness.[50] The request was granted. The video showed a number of cadres (including Pol Pot and Sao Phim) and people giving a speech. The witness said that it was the first time that he saw the video and that it was difficult for him to recognize people. He said that these people were civilians and he was from the military side, which was why he could not recognize people.
Mr. Koppe asked whether he recognized Pol Pot. He replied that he did not know him and only heard of his name. Mr. Koppe asked whether he recognized Sao Phim and that he would recognize Sao Phim if he saw him. He said that the video clip was not clear to him. Mr. Koppe told the witness to “say stop” when he recognized Heng Samrin or Sao Phim. The video clip was shown again. Mr. Koppe asked whether he did not recognize anyone on the video. The witness replied that the video “was not clear.” He suspected that “Sao Phim was quite a short man with a cap on his head.” Mr. Koppe said that there was a man “always clapping” walking behind another leader and that he had a round face. Judge Claudia Fenz said that referring to standstill might be beneficial. “It’s fine. It’s also interesting,” Mr. Koppe responded. The video was “blurred”, the witness said, and that this was why he could not recognize anyone. Mr. Koppe asked whether his troops ever gave intelligence information after they had defected. He replied that he met “those people in the jungle” after 1978.
No Further Knowledge about Vietnamese-Cambodian Collaboration
Mr. Koppe referred to Stephen Morris’ testimony and that Vietnam had installed a colonial relationship with Cambodia in 1979 and 1980.[51] He replied that “this is a different matter. The national affairs are a different matter.” He stressed that he was in Zone 7 and responsible for public order, and not in the administrative section. For example, the cadres were required to learn the Vietnamese language and that Vietnamese civilians arrived in 1979. He stressed that he was not fully informed about affairs “across the country” and that he was better informed about police affairs. Mr. Koppe concluded his questions.
The floor was handed to Khieu Samphan Defense Counsel Kong Sam Onn, who asked about the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia and wanted to know which villages and communes were under the attacks of Vietnamese troops between 1975 and 1978. He replied that there were three important bases: one was at Memot, and the other at Ponhea Kraek. In late 1977, there was fighting back and forth. The Khmer Rouge pushed the Vietnamese into their territory and counterattacked. “I could not defeat them, and after 1978, that was a different issue.”
Mr. Sam Onn quoted villages that were under control of the Vietnamese troops and wanted to know whether they were located along National Road 22.[52] The witness answered that Phal and Nah Kada were not adjacent to Road 22, but rather adjacent to the border running from the house of the president of the National Assembly. “People living close to the border were required to pay taxes,” he said. He said he did not know about the requirement during Democratic Kampuchea. Mr. Sam Onn quoted a part of his statement, in which he had said that the zone made the decision to attack villages. The witness confirmed this.[53] The military was usually not determined by the zone, but had partial power over whether to attack or not to attack. He never attended meetings in relation to this. Regarding all the affairs, the Zone would usually invite cadres that would then convey the content of the meetings to subordinates.
Mr. Sam Onn then asked what were the reasons were that Pol Pot conducted a coup d’état against Sao Phim. The witness answered that there were several reasons: 1) the forces at the defense line were attacking the Vietnamese. 2) Troops at the Central Zone had their own forces and some of the forces at the defense line were called into the meeting. 3) They were all arrested. Some could flee and provided this information. He did not know the purpose of such a coup d’état, since he did not have the opportunity to discuss this with Pol Pot. “I knew only about the small plan, not the big plan. The zone never disclosed the plan in details, but I only knew the real situation that happened on the ground.”
With this, Mr. Sam Onn concluded his line of questioning. Ms. Guissé said that they had made time calculations: they had thought that they still had 45 minutes to examine the witness. Mr. Koumjian responded that “that wouldn’t be the way that I would calculate it.” He said that the Chamber had used three sessions, which would mean that the defense teams had 2.5 sessions, which they had already used. Mr. Koppe responded that the e-mail indicated that they had more time. The president said that Ms. Guissé was correct.
The President adjourned the hearing. It will continue tomorrow, November 8, at 9 am with the testimony of 2-TCW-1065, followed by Civil Party 2-TCCP-237.
[1] E3/9
[2] At 00396504-06 (EN)
[3] At 00639931 (FR), 00396571 (EN).
[4] At 00639964 (FR), 00396597 (EN).
[5] E3/2373; E3/217.
[6] 2 November 1975; E3/227, at 00019133 (KH), 00290867-68 (FR), 00183413 (EN).
[7] E3/1150.
[8] E3/218.
[9] E3/903.
[10] E3/837; E3/852
[11] E3/1593, at 00637902-03 (KH), 00639136-37 (FR).
[12] E3/2376, at 00191526 and 560 (KH), 00192379 and 498 (EN), 00237062 and 086 (FR).
[13] E3/9723.
[14] E3/882.
[15] E3/1651.
[16] E3/794.
[17] E3/799.
[18] E3/2376.
[19] E3/18.
[20] E3/18, at 00595447 (FR), 00103760 (EN), 00103849 (KH).
[21] E3/1150.
[22] E3/893, at 00386272 (FR), 00000708 (KH), 00182620 (EN).
[23] E3/218, at 00334960 (FR), 00182653 (EN), 00000753 (KH).
[24] At 0033497 (FR), 00182657 (EN), 00000757 (KH).
[25] E3/1020, at 00711511 (FR), 00021462 (KH), 00305246 (EN).
[26] E3/8373.
[27] E3/805.
[28] E3/143, at 00168726 (EN).
[29] E3/878, at 00611723 (FR), 00182770 (EN), 00001265 (KH).
[30] E3/981, at 00623824 (FR), 00314586 (EN), 00002824 (KH).
[31] E3/8369, at 00182815 (EN).
[32] E3/8372, at 00291043 (FR), 00183632 (EN), 00020917 (KH).
[33] E3/4283.
[34] E3/1076.
[35] E3/1269, at S00009871 (EN), 00302573 (FR).
[36] E3/7891, 0007882 (FR), 00079295 (EN), 00721426 (KH).
[37] E3/890, at 0038624 (FR), 00386264 (EN), 00020874 (KH); E3/583.
[38] E3/932.
[39] E3/1262, at 00079723 (EN), 00224494 (KH), 00076147 (FR).
[40] E3/9, at 00396378 (EN), 00639686 (FR).
[41] 15:43.
[42] E3/1593, at 00637771 (KH), 00639034 (FR).
[43] E3/1593, at 01150203 (EN), 00637947 (KH), 00639172 (FR).
[44] E3/157.
[45] E3/10699, at 01335197 (EN).
[46] 00651889 (EN), 00743361 (KH).
[47] At 00651900 (EN), 00713981 (KH), 00743376 (FR).
[48] E3/1658, at 00713985 (KH), 00743379 (FR).
[49] E3/2376, at 00192403 (EN), 00237082 (FR), 00191553 (KH).
[50] E3/3015R.
[51] E3/7338, at 01001897 (EN).
[52] E3/10668.
[53] E3/10668, at answer 22.
Featured Image: Witness 2-TCW-1065 (ECCC: Flickr).