



អង្គជំនុំជម្រះវិសាមញ្ញក្នុងតុលាការកម្ពុជា
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
Chambres Extraordinaires au sein des Tribunaux Cambodgiens

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ជាតិ សាសនា ព្រះមហាក្សត្រ

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អង្គជំនុំជម្រះសាលាដំបូង
Trial Chamber
Chambre de première instance

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Trial Day 45

Before the Judges: NIL Nonn, Presiding
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YA Sokhan
Jean-Marc LAVERGNE
YOU Ottara
THOU Mony (Reserve)
Claudia FENZ (Reserve)

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List of Speakers:

Language used unless specified otherwise in the transcript

Speaker	Language
MR. ANG UDOM	Khmer
MR. HONG KIMSUON	Khmer
MR. KAING GUEK EAV alias DUCH	Khmer
MR. KARNAVAS	English
MR. KONG SAM ONN	Khmer
JUDGE LAVERGNE	French
MS. NGUYEN	English
THE PRESIDENT (NIL NONN, Presiding)	Khmer
MR. PESTMAN	English
MR. PICH ANG	Khmer
MS. SIMONNEAU-FORT	French
MR. SMITH	English
MR. SON ARUN	Khmer
MR. VERCKEN	French

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (Court opens at 0931H)

3 MR. PRESIDENT:

4 Please be seated. The Court is now in session.

5 Today, as planned, the Chamber continues to hear testimony of
6 witness Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch. The Prosecution will continue
7 putting questions to the witness for another hour, then the
8 Chamber will hand over to civil party lawyers to put questions to
9 this witness.

10 Now the floor is handed over to the Prosecution to continue their
11 questioning to this witness, if any.

12 [09.32.44]

13 QUESTIONING BY MR. SMITH RESUMES:

14 Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning. Good morning, Your
15 Honours, good morning, counsel, good morning, Witness, and to the
16 general public.

17 Q. Mr. Kaing Guek Eav, last week we discussed a number of
18 matters, and throughout your testimony you referred to the fact
19 that CPK leaders attended large rallies or meetings.

20 How many rallies or meetings of the CPK did you attend during
21 that period from 1975 to 1979?

22 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

23 A. Mr. President, there were two types of meetings, the 17 April
24 meeting and the August 30th -- rather, the September 30th rally.

25 I began joining the rally on the 17 April 1975 -- rather, 1976,

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1 and I also joined another meeting in that year, 1976.

2 In the last -- the last 19 -- the last 17 April rally was
3 conducted at the Olympic stadium. It was not conducted at Borei
4 Keila as it was conducted before. The previous meetings or
5 rallies were conducted at Borei Keila, and the 17 April 1978
6 meeting was conducted at the Olympic stadium. It was conducted at
7 the basketball court.

8 [09.35.14]

9 Q. So you referred to attending two rallies, one in 1976 and one
10 in 1978. Did you attend a rally in 1977 on the 17th of April?

11 A. I joined that meeting.

12 Q. And you've also mentioned that you attended rallies on the
13 30th of September. About how many of those rallies did you attend
14 during those three and a half years?

15 A. I attended such meetings in '60 -- rather, '76, '77 and '78.
16 During that time, there was a special rally. It was on the 6th of
17 January 1978. Pol Pot convened that rally in order to announce
18 the victory of the Revolutionary Army over the Vietnamese armies.
19 And the formal name of that Vietnamese army was called the
20 People's Armies of Vietnam, but I'm not sure about this name. I
21 joined that meeting at that time.

22 Q. And at these rallies, did you see either of Khieu Samphan,
23 Ieng Sary and Nuon Chea at any of these rallies?

24 A. Mr. President, the 17 April 1976 rally and during the 17 April
25 1977 meeting, there were only two delegates, Brother Pol Pot and

3

1 Brother Nuon Chea.

2 The 13 -- during the 13 -- rather, the 30th September 1976 rally
3 and during the 30th September 1977 rally -- was actually
4 conducted since the 27 September. And during those meetings, I
5 saw only Brother Pol Pot and Brother Nuon Chea on the stage.
6 And as for the 17 April 1978, there were a lot of people joining
7 that rally. There were four of them. They were Brother Nuon Chea,
8 Brother Vorn Vet, Brother Thiounn Thioeunn -- I'm not sure about
9 the other. I'm not sure whether it was Brother Ieng Sary or
10 Brother Khieu Samphan. I was confused.

11 [09.39.41]

12 Besides, as for the rally on the 30th of September 1978, on the
13 stage there were three people, Brother Secretary Pol Pot, Brother
14 Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea and Brother Mok. It was conducted at
15 the Olympic stadium.

16 Q. Thank you. You've mentioned that, as -- part of your job at
17 S-21 was to train, and as a part of that, you read all the
18 "Revolutionary Flags" and "Revolutionary Youth".

19 So I'd like you to look at a document. It's D243/2.1.12. And I
20 have a few questions to ask you about that.

21 Your Honour, I have a hard copy if I can provide to the witness,
22 please.

23 [09.40.53]

24 MR. PRESIDENT:

25 The Chamber permits. Court officer is instructed to bring the

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1 document from the Prosecution to the witness.

2 BY MR. SMITH:

3 Your Honours, also E3/11.

4 Q. Witness, if you can look at this document and if you see after
5 the first couple of pages, it states: "The presentation of the
6 Party representative on the occasion of the 17th anniversary of
7 the great victory of the founding of the Communist Party of
8 Kampuchea and on the occasion of the official domestic and
9 international public announcement of the Party."

10 [09.41.56]

11 Is this document a record of the speech that you referred to
12 earlier in your testimony about the announcement -- the public
13 announcement of the CPK?

14 MR. PRESIDENT:

15 Yes. Defence counsel, you may proceed.

16 [09.42.26]

17 MR. PESTMAN:

18 Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning. I don't want to object,
19 but I'm just wondering whether we can see the document on the
20 screen. I have no document on the screen. Thank you.

21 MR. SMITH:

22 Yes, Your Honour. We're trying to place it on the screen now.

23 Your Honour, whilst the case manager is putting the document on
24 the screen, if I'll just continue the questions and it will come
25 up shortly.

1 [09.43.21]

2 BY MR. SMITH:

3 Q. Witness, is this the document -- is this the "Revolutionary
4 Flag" that you referred to that announced -- publicly announced
5 the Communist Party of Kampuchea?

6 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

7 A. Mr. President, the question is not very practical. There were
8 two occasions of the announcements. The first one was secretly
9 done amongst the Party's members at Borei Keila. That document
10 was not published in the "Revolutionary Flag" magazine. I was
11 able to take some notes and I kept them at S-21.

12 This "Revolutionary Flag" was what Brother Pol read at the
13 Central Committee. I used to see this document, but I was not
14 really aware of the secret document.

15 [09.45.02]

16 Q. And the document that you have before you now, is that a copy
17 of an original document that you saw back during the -- your
18 period at S-21?

19 A. Mr. President, I do not believe that there was a copy of the
20 original "Revolutionary Flag".

21 Q. Thank you. But I'm referring to a photocopy of an original.
22 Do you agree that that's a photocopy of the original
23 "Revolutionary Flag"?

24 A. Mr. President, I did not see that the original was
25 photocopied, but I believe this was the copy of the original.

6

1 [09.46.28]

2 Q. Thank you. And, Witness, in the speech -- in this speech in
3 the "Revolutionary Flag", if I can take you to page 0063138--
4 it's tabbed in yellow. It's got a yellow tab, in the document
5 before. And English 00486228, in French 00492814. Witness, it has
6 a yellow tab and it's 0063138.

7 And in this document, do you see point 2? It should be marked
8 with a highlighter at page 39 in the Khmer version.

9 A. Mr. President, yes, I saw this.

10 Q. If you can read briefly the passage starting from point 2, and
11 then I have two questions to ask you about it.

12 A. Thank you. Mr. President, if I may read, as requested by the
13 prosecutor:

14 "Point 2, the Congress analyzed and defines the contradictions
15 directly inside Kampuchean society. At the time that we were
16 working out the Party's line, Kampuchean society was divided into
17 five distinct classes; the working class, the peasants class, the
18 petit bourgeoisie class, the capitalist class and the feudalist
19 class. In all, there were five classes.

20 [09.49.20]

21 "With their contradictions between these various classes, there
22 were -- and they were complicated ones. There were contradictions
23 between the workers and the capitalists, between the petit
24 bourgeoisie and the capitalists, between the peasants and the
25 land owners, between the capitalists and the peasants, etc. The

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1 contradictions were complex and much entangled. But which
2 contradictions played the leading role in society at that time?"

3 [09.50.05]

4 To answer this question, we had to find among the many
5 contradictions in society the one which involved the majority of
6 the population, which class most exploited the others, which
7 class was the most exploited and the most numerous.

8 An examination of the Kampuchean society of that time reveals
9 that the peasants were 85 per cent of the country's entire
10 population. Therefore, the peasants were the overwhelming
11 majority of the population. They were oppressed by all classes.
12 They were oppressed by the capitalists and the landowners.
13 However, it was from the landowners that the peasants suffered
14 the worst, most varied and most direct oppression.
15 Thus, 85 per cent of the population, the peasants, were in
16 contradiction with the exploiting class that exploited them
17 directly, the landowners.

18 [09.51.24]

19 Q. Thank you. If I can stop you there and now take you to the
20 following page. The ERN number is 0063140, English 00486230 and
21 French 00492816. And if I can read out the passage briefly, and
22 it's highlighted in your document, it states:

23 "Therefore, this contradiction was a life and death
24 contradiction. This was a profound contradiction in Kampuchean
25 society, one which impacted 85 per cent of the population. It was

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1 for this reason that the First Party Congress defined this
2 contradiction as an antagonistic contradiction."

3 Mr. Kaing Guek Eav, my question is: Can you explain -- can you
4 explain the meaning within this document of "this contradiction
5 was a life and death contradiction"?

6 A. Thank you. Mr. President, in the philosophy of the
7 dialectical materialism, there were contradictions. The
8 contradiction between us and our enemy is the life and death
9 contradiction which means that for one to prosper, the other one
10 must die. This is what it means and I end my explanation here.

11 Q. Thank you. And does the term "antagonistic contradiction" mean
12 something different?

13 A. Mr. President, the antagonistic contradiction was the
14 contradiction between two parties. The two parties rely on each
15 other in order to promote the movement. For example, the
16 contradiction between the cadre and the combatants; these are the
17 internal conflicts. The resolution of this contradiction was done
18 through education.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 [09.54.38]

21 I'd now like to move to another topic and this is in relation to
22 the role of Khieu Samphan, which you discussed last week, and
23 also the role of Sua Vasi, Doeun, who you also discussed last
24 week.

25 You testified that Khieu Samphan was the Chairman or head of the

1 Central Office Committee of the CPK and you also testified that
2 Sua Vasi, Doeun, had that role, as well, until he was transferred
3 to the Ministry of Commerce. You also testified that although
4 Doeun had that role, as well, he was only in charge of
5 maintaining documents, but he did not have actual power. And you
6 also testified that when Doeun left that role, there was no
7 significant change to the role of Khieu Samphan in that
8 committee.

9 [09.55.49]

10 My question is: Who had the higher ranking role in the Party? Was
11 it Doeun or Khieu Samphan?

12 A. Mr. President, the explanation has to rely on my understanding
13 from now. Let me first begin my explanation based on my
14 understanding back then.

15 For those who loved Khieu Samphan knew clearly that Mr. Khieu
16 Samphan was in charge of the ministries in 1971 and he was one of
17 Pol Pot's students. From our perspective, we understood that his
18 role was nothing. He was only in charge of papers.

19 [09.57.27]

20 Later on, Doeun was appointed to work as the head of the Central
21 Office. We, from the lower levels, knew Doeun as a person and we
22 knew that, as Doeun was appointed the Chief of the Central
23 Office, the intention was to separate the force of Koy Thuon
24 apart.

25 From my understanding -- understanding, back then, the head --

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1 the position as the head of the Central Office was the
2 Secretariat of Pol Pot.

3 I also heard, informally, that Brother Pol Pot was in charge of
4 distributing machines to the bases. Moreover, there was also
5 evidence that Brother Khieu Samphan was the one who accompanied
6 Samdech Penn Nouth and Sihanouk to visit countryside. That was
7 what I knew back then.

8 Q. Thank you. And when Doeun left for the Ministry of Commerce,
9 did Khieu Samphan stay in the same position?

10 A. When Doeun left for the commerce section and later on he was
11 arrested; I still am convinced that Brother Khieu Samphan still
12 maintained his position. A few days ago, last week, I already
13 talked about this. No one could do anything regarding the
14 position Khieu Samphan held.

15 Q. And if we go back to my original question, do you know who was
16 higher ranking in the CPK? Was it Doeun or Khieu Samphan?

17 A. Mr. President, so far as I recollect, I read the record of
18 interviews by Khieu Samphan before the Co-Investigating Judges,
19 and this account is consistent with what my understanding is.

20 [10.01.11]

21 Brother Khieu Samphan was the member of the Central Office when
22 Doeun was also a member, but a candidate member. He could have
23 not been the full-right member; if he were, he could not or he
24 would not have held the full-right position as Brother Khieu
25 Samphan would. Although Khieu --Doeun could have been the head of

11

1 the Central Office, he could be inferior than Khieu Samphan
2 because he was junior; he was as young as I was back then.

3 Q. And do you know who took over Doeun's tasks when he left the
4 Central Office to go to the ministry of commerce?

5 [10.02.14]

6 MR. PRESIDENT:

7 (No interpretation)

8 MR. VERCKEN:

9 Mr. President, I am intervening, quite simply, to point out to my
10 learned friend of the accusation that it would be proper for the
11 witness to be always precise in his answers when his testimony is
12 on issues that he was aware of at the time or information he
13 obtained in the course of the investigations. He has done so, so
14 far. I wouldn't like the witness to be caused to give a testimony
15 without clearly making the distinction between what he knew at
16 the time and what he knew, subsequently, as part of the judicial
17 investigations. Thank you.

18 BY MR. SMITH:

19 Yes, Your Honour, I think that's appropriate and I'll ask that
20 question.

21 [10.03.38]

22 Q. Back when you were at S-21, during that period, when Doeun
23 left for the Ministry of Commerce, did you know, back then, who
24 took over Doeun's tasks in the Central Committee?

25 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

12

1 A. I'm not sure regarding this. However, the person who knew a
2 lot and who took orders from Pol Pot and went all the way to S-21
3 was Pang.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 [10.05.04]

6 The next question is: In your testimony earlier, at one stage you
7 stated that the Central Office Committee was the same as Office
8 870; is there a different -- from what you knew back then, was
9 there a difference between Office 870 and the Central Office
10 Committee or are you saying they -- there -- they were the same
11 thing, from what you knew?

12 A. The Central Standing Committee, as I already said, comprised
13 of seven individuals: one, Brother Pol, Brother Nuon, Brother So
14 Phim, Brother Ung Choeun alias Mok, Brother Ieng Sary, Vorn Vet,
15 and Son Sen.

16 [10.06.24]

17 Among the seven people, two were outside; So Phim, the Secretary
18 of the East who was -- who was in charge of the East Zone and Ung
19 Choeun alias Nok -- alias Mok was also outside supervising the
20 whole Southwest Zone.

21 Q. Thank you. And in your testimony, you testified that there was
22 a -- a Standing Committee, which you've just discussed, and
23 you've also testified that there was a Central Office Committee.
24 Now, I'm talking about the Central Office Committee of the CPK.
25 And my question is: To your knowledge, back then, was the Central

13

1 Office Committee the same as Office 870 or was it different?

2 A. Thank you for the question. Mr. President, the Central
3 Standing Committee comprised of the seven people, as indicated.
4 However, when it comes to the office of 870, it was the location
5 where people worked regularly; five people worked regularly,
6 Brother Pol, Brother Nuon, Brother Van, Brother Vorn, and Brother
7 Khieu, who had worked on a regular basis at the office.

8 Q. So are you saying then that when you referred to the Central
9 Office Committee of which Khieu Samphan and Doeun were heads that
10 is different to Office 870, to your knowledge, back then?

11 A. I think the distinction is, in this, as follows: The five
12 individuals who stationed in Phnom Penh were embedded with their
13 own authority and power as the members of the Standing Committee.
14 However, Khieu Samphan and Comrade Doeun did not enjoy the same
15 power as those mentioned.

16 [10.09.33]

17 Khieu Samphan, as the head of the office of 870, he had the
18 authority over the units under his supervision and, as I
19 indicated, at least there were one -- there was one unit at Chak
20 Angrae under his supervision, so this -- this is the real or
21 actual unit that I'm very convinced that he oversaw.

22 Q. Thank you. The relationship between Khieu Samphan and Pol Pot,
23 I think you testified earlier that it was a good relationship; is
24 that correct?

25 MR. VERCKEN:

14

1 Mr. President, with your leave? Thank you.

2 I think that with the last question -- we went from a testimony
3 on what he knew at the time, to something he learned from books.
4 Now, the prosecutor is trying to gain an advantage by putting a
5 question to the witness on his -- on the relationship between my
6 client and Pol Pot, whereas the witness has already stated that
7 he never met my client, personally, throughout that period. So I
8 wonder on what basis he will rely to answer the prosecutor's
9 question.

10 [10.11.32]

11 This is problematic to me because subsequently we'd have to plead
12 and draft our closing brief. Everyone will try to clarify all
13 issues. The witness has already been interviewed 65 times as part
14 of the judicial investigations in addition to hearings before
15 this Chamber. It is, therefore, absolutely important that the
16 basis of the testimony he gives here should be crystal clear to
17 everyone. That is the main thrust of my submission.

18 BY MR. SMITH:

19 I'll continue to try and make that distinction between what he
20 knew now and what he knew before.

21 Q. So, perhaps, if I just rephrase the question and so it's
22 clear: Witness, during your period at S-21, were you aware of the
23 relationship -- of any relationship between Pol Pot and Khieu
24 Samphan and if you were aware of it, what was the nature of that
25 relationship?

15

1 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

2 A. The relationship between Brothers Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan
3 was understood very well internally including me, myself, and I
4 understood that relation very well. And I just would like to know
5 because a person who just -- who graduated from just high school,
6 like me, paid great respect to Pol Pot and now Khieu Samphan, who
7 was -- who obtained higher education than us; he could still be
8 very -- could pay great respect to Pol Pot and we just wanted to
9 know why Brother Khieu Samphan respected Pol Pot very much.

10 [10.14.08]

11 And Koy Thuon discussed about such respect and he indicated that
12 the respect could vary from worst person to another. However, in
13 general, internally, we understood that this is how people paid
14 respect to Pol Pot.

15 Q. And did you know, at the time, when you were working at S-21
16 whether Pol Pot had the same respect for Khieu Samphan?

17 A. Thank you. I think I have no evidence to prove that Bong Pol
18 paid any respect to Khieu Samphan. However, I could see that the
19 relationship between the superior and the subordinate, it could
20 be inferred that the superior paid great attention to his
21 subordinate like my superior did to me -- Son Sen, indeed, did to
22 me.

23 Q. Were you aware of the relationship between Doeun and Pol Pot
24 during that period, and what that was like?

25 A. I already testified before that Doeun came to work at the

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1 Central Office in his capacity as the person in charge of the
2 secretariat and I still stand by this position.

3 [10.16.23]

4 And I also told the Court that Doeun, assigned by Pol Pot to the
5 position at the Central Office, was to break Koy Thuon's forces
6 just to ensure that Koy Thuon's forces could not be well
7 connected and this is part of the work of Pol Pot to do so.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 I'd like to move to another topic now; it's in relation to the
10 GRUNK and FUNK members after 17th of April 1975. And the question
11 is: Do you know if there was a policy by the CPK with respect to
12 non-CPK members of the GRUNK?

13 A. I would like to talk about the term "the front." The front was
14 meant to gather forces to fulfil some tactical tasks including --
15 and in terms of long-term tactical tasks, some were friends, some
16 were not friends or enemies. So this is a big issue.

17 I may recollect in 1973 that there was a study session. Vorn Vet
18 lectured in that session. He said: "We did. We ate. We did our
19 best so that we could have something to eat and allow Sihanouk to
20 remain our chairman."

21 [10.18.53]

22 This short phrase made us understand the role of the front. That
23 slogan was discussed before 1975.

24 Later on, there was another study session lectured by Son Sen. He
25 said that our Party had applied different strategies. Our Party

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1 appointed the state presidium which was rather different from
2 others parties. At that time, that was the appointment.

3 Later on, through radio broadcast, Sihanouk was heard to have
4 resigned from the Party; he retired. However, regarding the
5 former officials of the GRUNK, they were made to move to some
6 camps including Boeng Trabaek and the camp in Chraing Chamres.

7 When Huot Sambath was sent to S-21, Son Sen said when Huot
8 Sambath was in charge of the office, Son Sen had endured some
9 difficulties because it was Sambath who decided the scholarship
10 had to be offered to Son Sen.

11 [10.20.58]

12 Q. Would you also agree that a number of other high-level
13 ministers from the GRUNK were sent to S-21?

14 A. Thank you. Back then, ministers were only appointed
15 internally; not from the outside.

16 Q. Would you agree that a number of former members of the GRUNK
17 that held high-level positions were sent to S-21?

18 A. The diplomats or ambassadors appointed by the GRUNK were sent
19 to S-21 gradually, including Huot Sambath, the name I still
20 recollect very well.

21 Q. Was there a policy directed against GRUNK members,
22 particularly, in light of your answers that they were taken to be
23 re-educated and some of them sent to S-21?

24 A. Yes, it was. First, people were appointed -- were sent to join
25 the re-education centres and later on, they were released because

18

1 the committee found out that they were bad elements; whether how
2 bad they were, it was beyond my understanding, but we, at S-21,
3 was -- were tasked with just interrogating any people sent in.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 [10.24.06]

6 And one last topic: When you left S-21 in January 1979, did you
7 leave all the documents behind?

8 A. On the 7 of January, I left Phnom Penh; it was when the tanks
9 were already right in front of my home. I left with only a pen
10 and a handgun. None of my subordinates or people in my unit could
11 manage to bring with them any piece of document, I believe.

12 Q. You said, at that time, Nuon Chea was your superior. Did he
13 tell you to destroy the documents or bring the documents with you
14 or leave the documents at S-21? Did he give you any instructions
15 about what to do with the documents when you had to leave Phnom
16 Penh?

17 A. I once already testified that I met Bong Nuon last and it was
18 not clear when I met him, but now I feel that I met on the 1st or
19 the 2nd of January 1979 when he ordered the executions of the
20 remaining prisoners in S-21. However, he did not talk to me about
21 any documents; he did not instruct me on how to handle the
22 documents.

23 [10.26.14]

24 Q. And how many prisoners were there when he gave you that order?

25 A. There were more than 100 prisoners; even over 500, I feel.

1 Q. And did you obey the order?

2 A. Immediately upon receiving the orders, I called Comrade Hor
3 who carried the orders immediately. Three days later, he came to
4 me that the mission -- the mission accomplished; he already
5 carried out the task as ordered.

6 Q. Just going back to the documents, you said that you received
7 no instructions from Nuon Chea in relation to the documents. At
8 some time later, after 1979, did you ever have a discussion with
9 Nuon Chea about what happened to the documents at S-21?

10 [10.28.14]

11 A. This happened in 1983 or 1984, but to my best recollection, it
12 was in 1983 rather. Brother Nuon went to Samlout -- Samlout
13 battlefield and he called me to meet him on one occasion. He
14 asked me whether I met him during the last day to work with him
15 or worked with Uncle Hem and I said: Yes, I met with Brother Hem.
16 And he asked me about -- what about the documents and I told him
17 the documents were in a mess. And he said: Look, on my side, we
18 destroyed them all. You were very bad that you could not manage
19 this. I think perhaps I could not recall all the words he talked,
20 back then, but it was something like that.

21 [10.29.41]

22 And in 1986, I met Son Sen, my superior, and reported to him on
23 all of this and Son Sen said that none -- documents were never
24 destroyed completely. I said what Nuon Chea said, so he talked
25 about the documents at the Central Office.

20

1 Q. And what mood was Nuon Chea in when he had that discussion
2 with you about not destroying the documents at S-21?

3 A. Mr. President, whose mood are you talking about? Are you
4 talking about the mood of Mr. Nuon Chea or the mood of Mr. Son
5 Sen?

6 Q. Nuon Chea.

7 A. It was his usual mood as I used to work with him. He did not
8 normally accept his weaknesses. He did not accept his weaknesses.
9 He liked to dominate other.

10 MR. PRESIDENT:

11 I note the defence counsel is on his feet. You may proceed.

12 [10.31.41]

13 MR. SON ARUN:

14 The last answer from the witness was the speculation and I object
15 to that.

16 MR. PRESIDENT:

17 How many questions do you still have, Mr. Co-Prosecutor?

18 MR. SMITH:

19 One or two last -- very short questions, Your Honour.

20 MR. PRESIDENT:

21 You are permitted to continue and to finish your questions to
22 this witness.

23 BY MR. SMITH:

24 Q. Witness, you've stated, in your interviews with the
25 Co-Investigative Judges and also in the Court over the last week,

21

1 that, from reading the case file, you gained knowledge as to the
2 workings of the CPK during that -- the period of 1975 to 1979.
3 My question for you is: When you've testified over the last six
4 days, has that been from your own personal knowledge, from during
5 the period, and not taking into account the knowledge you have
6 gained later?

7 MR. KARNAVAS:

8 Mr. President, if I may interject here.

9 MR. PRESIDENT:

10 Yes, Counsel.

11 MR. KARNAVAS:

12 Thank you, Mr. President. And good morning to everyone in and
13 around the courtroom and especially to the Bench.

14 [10.33.27]

15 The gentleman has testified quite a bit, often indicating what he
16 learned thereafter. Now we have this all-encompassing question to
17 sort of wrap up and sort of deliver on a silver platter the
18 gentleman's testimony as if everything that he's told us in the
19 last six days is from his memory.

20 I think it's farcical to even suggest that, let alone ask him to
21 validate his own testimony. I think it's quite clear that on
22 occasions he's indicated and he's admitted that what he learned
23 later, meaning what he read afterward--

24 [10.34.02]

25 Now, if he wishes to rephrase the question, perhaps I won't

1 object. But this question is self-serving and has no value at
2 all. Thank you.

3 MR. SMITH:

4 Your Honour--

5 MR. PRESIDENT:

6 National Defence Counsel for Mr. Khieu Samphan, you may proceed.

7 [10.34.27]

8 MR. KONG SAM ONN:

9 Thank you, Mr. President. From -- after hearing answers from
10 witnesses -- witness has indicated, at times, that his answers
11 may be speculations, and we have heard of these speculations. And
12 now the prosecutor tries to elicit answer from the witness prior
13 to 1975, and I'm afraid that the witness will not able to do
14 that.

15 MR. PRESIDENT:

16 Yes, International Co-Prosecutor, you may proceed.

17 BY MR. SMITH:

18 Thank you, Your Honour. Perhaps I'll just rephrase the question.

19 Q. Over the last six days, have you told the truth to the Trial
20 Chamber?

21 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

22 A. Mr. President, I said everything the other day that I upheld
23 everything I said before the Co-Investigating Judges, and

24 everything I said during the Case 001 Trial.

25 Sometimes I talked in principles, as I respond to questions posed

1 by Judge Lavergne, and sometimes I went into details about what I
2 hear and I understand.

3 MR. SMITH:

4 I have no further questions, Your Honour.

5 MR. PRESIDENT:

6 Thank you.

7 It is now appropriate for us to adjourn for 20 minutes, and we
8 will resume at 11 o'clock.

9 [10.36.45]

10 Security guards are instructed to accommodate the witness to his
11 waiting room and bring him back before the Court resumes. Yes,
12 defence counsel for Mr. Ieng Sary?

13 MR. ANG UDOM:

14 Good morning, Your Honours. Because of his health issues, Mr.
15 Ieng Sary requests that he waive his right to be present in this
16 courtroom, but request that he'll be continuing the proceedings
17 from the holding cell downstairs for the rest of the day.

18 MR. PRESIDENT:

19 Having heard the request from Mr. Ieng Sary through his counsels
20 that he would like to waive his rights to be present in this
21 courtroom and to continue the proceedings from the holding cell
22 below this courtroom, because of his health reasons that he could
23 not sit in this courtroom for a long time, the Chamber decides
24 that the request is granted, that is, Mr. Ieng Sary now waives
25 his right to be present in this courtroom and to continue the

24

1 proceedings from the holding cell through audio-visual means for
2 the rest of today's proceedings.

3 The Chamber orders to the defence counsel for Ieng Sary to submit
4 the Chamber the written waiver with a thumbprint or a signature
5 from the accused, Ieng Sary.

6 [10.38.35]

7 AV Unit is instructed to live the proceedings to the holding
8 cells downstairs for the accused, Ieng Sary.

9 Security guards are instructed to bring Mr. Ieng Sary to the
10 holding cell.

11 The Court is adjourned.

12 (Court recesses from 1038H to 1100H)

13 MR. PRESIDENT:

14 Please be seated. The Court is now back in session.

15 [11.00.45]

16 Next, the Chamber would like to hand over to the Lead Co-Lawyers
17 for the civil parties. They may proceed.

18 MR. PICH ANG:

19 Mr. President, Your Honours, last week I indicated to the Chamber
20 that Lead Co-Lawyers will hand over to Mr. Hong Kimsuon to put
21 questions to the witness on behalf of Ms. Sin Siworn. Counsel
22 Hong Kimsuon will proceed with the lines of question, and Ms.
23 Lyma Nguyen will follow.

24 MR. PRESIDENT:

25 The Chamber notes this. And, Counsel, you may proceed.

25

1 MR. HONG KIMSUON:

2 Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours. Good morning, Mr. Kaing
3 Guek Eav, alias Duch. Today, I have a few words of courtesy
4 before we proceed. We are representing civil parties, and today,
5 on behalf of the civil parties, we are going to pose some
6 questions to you concerning the accused person.

7 [11.02.45]

8 In Case File 001, you already testified in your capacity as an
9 accused, and you already expressed your remorse towards the
10 victims and the families of the people who perished at S-21 --
11 the more than 12,000 people. Your apologies are compiled and
12 disseminated. Your apologies, as you indicated in that -- you
13 emotionally responsible for the death -- or the crimes committed
14 between 1975 and 1979. You indeed show great cooperation with the
15 Court back then, and on behalf of the civil parties we are very
16 grateful, indeed, to your openness and cooperation, and it is
17 very important, indeed, that you tell the world -- Cambodian
18 people, in particular, about what had actually happened during
19 the Khmer Rouge regime.

20 [11.04.18]

21 And we are optimistic that you still continue to cooperate in
22 this courtroom setting concerning Case File 001 -- rather,
23 002/01, with regard to the communicative administrative
24 structures and also the brief background of the CPK.
25 On behalf of the civil parties and the victims, we hope you --

26

1 your genuine cooperation will remain in this courtroom.

2 QUESTIONING BY MR. HONG KIMSUON:

3 Q. I would like now to proceed with some questions. Several
4 questions have already been posed by the Prosecution to you, but
5 I am interested to put questions concerning the structure
6 established at the foreign ministry -- foreign affairs ministry.
7 My first question would be: During the Khmer Rouge regime, who
8 was actually the most superior person at the Ministry of Foreign
9 Affairs?

10 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

11 A. The minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is -- or was
12 Mr. Ieng Sary, alias Van.

13 Q. You indicated that, during the Democratic Kampuchea regime,
14 you did not know where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could have
15 been located, but you are convinced that Mr. Ieng Sary, alias
16 Van, was the minister of that Ministry.

17 [11.06.28]

18 My next quest is: Do you know, back then -- or, did you know back
19 then how were people recruited as the ministers for that -- for
20 those key ministries?

21 A. Mr. President, I don't know how or when this took place, but
22 after the election -- the assembly election, although there was
23 non-election -- but after that so-called election, people were
24 recruited for the post.

25 Q. Last week, the Prosecution already made request to the Chamber

27

1 that the -- some documents be presented to you. With the
2 President's leave, may I ask that the same document be presented
3 again?

4 [11.08.01]

5 Because I have a few more questions, different from the questions
6 put by the Prosecution.

7 I would like to refer to IS 13.2, document ERN 00019108 --
8 document concerning the minutes of the meeting on the 9th of
9 October 1975.

10 MR. PRESIDENT:

11 Counsel, you may proceed.

12 BY MR. HONG KIMSUON:

13 Thank you.

14 Q. Mr. Kaing Guek Eav, do you see the document being projected on
15 the screen now?

16 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

17 A. Thank you. I actually could see this document now on the
18 screen clearly.

19 Q. I have a question on this. On page number 1, as highlighted in
20 red square brackets -- could you read it please?

21 A. Could you move your mouse? I'm sorry; I'm not able to use this
22 computer.

23 MR. PRESIDENT:

24 Court officer is now instructed to assist counsel and the
25 witness.

1 BY MR. HONG KIMSUON:

2 Mr. President, with your leave, may I read this for him -- or to
3 him?

4 [11.10.27]

5 Q. Do you see anything on the screen?

6 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

7 Counsel, could you give the original document to me? Or were you
8 not allowed to do that?

9 MR. PRESIDENT:

10 Counsel, you are now instructed to hand over to the witness the
11 document in hard copy you wish to refer to when putting questions
12 to the witness.

13 [11.10.47]

14 Please do the same as what the Prosecution had already done
15 concerning the documents. And we also note that, on the
16 documents, sometimes part of the documents could not be seen
17 clearly on one screen, and on the other screen it is not clearly
18 visible. So I think you should follow what the Prosecution had
19 already done pretty well with this.

20 BY MR. HONG KIMSUON:

21 Q. I would like just to read out, to save our time, the portion
22 of the text in the highlighted part.

23 Witness, please indicate to me if you now see the document on the
24 screen, and I would proceed with the reading. Do you see this?

25 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. If you look at the square bracket in red, can you read it to
3 us, please?

4 A. I would like to read it as follows:

5 "Number 3. Comrade Van. Foreign Affairs work, both Party and the
6 State."

7 Q. Thank you. I would like to proceed with another question.

8 [11.12.34]

9 During the Democratic Kampuchea regime, from the 17th of April
10 1975 through 1976 of January, you indicated that you attended
11 sessions -- meetings -- with the Standing Committee and the
12 Central Committee meetings. My question here would be the works
13 of the ministries of foreign affairs and the Central Committee's
14 work. Could you tell the Court about -- on this?

15 A. Personally, I never attended meetings are the central office
16 or the Standing Committee meetings. May I therefore ask that
17 counsel redirect the question to something that is relevant to my
18 work?

19 Q. Thank you.

20 [11.13.47]

21 Are you aware that -- or, aware of the people who lived in
22 foreign countries and whose names, later on, were sent to the
23 S-21 -- and these people were from the Ministry of Foreign
24 Affairs? Could you -- how did you know that?

25 A. With regard to people from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

30

1 those who hold -- or, held the highest position were the
2 ambassadors, the ambassadors representing Democratic Kampuchea
3 regime abroad. Those ambassadors were called to return to the
4 country. Huot Sambath is -- or was an ambassador, as an example.
5 He was sent to S-21. I don't remember other names.
6 To put it simply, other ambassadors to other countries were also
7 sent to Cambodia. Meak Touch and another ambassador were called
8 to return to the country. Other officers from the Ministry of
9 Affairs -- Foreign Affairs, were also sent to S-21. Chau Seng and
10 Van Piny were also part of the people relevant to this part who
11 was sent to S-21.

12 Q. I would like to proceed to the next question, please. The
13 Co-Prosecutor showed you the records of interviews you gave
14 before the Chamber -- Co-Investigating Judges. And I would like
15 to refer to document E3/107, the 24th interview you gave to the
16 Court.

17 [11.16.42]

18 Do you still recall the statement you made before the
19 Co-Investigating Judges, the 24th interview regarding letters
20 sent by Mr. Ieng Sary to S-21 Security Office or Centre? This
21 document is E3/107. It is under ERN 00197970. With the
22 President's leave, I may ask that this document be presented to
23 the witness.

24 MR. PRESIDENT:

25 You may proceed.

31

1 BY MR. HONG KIMSUON:

2 Q. Could you please look at the document with highlight?

3 [11.18.00]

4 The document has been highlighted for your easy reading.

5 MR. PRESIDENT:

6 Counsel, what about the other two languages? Have you got the
7 references to French and English versions, and could you also
8 provide the ERN numbers of those relevant pages in the foreign
9 languages, because parties to the proceeding who do not read
10 Khmer may refer or rely on the foreign languages of the document?

11 MR. HONG KIMSUON:

12 Thank you, Mr. President. Document ERN in English is 00198219.
13 Khmer ERN was already indicated -- I can repeat, 00197970. This
14 document is not available in French -- or, rather, I don't have
15 the French reference.

16 BY MR. HONG KIMSUON:

17 Q. Mr. Kaing Guek Eav, could you please look at this portion of
18 the statement, and would you wish to comment on this?

19 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

20 A. Mr. President, this event is still in my mind.

21 [11.19.58]

22 However, there was no letters from Ieng Sary to S-21. I remember
23 -- I still recollect this event vividly, but not remember any
24 letter sent by Ieng Sary to S-21.

25 May I ask that counsel redirect the question to the relevant

32

1 portion he wishes to ask me?

2 Q. Thank you. This question is relevant to the hierarchy -- or,
3 communication hierarchy from the parties. We just would like to
4 know about your knowledge regarding Ieng Sary's letters to S-21.
5 Before prisoners who were from --

6 MR. PRESIDENT:

7 Counsel, you may proceed, Counsel Karnavas.

8 MR. KARNAVAS:

9 Thank you, Mr. President. I apologize to my colleague for
10 interrupting.

11 [11.21.15]

12 The question assumes facts which are not in evidence. The
13 gentleman testified over six days. Not once did he ever say that
14 any letters were being sent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
15 or Mr. Ieng Sary himself to S-21.

16 Now, I didn't object initially, because I was waiting to see
17 where he would go with this. Clearly, there's nothing in this
18 document that would indicate that. No assumptions can be drawn
19 that would lead to that conclusion from reading this document. It
20 is highly improper, and it's suggestive.

21 Now, he was corrected by the witness that he never received
22 anything, yet the gentleman persists in this line of thinking and
23 in this line of questioning. So I suggest that he either rephrase
24 or move on.

25 But what he's doing is highly improper. He is inserting facts

1 which are not in evidence, and is claiming them to be so. And
2 that's testifying. Thank you.

3 MR. PRESIDENT:

4 Thank you, Counsel.

5 And counsel for civil party is now advised to rephrase the
6 question to be more precise, and as long as the questions are
7 precise then we can save some objections. As indicated by the
8 Chamber, counsel is instructed to ensure that the questions are
9 well put and precise.

10 [11.23.05]

11 MR. HONG KIMSUON:

12 Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to rephrase it.

13 BY MR. HONG KIMSUON:

14 Q. Mr. Kaing Guek Eav, last week you testified that the decision
15 to arrest or send someone to S-21 was made - or, were made by the
16 Central Committee. Is that so?

17 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

18 A. The decision to arrest were made by the Central Committee in
19 broader sense, but in a more practical sense, it was Brother Pol
20 who made the decision and, in some cases, Brother Nuon was the
21 one who made such decisions.

22 Q. So the offices surrounding the Central Office -- and with Mr.
23 President's leave, I would like to present the same document
24 presented by the Prosecution to the witness, and I would like to
25 refer to IS 6.3 on the first page; ERN in Khmer, 00003136; in

34

1 English, ERN -- my apologies --

2 (Microphone not activated)

3 [11.25.21]

4 MR. PRESIDENT:

5 Please make sure your mic is activated before you speak, Counsel.

6 MR. HONG KIMSUON:

7 Please excuse us. This document is IS 6.3, ERN in Khmer 00003136;

8 in English, ERN 0 -- my sincere apologies again. I would like to

9 repeat the number in English; ERN number in English is 00182814.

10 MR. PRESIDENT:

11 Counsel, could you please indicate to the Chamber whether you

12 wish to have the document be projected on the screen or not?

13 Counsel, please be more precise so that the Chamber can decide

14 what you wish the Chamber to do, otherwise our decision would not

15 be relevant.

16 MR. HONG KIMSUON:

17 With the President's leave, we would like this document to be put

18 up on the screen.

19 [11.27.03]

20 MR. PRESIDENT:

21 Court officer is now instructed to bring the hard copy of the

22 document to the witness, and AV official is instructed to put up

23 the document on the screen.

24 BY MR. HONG KIMSUON:

25 Q. Witness, have you now seen the document on the screen?

1 [11.27.44]

2 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

3 A. Yes, I have. And also I have obtained the document in hard
4 copy handed over to me.

5 Q. My question is relevant to the decisions by the Central
6 Committee. It is about the right to smash inside and outside the
7 ranks.

8 My question is: Have you ever read and understood the content of
9 this decision?

10 A. In real practice, I personally used to obey the standing --
11 the orders from the standing committee of the zones from 1971,
12 and this document was implemented after the -- 1976 because there
13 are a few other points that indicated in the decision for further
14 implementation.

15 Q. Thank you--

16 MR. PRESIDENT:

17 Counsel for the defence, you may proceed.

18 MR. KARNAVAS:

19 Thank you, Mr. President. I apologize again. The gentleman is
20 asked a specific question and then he goes on to give whatever
21 evidence he wishes to give. It's non-responsive and it makes it
22 very difficult for the rest of us to know whether to object or
23 not to object.

24 [11.29.46]

25 The question was whether he saw it, and then he went on on this

1 tangent. If the gentleman cooperates with the attorney, I believe
2 we could go step-by-step and this would avoid me having to object
3 to the sort of non sequiturs by the witness. Thank you.

4 MR. PRESIDENT:

5 We have two issues here.

6 One, the Chamber notes that counsels are reminded to refrain from
7 repeating the same questions asked by the Prosecution. The
8 Prosecution has already asked the witness whether he has seen,
9 has read or has heard of the documents prior to the time the
10 witness was called to appear in this Court. We settled these
11 issues already.

12 The Chamber finds that this kind of question asking for the
13 witness' knowledge of the documents should not be asked again.

14 Secondly, the witness is reminded to pay attention to the
15 questions asked by counsels.

16 [11.31.31]

17 The question asked now by the civil party lawyers are about
18 whether the witness is aware or he know -- don't know about the
19 document. So if witness believe that the -- he has already
20 answered such a question, he may indicate as such. The Chamber
21 hopes the relevant parties and witness pay closer attention to
22 the question and answers.

23 Again, counsels are reminded of the questions that are not
24 allowed by the law, for example, the leading question or the
25 speculation question.

1 Counsel, you may proceed.

2 MR. HONG KIMSUON:

3 Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you for your reminder.

4 I have already indicated that this document was shown by the
5 Prosecution and I was moving towards the next question.

6 [11.32.52]

7 BY MR. HONG KIMSUON:

8 Q. Mr. Witness, following from what Mr. President has said, I
9 would like to ask you to answer the questions precisely.

10 My question is: Khmer people, or what we called "intellectuals"
11 who were sent from abroad to the country, I want to know whether
12 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to be informed of these
13 intellectuals or not?

14 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

15 A. Thank you, Mr. President. I can only answer this question in
16 principle.

17 The ambassadors from abroad were under the control -- direct
18 control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of
19 Foreign Affairs was under the control of the Secretary and Deputy
20 Secretary of the Party. This is my answer to the question.

21 [11.34.13]

22 Q. Thank you.

23 My next question is: Because you have answered to the Chamber
24 that for those who were sent from abroad to S-21, do you still
25 remember -- I would like to refer to Document -- with your --

1 President's leave, I refer to document D120.

2 May I request that this document be displayed on the screen? The
3 ERN number is 00242920; the English ERN 00242931.

4 MR. PRESIDENT:

5 The Chamber permits. Court officer is instructed to bring the
6 document from counsel to witness and assist with the display of
7 the document on the screen.

8 BY MR. HONG KIMSUON:

9 Q. Witness, can you have a look at the portion encircled in red?
10 What can you say about this portion? My apology, I understand
11 that you were examining the document.

12 [11.36.50]

13 Mr. President, may I request that the witness read the portion
14 encircled in red?

15 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

16 A. I indicated that I was far away from Ieng Sary. I saw him only
17 twice, as I mentioned earlier. However, I can assert that as a
18 principle of practice before arrests at the Ministry of Foreign
19 Affairs could be made, the decision from Ieng Sary was necessary.
20 There was only one exception that I mentioned earlier, that of
21 Chau Seng; arrested under a false name without Ieng Sary's
22 knowing.

23 I received the list of persons arrested before they arrived at
24 S-21. I have received the list of persons arrested before they
25 arrived at the prisons. Until August 15, 1977, Son Sen sent the

1 list to me. After that, it was generally Pang who delivered the
2 lists, sometimes Lin. Thank you.

3 [11.38.59]

4 MR. HONG KIMSUON:

5 Thank you.

6 With your leave, Mr. President, I would like to provide the
7 documents to witness. It is the transcript documents D288/4.65.1.
8 This is a transcript from Case 001 of August 19, 2009, at page
9 56.

10 May I request that this document be displayed on the screen and
11 be provided to the witness?

12 MR. PRESIDENT:

13 The Chamber permits. Court officer is instructed to bring the
14 document to witness and the document be displayed on the screen
15 as requested by counsel.

16 [11.40.03]

17 MR. HONG KIMSUON:

18 May I request that the witness be reading the portion
19 highlighted?

20 MR. PRESIDENT:

21 So the document has not yet been displayed on the screen?

22 Can counsel indicate the English ERN so that relevant parties can
23 have access to the document; at least the English ERN if not the
24 French one?

25 (Short pause)

40

1 MR. HONG KIMSUON:

2 My apology, Mr. President. There is a technical problem; the
3 document cannot be displayed on the screen. Can I read the
4 document in Khmer?

5 MR. PRESIDENT:

6 Can you provide parties with ERN number -- the English ERN number
7 so that the parties can search by themselves for the document?

8 [11.42.34]

9 The Chamber already informed you that when documents be
10 discussed, documents of the three languages -- or at least two
11 languages of the working languages -- has to be referred to. You
12 must be prepared when it comes to examining documents.

13 MR. HONG KIMSUON:

14 Thank you, Mr. President.

15 May I move on to the next question while we are waiting for the
16 searching of the document?

17 BY MR. HONG KIMSUON:

18 Q. Mr. Witness, I want to ask you another question because my
19 time is running out.

20 From your recollections when you were the Secretary of S-21, did
21 you know Chau Seng?

22 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

23 A. Thank you. The name Chau Seng was still in my memory. I
24 remembered a lot about him.

25 [11.43.59]

41

1 Q. Thank you. Can you indicate to the Chamber what kind of person
2 Chau Seng was as he was arrested and brought to S-21?

3 A. Thank you. Chau Seng was a popular mass. He fought against the
4 Lon Nol. He was the one who established the pedagogic institution
5 that trains teachers, but later on there was an implication made
6 against Chau Seng.

7 One time in August 1977, Chau Seng said that the Central
8 Committee -- rather, Son Sen told me that Chau Seng was to be
9 sent to S-21. This is the issue surrounding the arrest of Chau
10 Seng.

11 And then Chau Seng was interrogated. The superior made a decision
12 later that Chau Seng was to be smashed and that superior was
13 Brother Nuon. At the Investigation phase I called him Uncle Nuon.
14 He decided that Chau Seng be smashed.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 [11.46.06]

17 MR. HONG KIMSUON:

18 Mr. President, may I provide the ERN numbers that I was looking
19 for?

20 It is D288/4.655.1. The ERN in English is 00367432 through
21 00367530. And the Khmer ERN is 000367632 through 000367708.

22 May I request that the witness read the highlighted portion of
23 the document and may I request that the document be put onto the
24 screen?

25 MR. PRESIDENT:

1 The assistant is now instructed to put the document onto the
2 screen.

3 MR. HONG KIMSUON:

4 With your leave, Mr. President, may I continue with another
5 question instead?

6 [11.48.19]

7 BY MR. HONG KIMSUON:

8 Q. Mr. Witness, in your capacity as the Secretary of S-21, do you
9 remember about a prisoner named Ros Sarin?

10 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

11 A. Thank you, Mr. President. I do not recall Ros Sarin, I never
12 knew this person before.

13 MR. HONG KIMSUON:

14 With your leave, Mr. President, may I provide the document to the
15 witness, document ERN 0086716, D108/26.282? And the ERN -- my
16 apology, Mr. President. May I move on to the other question?

17 [11.50.08]

18 BY MR. HONG KIMSUON:

19 Q. My next question, Mr. Witness, concerns another Khmer person
20 named Ouk Ket. Do you recall him in your capacity as the
21 supervisor of S-21?

22 MR. KAIN GUEK EAV:

23 A. Thank you. Mr. President, I remember Ouk Ket. I also remember
24 his wife and his daughter. They were civil parties in Case 001.

25 Q. Can you tell the Chamber about this because Case 001 is a

1 different case in our case here?

2 [11.51.13]

3 Can you tell the Court that Ouk Ket, as well as Ros Sarin and
4 Chau Seng, were indeed ordinary prisoners or they were some other
5 kind of prisoners?

6 A. I never knew Ouk Ket before, but I remember him very well
7 because during Case 001 Trial, civil parties there -- there were
8 civil parties who were the wife and daughter of Ouk Ket.

9 I indicated back then that Ouk Ket came to S-21 prior to the time
10 that I was the Secretary of S-21, so I concluded that Ros Sarin
11 and Ouk Ket were the diplomats of the GRUNK and Chau Seng was a
12 progressive person, and he may have been in France. They were of
13 different types of people. Chau Seng was in a position to
14 establish training schools.

15 Q. Thank you. Do you remember where Chau Seng and Ouk Ket were
16 working before they were brought to S-21?

17 A. Mr. President, may I indicate that I came to know about -- I
18 came to know about Ouk Ket during Case 001 Trial. His documents
19 were sent out to Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And as for Chau
20 Seng I knew about him from the beginning. My superior told me
21 about him.

22 Q. When you say they moved to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, does
23 that mean that they worked at the ministry?

24 A. Yes, it is correct.

25 [11.54.26]

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1 And that applies to Chau Seng. And as for Ouk Ket and Ros Sarin,
2 I think that they might not be working at the Ministry of Foreign
3 Affairs.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 My next question is -- it is only a reminding question. All
6 diplomats, intellectuals, and students who went from abroad to
7 Democratic Kampuchea, were all their names first submitted to the
8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs before they were sent to your
9 superior and to you?

10 A. Mr. President, in principle, it was like that.

11 Q. My question is: You said before the Court last week concerning
12 the arrest in the East Zone, you said that if the chief of the
13 unit rejected or requested that the people were to be maintained,
14 they would not be arrested; is that correct?

15 [11.56.30]

16 A. Yes, it was -- it is correct.

17 Q. Concerning the two persons I asked you about a while ago, Chau
18 Seng and Ouk Ket, from your understanding, before Chau Seng was
19 sent to S-21, before Ouk Ket was sent to S-21, there had to be
20 agreement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; this is correct?

21 A. In principle, I can say yes. And that particularly applies to
22 Ouk Ket.

23 And as for Chau Seng, I think, at the time, Ieng Sary was not at
24 the Ministry, so the Standing Committee decided that Chau Seng
25 was sent to my superior and my superior sent Chau Seng to me. So,

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1 for this practical instance, the decision was made without the
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3 MR. HONG KIMSUON:

4 Mr. President, I am mindful of the time. Maybe we now take the
5 adjournment.

6 MR. PRESIDENT:

7 Thank you.

8 It is now appropriate for us to adjourn for lunch break. The
9 Chamber will adjourn and will resume at 1.30, this afternoon.
10 Security guards are instructed to escort the witness back to the
11 waiting room and return him to the courtroom by 1.30.

12 [11.58.25]

13 Yes, defence counsel for Nuon Chea, you may proceed.

14 MR. PESTMAN:

15 Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. My client would like to remain
16 downstairs after the break to follow the proceedings from the
17 holding cell.

18 MR. PRESIDENT:

19 Having heard the request of Nuon Chea made through his counsel,
20 that request that he be following the proceedings from the
21 holding cell downstairs during the afternoon session, by waiving
22 his right to be present in the courtroom, the Chamber grants the
23 request of Mr. Nuon Chea that he will be following the
24 proceedings from the holding cell downstairs for the duration of
25 the afternoon session.

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1 The Chamber directs that the defence counsel for Nuon Chea submit
2 the written waiver with the thumbprint or signature of the
3 accused person.

4 AV Unit is instructed to live the proceedings to the holding cell
5 for this afternoon session. Detention facility guards are
6 instructed to bring the accused to the holding cell, downstairs,
7 and return Mr. Khieu Samphan to the courtroom by 1.30, this
8 afternoon.

9 The Court is now adjourned.

10 (Court recesses from 1200H to 1332H)

11 MR. PRESIDENT:

12 Please be seated. The Court is now in session.

13 Next, the Chamber hands over to civil party lawyer who has been
14 delegated to put questions to this witness.

15 MR. HONG KIMSUON:

16 Mr. President, I do not have any further questions for this
17 witness, but my colleague, Ms. Lyma Nguyen will continue
18 questioning this witness.

19 MR. PRESIDENT:

20 Yes, the floor is now yours, Counsel.

21 MS. NGUYEN:

22 Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon, all parties to the
23 proceedings. Good afternoon, Witness and members of the gallery
24 and civil parties sitting inside the Court.

25 [13.34.35]

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1 Your Honours, before I start, I think it might be helpful to
2 clarify exactly how much time the civil parties have, and what
3 that time goes into. As I understand it, there are six court
4 hours per day. We've already donated one hour to the Prosecution,
5 leaving us five hours remaining. One hour was used earlier by my
6 national co-counsel, with four hours remaining. We have two and a
7 half hours this afternoon, and the way that I understand it, we
8 then have one and a half hours going into tomorrow, and ending at
9 around the first break. If I could have some clarification over
10 this, then that might assist us to formulate the scope and extent
11 of our questions for today.

12 MR. PRESIDENT:

13 Counsel Karnavas, you may proceed.

14 MR. KARNAVAS:

15 Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon, everyone.

16 [13.35.35]

17 Of course, we leave it to the wise discretion of the Court.
18 However, it appears that, first, they asked for a day. Now
19 they're going by hours. They have to pick and choose. I mean,
20 nice trick, but that's not how it works. They donated one hour to
21 the Prosecution, we started half hour late today, so they may
22 have a half hour, as far as I'm concerned, tomorrow morning to
23 make up for the half hour that we lost this morning. But to go
24 through the mental gymnastics of the arithmetic that we just did
25 is a bit of sleight of hand.

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1 They asked for one day, they gave part of it away, they have
2 until the remaining of the day, and if the Court desires, they
3 can give them the half hour to make up for starting late this
4 morning. Anything more than that, I think, is a bit too much.

5 Thank you.

6 [13.36.25]

7 MS. NGUYEN:

8 Your Honours, it was always our understanding that one day meant
9 one full day, and that one full day meant six hours, or
10 thereabouts. The calculations were done for the assistance of the
11 Court. Your Honours don't need to answer it right now, but
12 perhaps, towards the end of today, if we can get some
13 clarification on that -- and, yes, in light of --

14 MR. PRESIDENT:

15 The Court will not answer to this question. You have the entire
16 day for today. Tomorrow, the Chamber will ask a number of
17 questions to this witness before it hands over to the defence
18 counsel.

19 QUESTIONING BY MS. NGUYEN:

20 Thank you for the clarification, Your Honour.

21 [13.37.31]

22 Q. Mr. Kaing Guek Eav, before I start my questioning, perhaps I
23 could request for you to be as succinct as possible in your
24 answers, unless I request for a more detailed answer by asking
25 you to explain something or asking you to describe something. Is

1 that something that you can do?

2 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

3 A. Mr. President, I will oblige.

4 Q. Thank you, Witness.

5 Witness, you said in evidence, yesterday, that S-21 belonged to
6 the regiment for the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea. Was there a
7 division of the Revolutionary Army dealing with the Air Force?

8 A. Thank you. Mr. President, the 502 Division was the Air Force.

9 Q. (Microphone not activated)

10 [13.38.47]

11 MR. PRESIDENT:

12 Please activate your mic.

13 BY MS. NGUYEN:

14 Q. Witness, the question was: Who was the chief of Division 502?

15 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

16 A. Mr. President, it was Sou Met. He was the chief of Division
17 502.

18 MR. PRESIDENT:

19 Yes, Mr. Karnavas?

20 MR. KARNAVAS:

21 Thank you, Mr. President. Earlier, we just heard that additional
22 time is being requested. Now it appears that questions are being
23 asked which seem to be irrelevant -- perhaps more relevant for
24 Case 003 and 004 -- or, 003, and this may be the ploy to suggest
25 that there are civil parties out there for 003.

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1 [13.39.43]

2 I would respectfully request that the questions relate strictly
3 to 002/01. Thank you.

4 MS. NGUYEN:

5 Your Honours, the questions are relevant to Case 002/1; they're
6 related to the communications structure.

7 The evidence has -- the witness has already given evidence about
8 the structure of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, and these
9 questions relate not only to the vertical communications
10 structures and administrative structures of the regime, but also
11 to the horizontal structures. And, in my submission, they are -
12 they are relevant to this trial.

13 [13.40.35]

14 Now, if I may continue?

15 MR. PRESIDENT:

16 Counsel is advised to be precise when it comes to questioning to
17 the witness concerning naming individuals. Some individuals may
18 be the subject to be summoned by the Court. This may be against
19 the protective measure principle. The Chamber would like just to
20 remind the counsel to be mindful of this provision.

21 The Chamber will not remind the witness to address other witness
22 by pseudonyms, because they are not aware of the pseudonyms of
23 other witnesses. Only parties are reminded of using pseudonyms to
24 address potential witnesses in order to be in line with the
25 principle of protective measures.

1 MS. NGUYEN:

2 Your Honours, as I understand it, these persons have -- evidence
3 have been given, in relation to these persons and their role in
4 the structure, in Case 001 already, and there is plenty of
5 evidence on the Case 001 case file in relation to the roles of
6 these people.

7 [13.42.18]

8 Now, I'm trying to establish that there were certain
9 communication channels that are within the realm of knowledge of
10 Mr. Kaing Guek Eav, and I'm not aware that anyone who has been
11 mentioned in these questions so far has been indeed called as a
12 witness in these proceedings.

13 (Judges deliberate)

14 [13.43.31]

15 MR. PRESIDENT:

16 Civil party lawyer can continue. The objection made by Defence
17 Counsel Karnavas does not stand.

18 However, the Chamber would like to remind parties that the
19 discussion at this stage is about the facts concerning the three
20 accused persons. Other irrelevant issues should not be the
21 subject of discussion at this stage. So your question should be
22 very related to the facts.

23 MS. NGUYEN:

24 Your Honours, I will do the best that I can.

25 Perhaps I could show the witness a document, with the leave of

1 the Court. This is document D288/5.210, with English ERN
2 00178065. The Khmer ERN is 00052994.

3 May I have the court greffier forward this document to the
4 witness?

5 [13.45.37]

6 MR. PRESIDENT:

7 Court officer is instructed to bring the document from counsel to
8 witness.

9 MS. NGUYEN:

10 Could I also have our case manager show this document onto the
11 screen?

12 MR. PRESIDENT:

13 The Chamber permits that. The assistant is instructed to put up
14 the document on the screen.

15 BY MS. NGUYEN:

16 Q. Witness, referring to either the document on the screen or the
17 hard copy document in your hand, could you please state whether
18 you have seen this document before?

19 [13.46.36]

20 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

21 A. Thank you, Mr. President. I have seen this document; I saw it
22 during the Case 001 Trial.

23 Q. Could you please identify for the Court the particulars of the
24 document, including who it was addressed to, who it was from, and
25 the date of that document, please?

1 A. Mr. President, the date of this document is the 1st April
2 1977. Son Sen asked Sou Met to write this document to me. He gave
3 this document to me.

4 I talked about this during Case 001 Trial.

5 Q. And could you summarize for the Court what the document is
6 about?

7 A. Mr. President, I would like to read the first part -- the
8 second part -- the third part, rather, part 1, paragraphs 3 and
9 4:

10 "After obtaining the confession of Saom of M-62, we have
11 transferred the followings to S-21:

12 "1. Phorn, whose wife named Phal (the network of Saom), was sent
13 on the 30th of March 1977.

14 "2. Sie, whose wife named Hoeung, is a traitor and has already
15 been arrested. Also, he is Saom's network of M-62, sent on the
16 31st of March 1977.

17 "3. Muk, a member of Battalion 512 (based on the confessions of
18 Sarum and Saom -- based on the confessions of Sarum and Saom of
19 M-62), was sent during the night of the 31st of March 1977.

20 "4. Phal, a member of Battalion 514 (based on the confessions of
21 Sarum and Saom of M-62), was sent in the morning of the 1st of
22 April 1977."

23 [13.50.13]

24 This document talks about the people sent to S-21 on the basis of
25 Angkar's decision.

1 And as for number 2, it reads that: "I wish to request Angkar's
2 advice on the remainder in order to take further action."

3 It means that it needs to seek advice from Angkar for those names
4 mentioned in the confessions. This is my reading, Your Honour.

5 Q. Thank you, Witness.

6 You mentioned in evidence, earlier, that the term "Angkar" was
7 used by individuals to sometimes refer to different things. You
8 gave the example that Nat used the term "Angkar" to refer to
9 himself, whereas you would use the term "Angkar" to refer to Pol
10 Pot or anyone who was instructed by Pol Pot.

11 [13.51.23]

12 Could you please clarify what "Angkar" refers to in this letter?

13 A. Thank you, Mr. President. The word "Angkar" mentioned in
14 Comrade Met's letter referred to Pol Pot.

15 Q. Witness, you said earlier that Son Sen had directed the author
16 of this letter to send the letter to you. Does this mean that
17 both you and the letter's author reported to the same person?

18 A. Mr. President, both of us reported to the supreme -- superior
19 through Son Sen.

20 Q. Witness, could I - could I just get you to clarify also what
21 "to take further action", in paragraph 2 of the letter, means?

22 A. Mr. President, the names on the basis of the confessions of
23 Saom and Sarum that Comrade Met sent to S-21 include others who
24 he sought advice from Angkar for further action. The further
25 action meant whether those names -- those people were to be sent

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1 to S-21 or not, and it was up to Angkar to decide on this.

2 [13.53.53]

3 MS. NGUYEN:

4 If I could take leave of the Court to present another document to
5 the witness?

6 MR. PRESIDENT:

7 Can you provide the document number?

8 MS. NGUYEN:

9 Yes, Your Honours. The document number is D288/5.211. The ERN in
10 English is 00178066, and the ERN in Khmer is 00002416.

11 MR. PRESIDENT:

12 Court officer is instructed to bring the document from counsel
13 and show it to witness for examination.

14 MS. NGUYEN:

15 I would also ask, at this stage, for the case manager to bring it
16 up on the screen.

17 [13.55.32]

18 MR. PRESIDENT:

19 The Chamber permits.

20 BY MS. NGUYEN:

21 Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Q. Witness, could you please state whether you've seen this
23 document before and whether you recognize it?

24 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

25 A. Thank you. Mr. President, I saw this document during Case File

1 001 Trial.

2 Q. Could you identify the document for the Court, starting again
3 with who it was addressed to, who it was sent from, and the date
4 of the document?

5 [13.56.35]

6 A. Mr. President, this letter was Comrade Met's. He sent it to me
7 following the instruction of the superior. It was actually sent
8 from my superior; it was not sent directly from Comrade Met. The
9 date of this document is 30th May 1977.

10 Q. When you say that it was sent directly from your superior, do
11 you mean to say that it was sent from the office of your superior
12 directly to your office?

13 A. Thank you. Mr. President, such these documents were sent
14 either from the messengers or some other kind of people, but I'm
15 sure that these documents reached me.

16 Q. Witness, if you could clarify for the Court, again, the last
17 paragraph, which says: "If Angkar allows, I would like to have
18 that confession in order to search for more enemies".

19 [13.58.14]

20 What does "Angkar" refer to in that paragraph?

21 A. Thank you. Mr. President, the word "Angkar" in paragraph 4
22 referred to the same person as in the previous document, through
23 Son Sen.

24 Q. Witness, if the document was sent through -- directly from Son
25 Sen, why is it that Son Sen did not sign the document?

1 A. Thank you. Mr. President, the writings of Comrade Met was
2 different from others, and we have seen that we had the signature
3 and the names of the -- of Comrade Met in this letter.

4 Q. Do you mean, Witness, that Met's writing is different from Son
5 Sen's writing?

6 A. Thank you. Mr. President, Comrade - Comrade Met's handwriting
7 is different from that of Son Sen.

8 Q. Witness, I have another document to show you, if the Court
9 grants leave. This is document ERN, in English, 00224319;
10 document D108/31.40; and in Khmer, it's ERN 00002078.

11 MR. PRESIDENT:

12 You may proceed.

13 [14.00.49]

14 Court officer is now instructed to hand over the document to the
15 witness.

16 And AV officer is now instructed to ensure that the document is
17 put up on the screen.

18 BY MS. NGUYEN:

19 Q. Witness, have you seen this document before?

20 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

21 A. (No interpretation)

22 Q. Could you -- could you please identify the document for the
23 Court, starting with who it's addressed to, who it's from, and
24 the date?

25 A. This document was another letter by Comrade Met--

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1 MR. PRESIDENT:

2 Witness, could you please hold on?

3 [14.01.51]

4 Counsel, you are on your feet. You may proceed.

5 MR. PESTMAN:

6 Sorry to interrupt, but we haven't got the document on the
7 screen. It helps to see the document. Thank you.

8 MR. PRESIDENT:

9 Court assistant, could you please advise the Court why the
10 document-- Oh, it is now back up on the screen.

11 Counsel, you may proceed with the question, but please be
12 reminded that the document be up on the screen. Only when it is
13 projected on the screen and that witness has received the hard
14 copy, then you may proceed with the questions. We wish to do this
15 because it is to be precise, and that parties also can save their
16 objections concerning documents being projected before a question
17 is put, because we have already seem to have established this
18 kind of pattern of work very well already.

19 [14.03.12]

20 BY MS. NGUYEN:

21 Yes, Your Honour. Thank you for the reminder.

22 Q. Witness, could you summarize what the document is about? And I
23 don't -- I'm not expecting you to read the document. Could you
24 say whether it concerns confessions?

25 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

1 A. This document concerns the request by the upper echelon to
2 obtain confession from Sem immediately, so that Angkar could
3 follow up his confession on time, or as soon as possible. The
4 document is dated 10th of August 1977.

5 Q. And can you clarify, as you have before, what the last
6 sentence refers to, the sentence that says: "Please reply through
7 Angkar as soon as possible."

8 A. I think the last wordings could have been understood as "as
9 soon as possible", although it's hard to read from this text.

10 [14.05.39]

11 However, I do not have any comment on the term "Angkar" -- the
12 different comment other than the one that I already testified.

13 Q. And just to be clear, you're referring to "Angkar" as Pol Pot
14 or as Son Sen?

15 A. Son Sen never regarded himself as Angkar, although some of his
16 subordinates would call him Angkar. But I, personally, regarded
17 Angkar as a person who was superior than that; sometimes Nuon
18 Chea, sometimes Pol Pot. So, when Son Sen brought the letter to
19 me, normally he would say that the letter was sent through me by
20 Angkar. That's what he indicated.

21 Q. Now, Witness, I noticed that the date on this letter is the
22 10th of August 1977. You gave evidence earlier that, on the 15th
23 of August 1977, Son Sen was sent to Neak Loeang, and Nuon Chea
24 took over Son Sen's position. Do you recall that?

25 [14.07.14]

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1 A. I do not know whether counsel made this mistake or through
2 translation lost, but Son Sen left me for Neak Loeang in 1978 --
3 rather, 1977, not 1978. That's when Son Sen left for Neak Loeang.

4 Q. Yes, and if I recall correctly, you gave evidence earlier
5 that, when Son Sen left, he was taken over by Nuon Chea -- or his
6 position was taken over by Nuon Chea, and Nuon Chea became your
7 direct supervisor; is that correct?

8 A. Yes, it is.

9 Q. So, given the date on this letter, it appears as though the
10 letter was only written five days before Son Sen was sent to Neak
11 Loeang. Was there a handover from Son Sen to Nuon Chea, in terms
12 of the tasks and responsibilities of his position?

13 A. I may not wish to respond to this question, because I want to
14 avoid any speculation. I'm afraid that my response would be
15 falling into the line of speculation regarding this particular
16 question.

17 [14.09.22]

18 Q. Thank you, Witness. Did you continue to receive similar
19 letters from Sou Met after he left to Neak Loeang in August 1977?

20 A. I'm afraid I don't recollect the details.

21 Q. Witness, could you please clarify the system of messengers
22 that was used to send these letters to you?

23 A. During that regime, Son Sen used two messengers to come to
24 S-21. Comrade Phan was the most frequent person who came to S-21
25 as a messenger. Comrade Phan would come by car when another

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1 comrade, Comrade Noeun, would come by motorcycle.

2 After the 15th of August 1977, Brother Nuon used two messengers:

3 Comrade Toeung and Comrade Sot, alias Chiv.

4 [14.11.22]

5 Later on, these two people -- never seen again, and Comrade Lin

6 took over the messenger position, and Comrade Ky, the chairman of

7 K-7, who would come to S-21 with letters brought directly from

8 Pol Pot.

9 So this is how letters were sent to S-21. It is that S-21 had no

10 authority to send anyone from S-21 to obtain the letters from

11 Angkar. It was Angkar who would send messengers to bring letters

12 to us.

13 Q. Did the messengers use any system of coding when they were

14 delivering the letters?

15 A. They did not use any specific coding. Brother Khieu used

16 Comrades Phan and Noeun since I had been working with Nat. And

17 when he left, Comrade -- rather, Bong Nuon introduced me to Pang.

18 [14.13.01]

19 And also another messenger was introduced. With just first

20 introduction, it was enough for us to get to know one another.

21 And I had known Pang and Toeung, who worked for Angkar, for a

22 long time. So, again, just the first introduction by our

23 superior, then we could establish this communication without any

24 problem.

25 Q. Thank you, Witness.

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1 I'd like to now move on to another topic, and, as I had alluded
2 to the Court the other day, I will be asking about the capture of
3 foreign nationals off the coast of Cambodia.

4 [14.14.00]

5 If the witness could be shown the Democratic Kampuchea
6 Constitution, which was previously shown to him by the
7 Prosecution. I have another copy here for the witness.

8 MR. PRESIDENT:

9 Court officer is now instructed to hand over the document from
10 counsel to the witness.

11 MS. NGUYEN:

12 Does Your Honour require me to read the ERNs in English and
13 Khmer, or am I able to forgo that, since the document had already
14 been presented to the witness?

15 MR. PRESIDENT:

16 Yes indeed, ERN numbers shall be read out so that other parties
17 are informed, because the French, English, and Khmer ERNs are
18 bearing different numbers.

19 MS. NGUYEN:

20 Yes, Your Honour. The English ERN of this document is 00184838.
21 It is document number D1.3.22.2. The Khmer ERN starts 0089841 and
22 the French ERN starts 0012644. Could I please have this document
23 shown on the screen?

24 MR. PRESIDENT:

25 You may proceed.

1 BY MS. NGUYEN:

2 Q. Witness, I draw your attention to Chapter 16 of the DK
3 Constitution; in particular, the second paragraph of Article 21.
4 Can you see that?

5 [14.16.18]

6 A. Yes, I can see this.

7 Q. This part of the constitution reads:

8 "Democratic Kampuchea adheres to a policy of independence, peace,
9 neutrality, and non-alignment. It will permit absolutely no
10 foreign country to maintain military bases on its territory, and
11 it resolutely opposed to all forms of outside interference in its
12 internal affairs and to all forms of subversion and aggression
13 against Democratic Kampuchea from outside, whether military,
14 political, cultural, social, diplomatic, or humanitarian."

15 [14.17.05]

16 Have you studied or taught this part of the Constitution?

17 A. According to my reading and my experience, the Democratic
18 Kampuchea had implemented this portion of the constitution
19 absolutely and firmly.

20 Q. Which regiment or unit of the Revolutionary Army of the
21 Kampuchea had responsibility over protecting the coastal waters
22 of the Democratic Kampuchea?

23 A. The navy forces for Democratic Kampuchea was from Division
24 106.

25 Q. And did this division have a mandate to defend the Democratic

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1 Kampuchea's waters aggressively?

2 A. Rather, the -- this division, Division 164, was meant to
3 protect waters, borders, and any matters relevant to maritime
4 within the territory of Cambodia firmly and absolutely.

5 Q. Who was the chief of Division 164, and what was his role in
6 relation to the Central Committee?

7 A. The commander of this division was Meas Muth.

8 [14.20.23]

9 He just became member of the Standing Committee recently.

10 Q. Do you recall having said, in evidence on the 29th of March,
11 that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was the implementer of
12 foreign policy of the Democratic Kampuchea?

13 A. The minister of foreign affairs was fully in charge of foreign
14 affairs, and I did testify like that.

15 Q. You also said in evidence that a large number of Thai
16 fishermen were sent to S-21 before the 30th of March 1976. Was
17 the arrest or capture of foreign nationals off the coast of
18 Cambodia a matter of foreign affairs?

19 A. The list of the fishermen who were still there at S-21 -- and
20 I would like to explain as follows.

21 [14.21.58]

22 These people were arrested by people at Division 164 under the
23 order from the general staff under order from Son Sen, not from
24 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

25 Q. Did the resolute opposition of all forms of outside

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1 interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Kampuchea,
2 which features in the constitution under Chapter 16, form a basis
3 as to the treatment of foreign nationals by the Democratic
4 Kampuchea?

5 A. Mr. President, counsel seems to have only read out a statement
6 without putting question.

7 Q. Witness, the question was: Did the policy under Chapter 16 of
8 the constitution on form a basis -- a foundation, for the
9 treatment of foreign nationals by the state?

10 A. I think, perhaps, the language used here were not the same.
11 The -- Division 164 was embedded with the jurisdiction to protect
12 waters -- maritime border -- exclusively.

13 Q. Do you recall, in Case 001 proceedings that evidence was led
14 about the detention of foreign nationals at S-21?

15 A. There were numbers of foreign nationals who were detained at
16 S-21, and later on executed.

17 [14.25.09]

18 Q. I'd like you to turn your mind to the Western foreign
19 nationals, the Caucasians who were captured off the coast of
20 Cambodia and taken to S-21. Do you accept that evidence was given
21 in Case 001 that these Westerners included two Australians, one
22 Briton, one New Zealander, and three Americans?

23 A. I think this issue has been well understood by the world.

24 These -- four Westerners were sent to S-21 -- four only.

25 [14.25.57]

66

1 They were detained and executed and orders were rendered from the
2 superior to burn them with car tires into ashes.

3 Q. I do have some questions for you about that issue, but before
4 we get to that, I'd like to ask; were the foreigners -- were the
5 foreign nationals considered to be important prisoners or special
6 prisoners when they arrived at S-21?

7 A. With regard to the Thai fishermen, there was no important
8 consideration regarding them, because they were executed
9 summarily. But, with regard to the four Westerners, there were --
10 there was some level of attention, and I had to choose some
11 interrogators who had experience interrogating key people to
12 conduct interrogation on these four Westerners.

13 Q. Why was it that these four Westerners had some sort of special
14 status?

15 A. These people entered Cambodia illegally, without permission
16 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Democratic Kampuchea
17 treated these people as spies. These wide-eyed Westerners were
18 believed to have experience in spying others -- or in espionage.

19 Q. Are you aware whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs
20 participated in any decisions regarding the capture, arrest, or
21 transfer of these foreign nationals to S-21?

22 A. I think, as a work principle permits, I don't see why the
23 Minister of Foreign Affairs had to do anything with this.

24 [14.29.20]

25 It was at the hand of Pol Pot and Nuon Chea who would be the ones

1 who shall handle this.

2 Q. Could you confirm what special procedures took place with the
3 special prisoners?

4 A. Mr. President, at S-21, these people were detained in special
5 rooms. The interrogators themselves were chosen by me. They were
6 experienced interrogators. I was very specific. And after the
7 interrogations there would be a decision to smash. The smash was
8 to be conducted in a formal burning to ash.

9 Q. In evidence, you said earlier that you conferred with Nuon
10 Chea on a regular basis about the identification of special
11 prisoners.

12 [14.30.49]

13 Did you confer with Nuon Chea in this case with the four foreign
14 nationals who you referred to earlier?

15 A. Thank you. Mr. President, to my recollection, these four
16 prisoners were sent from the superior. They were sent during the
17 times that Son Sen was in charge. And the second time that they
18 were sent, they were sent during the time that Nuon Chea was in
19 charge of the place, so I was following the order from Nuon Chea,
20 and I implemented the order.

21 Q. You said earlier, Witness, that Nuon Chea gave you an order to
22 burn the foreign Westerner's in tires. When did Nuon Chea give
23 you this order, if you could recall the date?

24 A. Thank you. Mr. President, I do not recall the date.

25 Q. Why was it necessary to burn the foreign Westerners in tires?

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1 A. Mr. President, we needed to burn them in tires because they -
2 we wanted them to be burned completely, to burn their bones into
3 ashes.

4 [14.33.08]

5 Q. And why was it necessary to burn them to ashes?

6 A. The reason was that no one would be able to trace -- to trace
7 them so no bones were left behind.

8 Q. Had these foreign national prisoners been executed before they
9 were burned in the tires?

10 A. Mr. President, these prisoners were not burned alive. No one
11 was burned alive; they were first killed before they were burned.

12 Q. After they were burnt to ashes, did you have to report that to
13 your superior?

14 A. I had to report to the -- to my superiors that it was
15 implemented -- the order was implemented.

16 Q. And how did you know when that order had been implemented?

17 A. I reported to my superiors that the regulation or the order
18 was already implemented, and I received the report from Comrade
19 Hor whom I ordered to do the burning.

20 Q. Did you have to send any evidence to your superiors to show
21 that that had taken place? Where any photos taken of the corpses?

22 [14.35.52]

23 A. These four individuals were not taken -- any photos.

24 Q. I just wanted a point of clarification. You said that there
25 were two lots of foreign nationals who came in at different

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1 times; that the first time -- the first lot who came in was
2 during a period where you were under the supervision of Son Sen
3 and the second lot who came in was during a period when you were
4 under the supervision of Nuon Chea; is that correct?

5 A. Yes, it is correct.

6 Q. So are you saying, then, that the first lot came in before the
7 17th of August 1977 and the second lot came in after the 17th of
8 August 1977?

9 A. Mr. President, it is correct, but it was not before 17 August
10 1977, it was after - it was before 15 August 1977 and after the
11 15 of August 1977.

12 [14.37.23]

13 Q. Yes, Witness, thank you for that clarification.

14 I'd like to show the witness a document. This document has
15 previously been shown to the witness by the Prosecution. It's a
16 copy of the "Revolutionary Flag". Your Honours, may I please have
17 the Court staff bring this document to the witness?

18 Your Honours, just to clarify the different versions of the
19 document, the Khmer version ERN starts 00064551 and goes to
20 00064585, the English version starts 00185322 and goes to
21 00185348, and the French version starts 00524447 and goes to
22 00524475.

23 [14.38.56]

24 MR. PRESIDENT:

25 Can you also provide the document number; is it a D or an E

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1 document?

2 BY MS. NGUYEN:

3 Yes, Your Honour, the document's number is IS 11.14.

4 Q. Witness, do you actually already have this document before
5 you?

6 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

7 A. Mr. President, it is difficult to find this. May I be provided
8 with a new document?

9 MR. PRESIDENT:

10 Court officer is instructed to take the document from Counsel and
11 bring it to witness and the assistant may put the document onto
12 the screen.

13 [14.40.02]

14 BY MS. NGUYEN:

15 Q. Witness, do you recall being shown this very document by the
16 prosecutor on Tuesday the 27th of March?

17 Just to identify it, I'll say that it's the "Revolutionary Flag"
18 special number, May to June 1978.

19 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

20 A. Thank you, Mr. President. After having seen this document, I'm
21 sure I have received this document. I must have received this
22 document from the prosecutors; the issue was of the May and June
23 1978.

24 Q. Yes and, in evidence, you confirmed that you had taught the
25 contents of this document to your staff at S-21; do you recall

1 that?

2 A. Mr. President, the "Revolutionary Flag" magazines are the
3 sources for educating cadres in terms of intellectuals and
4 spiritual. Sometimes, I quote -- I quoted from this page,
5 sometime, I quoted from the other page. So I selected certain
6 contents of the "Revolutionary Flag" magazines to teach; I'm not
7 sure of which portion that counsel is referring to.

8 Q. Witness, I draw your attention to page 26 of the Khmer version
9 of the "Revolutionary Flag"; this is ERN 00185332-- Oh, sorry,
10 excuse me, that was the English ERN. The Khmer ERN is 00064566.

11 [14.42.35]

12 This is underneath the heading that says: "What are the
13 Contradictions Between our Revolution and the Counter Revolution?
14 What are the Forces Opposing Our Revolution?" That's the heading.
15 Do you see that?

16 A. Mr. President, yes, I see these points.

17 Q. The document is also being shown on the screen and certain
18 portions of the document have been boxed in a red colour. I'll
19 take you through those portions.

20 The first box is a title. The second box says: "The problem is a
21 political one."

22 The third box says: "The contradiction is between socialism and
23 the capitalists. This is basically the correct problematic and it
24 is basically correct that there must be measures attacking
25 capitalism."

1 [14.43.44]

2 The fourth box should say: "Immediately after liberation, the
3 attacks against us began. Who was attacking us? It was the CIA,
4 the Yuon, and the KGB."

5 Going down the document, the sixth box should say: "The heads we
6 must attack are CIA, Yuon, and KGB. Since 1975, the forces that
7 have attacked us have all nothing other than CIA and Yuon."

8 Further down that same paragraph, it talks about the CIA: "The
9 only difference among them was that some of these CIA's were more
10 on the American side whilst others were more on the Yuon side."

11 And then the box further down after that says: "What we want to
12 make clear here is that these traitorous networks have always
13 been with the CIA and the Yuon and that inside the Yuon, the CIA
14 are already predominant."

15 Further down, the next paragraph that's boxed says: "All such
16 opposition forces are CIA, Yuon, and Soviet espionage agents and
17 it is these forces that we must attack."

18 [14.45.16]

19 The paragraph after that says: "To sum things up, in the
20 contradiction with us are the CIA, the Yuon, and the KGB and
21 amongst these, the Yuon are the most noxious and acute."

22 The next boxed part says: "Our sharpest attack is on the
23 aggressive, territory-swallowing Yuon. At the same time, we
24 attack the CIA and the KGB."

25 And then on the next page or the - the next page, yes, page 30 of

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1 the Khmer document, there is a statement in the box: "There are
2 only CIA, Yuon, and Soviet forces attacking our revolution."
3 [14.46.10]

4 Witness, could you explain to the Court what was your
5 understanding of CIA at the time?

6 A. Mr. President, CIA, at the time, referred to Khmers in
7 Cambodia, but who received appointments from the America.

8 Q. Did your understanding of the CIA derive from the propaganda
9 documents such as the "Revolutionary Flag" which you said, in
10 evidence, was written by the Party Secretary?

11 A. Mr. President, the life and death enemy of the Communist Party
12 of Kampuchea were to be determined by the Secretary of the Party.
13 No one could determine that.

14 Q. Can you explain to the Court - can you please explain to the
15 Court what "Yuon" refers to?

16 A. Mr. President, "Yuon" refers to "Yuons" who lived in the Khmer
17 territories. Actually, it refers to the Khmer people with "Yuon"
18 tendency; they are -- they were against the Party's policies.

19 Q. And what was the Party line in relation to the "Yuon" enemy?
20 [14.48.51]

21 A. The Party policies were to the -- smash all enemies. Those who
22 were arrested were brought to the police and after interrogated,
23 they were to be smashed.

24 Q. In evidence, last week, you said that Son -- Son Sen directed
25 that S-21 was to identify and extract confessions from CIA

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1 agents. You said that you later had to identify KGB agents and
2 there was also the aggressive "Yuon" who had to be smashed and
3 killed. Could you confirm then the classes of enemies of the
4 Communist Party of Kampuchea included the CIA, the KGB, and the
5 "Yuon"?

6 A. As the life and death enemies of the Communist Party of
7 Kampuchea were these three groups, CIA, KGB, and the "Yuon"
8 agents.

9 Q. Witness, just so that we can be absolutely clear, because you
10 explained that "Yuon" refers to "Yuon" who live in Khmer
11 territory or Khmer people with "Yuon" tendencies, are you
12 referring to the Vietnamese when you say "Yuon"?

13 [14.50.40]

14 A. Thank you. Mr. President, we have misunderstood one word.
15 Perhaps I made a mistake. We were to explore the "Yuon" enemies
16 within the Khmer territory; we were not to arrest "Yuon" enemies
17 in their territory. Then I moved on to talk about the Communist
18 Party of Kampuchea referring to the old forces of the enemies of
19 the Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea.

20 Q. Witness, thank you for that, but it is still confusing when
21 you refer to "Yuon" to explain the word "Yuon". So just to be
22 very clear, does "Yuon" mean people who are racially Vietnamese
23 or ethnically Vietnamese or have Vietnamese nationality?

24 A. In practice and in theory -- in theory we refer to the "Yuon"
25 agents as -- as the agents following the Cambodian territories

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1 and that refers to Khmer people with "Yuon" tendencies and they
2 refers to the forces of the People Revolutionary Party of
3 Kampuchea.

4 In practice, we saw this together; "Yuon" people were not able to
5 live in Cambodia, they would be looked at every time.

6 [14.53.10]

7 Q. I might just move on now. In evidence, earlier, you said that
8 Son Sen reprimanded you for there being no CIA confessions at
9 S-21 on one occasion; do you remember when he reprimanded you for
10 this?

11 A. Thank you. I do not recall the exact date, but the situation
12 there was that I was with Nat; I was his deputy. I was
13 interrogating a prisoner with him. He took out a piece of paper;
14 he said that now, in Sector 32, a CIA agent was found. No matter
15 if that CIA agent was base, he was still a CIA agent. Now, the
16 security sector of Sector 32 was -- found a CIA agent and how --
17 and why did S-21 not find any CIA agents?

18 [14.54.53]

19 Chap Nam was the chief of the Security Sector; it was Sector 32.
20 It was probably in December because I remember that it was before
21 I got married. Those who were from the Soviet Union were asked
22 and they named CIA rather and then Son Sen questioned why we
23 refer the Soviet people as CIA. And so we questioned them again
24 and so they said they were KGB not CIA, so that is why the KGB
25 agents were identified.

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1 And after that the third category of enemy were identified; they
2 was the "Yuon" agents. The word "agents" is very important here.

3 MR. PRESIDENT:

4 It is now appropriate for us to take a short break. We will break
5 for 20 minutes -- rather, we will break for 15 minutes and we
6 will resume after that.

7 Security guard is instructed to escort witness to the waiting
8 room and return him to the courtroom before we resume.

9 The Court is adjourned.

10 THE GREFFIER:

11 All rise.

12 (Court recesses from 1508H to 1513H)

13 MR. PRESIDENT:

14 Please be seated. The Court is now back in session.

15 We would like to hand over to Counsel for the civil party--

16 We note that counsel for Nuon Chea is on his feet. You may
17 proceed first.

18 MR. PESTMAN:

19 I'm sorry to stand up again but I just had a question, because
20 apparently, Mr. President, you said something about three days
21 being given to the Defence to examine or cross-examine this
22 particular witness, in total -- something which not translated
23 into English. I don't know whether I was informed correctly or
24 not.

25 [15.15.07]

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1 Is it true that we will only have three days for - combined for
2 our cross examination?

3 MR. PRESIDENT:

4 Yes indeed, according to the schedule, defence counsels have
5 three days starting from tomorrow. And the Chamber has not
6 determined precisely how the three days will be divided among the
7 three civil - rather, three defence teams because, so far as we
8 observed, each and individual defence counsel has used the
9 allocated time differently. Some may have used more times than
10 the others and some have exercised their rights not to put
11 questions, and they have, for example, indicated to the senior
12 legal officer of the Trial Chamber that they would need half day,
13 but then they would not use the half day asked -- so on and so
14 forth. For this, the Chamber wishes to just make clear that we
15 offer three days for the defence counsels - the three defend
16 counsels. Whether -- how they share the times among themselves --
17 then they would need to advise the Chamber, and -- yes, we hope
18 it's clear.

19 [15.17.03]

20 MR. PESTMAN:

21 Because we had indicated earlier to the senior legal officer that
22 we were - we did not know how much time we needed, exactly. Of
23 course, dependent on the questions asked by the prosecutor and
24 the answers given -- also to questions by the civil parties, but
25 I - my estimate is now that we will need approximately two days

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1 for our cross-examination. I don't know whether that allows
2 enough time for the other teams to do their part of the
3 cross-examination.

4 [15.17.36]

5 MR. PRESIDENT:

6 Counsel for Khieu Samphan, you may proceed.

7 MR. VERCKEN:

8 Thank you, Mr. President. First of all, this whole discussion
9 regarding the duration of the cross examination of the witness
10 now on -- at the dock leads me to underscore the great difficulty
11 - the obscure nature of these proceedings place us.

12 Regarding, in particular, the way your Chamber is going to use
13 the elements from the investigation. Let me clarify.

14 I spoke about this matter to all parties present here -- except
15 for the Prosecution, I must confess, and no one is able to answer
16 the simple following question, which is: at the end of this
17 trial, are you going to deliberate and are you going to use the
18 totality of the investigation or will you only limit yourselves
19 to the documents that were produced before the Chamber and
20 debated in public, and that were indexed corresponding to this
21 status?

22 [15.19.49]

23 And I mention this right now because, when we cross-examine
24 someone, and especially someone as the witness, who was
25 questioned 65 times, as I already said, you can very well imagine

1 that if you look at the totality of these 65 sessions it will be
2 very - it
3 will be different from just looking at the transcripts and at the
4 documents that were produced before the Court and approved as
5 such.

6 So that is my issue, and apparently I'm not the only one who is
7 confused about this -- and this is very important because in
8 terms of allowing my team to determine how much time we're going
9 to need to cross-examine this witness as well as the others, of
10 course.

11 [15.20.32]

12 MR. PRESIDENT:

13 Could you advise the Chamber how much time would you need?

14 Counsel for Nuon Chea indicated that they would need
15 approximately two days for this so the Chamber is now expecting
16 from you the exact time your counsel - your team wishes to have.

17 As we have learned from the past that sometimes you would ask for
18 more time and that, when it came to the time you put questions,
19 then counsel chose not to put any question.

20 And it is difficult for Chamber to determine the time for each
21 counsel. We understand that witness has different experience
22 accounts or testimonies to give to the Chamber, and for that the
23 Chamber cannot make any decision on the time and that - for that
24 reason as well we also need to understand from counsels -- they
25 are supposed to advise the Chamber on how much time they need.

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1 On Friday, counsels are also supposed to provide some preliminary
2 information concerning the times needed to the Chamber in that
3 meeting.

4 [15.22.37]

5 And at the same time the Chamber also needs to consider whether
6 questions are repetitious and if questions are repeated, then
7 Chamber may remind parties concerning their time used.

8 MR. VERCKEN:

9 Yes, Mr. President, I understand very well your concerns. And
10 this is why, in order to clearly address your concerns in the
11 most reliable way possible, I am requesting clarification as soon
12 as possible, and, if possible, right now, about how this trial is
13 going to unfold. I'd like to know very clearly, and I need this
14 in order to determine how much time I will require to
15 cross-examine the witness.

16 I need to know the rules according to which your Tribunal
17 operates; and I need to know which are the documents that you're
18 going to take with you when you deliberate. Are you going to use
19 the totality of the investigation for your deliberations?

20 [15.24.13]

21 Well, in that case, what I'm trying to say is that the
22 cross-examination will necessarily be longer because it will not
23 be based only on elements that were put before the Chamber during
24 the hearings. But on the other hand, if you tell us that the only
25 elements that you're going to take with you when you are going to

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1 deliberate are the transcripts and the documents that were – that
2 were produced before the Chamber and that were indexed, well,
3 then, this will restrict, of course, the time that I will need to
4 cross-examine the witness.

5 And this question is being asked, in fact, from both sides: from
6 the Prosecution as well as from the Defence, so I think that it
7 is essential to obtain a clear and simple answer as soon as
8 possible. And then, on that basis, of course, we will be able to
9 address the concerns of the Chamber.

10 MR. PRESIDENT:

11 Counsel for Ieng Sary, would you wish to make any observation
12 concerning this?

13 (Judges deliberate)

14 [15.26.58]

15 MR. PRESIDENT:

16 Counsel Karnavas, you may now proceed.

17 MR. KARNAVAS:

18 Thank you, Mr. President. Thus far, I've prepared approximately
19 two days' worth of examination. However, that is based on if I
20 were to be going first, which I'm not. Depending on what happens
21 with the Nuon Chea team, obviously, I will then reconsider and
22 edit away things that might have been covered by them, assuming
23 they're covered sufficiently. And so I can only say that at least
24 a day I will need. I'll try to be as efficient as possible but I
25 have prepared for two days for the gentleman.

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1 And before I sit down, I notice that we've eaten up about --
2 approximately half hour worth of the civil parties' time, and I
3 do think -- at least the Ieng Sary team thinks it's - it would be
4 fair to give the civil parties one hour tomorrow morning to make
5 up for the lost time this morning and this afternoon that's been
6 take up with procedural matters. Thank you.

7 [15.38.10]

8 MR. PRESIDENT:

9 International Co-Prosecutor, you may now proceed.

10 MR. SMITH:

11 Thank you, Mr. President. Certainly, in answer to the defence
12 team for Khieu Samphan, it would be the Prosecution's position
13 that all of this witness' prior statements be taken into account
14 in your deliberations, and all of his prior testimony. Your
15 Honours have already made a decision on this point and stated
16 that all of the prior statements of a witness are deemed put
17 before the Chamber.

18 [15.28.46]

19 The witness is available here for cross-examination, and
20 certainly it accords with international criminal law practice
21 particularly in relation to the acts and conduct of the accused.
22 If the witness - the witness needs to be present for examination
23 and now that that has occurred, we would ask -- we will be
24 submitting that all of his prior testimony and statements be
25 taken into consideration. Thank you.

1 MR. PRESIDENT:

2 Lead Co-Lawyer for the civil party, you may proceed first.

3 MS. SIMONNEAU-FORT:

4 Yes, good afternoon, Your Honours, good afternoon, President.

5 First, a few observations regarding the issue that was raised by
6 the Defence, I believe that it's very difficult for us to gauge
7 precisely how much time is necessary for examination ahead of
8 time, independently of the issue of documents. It's difficult
9 because we do not know the questions that are put by the other
10 parties before us so we can only provide you with estimates. And
11 I understand, of course, that the Defence teams are not always
12 able, just as we are, to provide a specific time.

13 [15.30.12]

14 Now, regarding the issue of documents, I - in my opinion, I also
15 believe that we should clarify which documents you're going to
16 use when you deliberate. As far as I am concerned, I thought that
17 any document that had been put before the Chamber could be used
18 during the deliberation, but it might be a good idea for your
19 Chamber to specify exactly what it means by "document produced
20 before the Chamber", because obviously this is not clear for
21 everyone. It is true that -- regarding the quantity of documents
22 that your Chamber will use will have an effect on the time for
23 examination.

24 [15.30.59]

25 And last point and please forgive me for insisting, and I was

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1 going to ask you this question at the end of the day but I will
2 do it right now because we're discussing this issue of
3 examination. And I think there was a misunderstanding regarding
4 our request for extra time. I'm not going to count up our time,
5 precisely, but it's true the hearing started 30 minutes late this
6 morning for reasons that we could not control. Thirty minutes is
7 a lot in a one-day examination and we would like at least to be
8 able to recuperate these 30 minutes, but also the 20-25 minutes
9 that we are spending now discussing an important issue. So I am
10 delighted to see that my colleague working for – my colleague --
11 the Ieng Sary defence is willing to grant us one hour now, and I
12 believe indeed that it would be a good idea to have one extra
13 hour tomorrow because we have lost more than 45 minutes without
14 us being responsible for this.

15 [15.32.10]

16 So I am kindly requesting the Court to grant us an extra hour.
17 And I think it's also normal for the Defence to ask for extra
18 time if the Defence feels that it's necessary. This hearing is
19 based on a debate, and we should not limit this time to debate
20 the issues if the parties believe that it is necessary and --
21 during which time we also put documents before the Court.

22 MR. PRESIDENT:

23 Defence Counsel for Mr. Khieu Samphan, you may proceed. And this
24 is the last time you will take the floor for this afternoon's
25 session.

1 MR. VERCKEN:

2 Not this afternoon, Mr. President; with regard to this question.

3 I would like to respond to the prosecutor and say that contrary

4 to what he has said the practice that he wishes to have applied

5 is not at all that of the International Courts.

6 [15.33.12]

7 International courts apply an accusatory procedure and the

8 Chamber has to deliberate on documents tendered into evidence and

9 there has to be a public debate on that. This is what happens in

10 France and it is similar to what we are doing here. The assize

11 courts cannot deliberate without the documents.

12 Let me cite the situation at ICTR, the International Criminal

13 Tribunal for Rwanda, where the practice that is being presented

14 by the prosecutor doesn't obtain the -- the proceedings cannot

15 proceed -- or cannot be held without the documents being tendered

16 into evidence and debated upon by the parties.

17 MR. PRESIDENT:

18 Is this your last standing, Mr. Pestman? Would you -- how many

19 times more you need to take the floor?

20 MR. PESTMAN:

21 Well, I certainly hope it's my last time. It's a bit confusing

22 because there's two discussions running parallel.

23 [15.34.33]

24 There's one about the amount of days allotted for the Defence. I

25 haven't heard Khieu Samphan's position on that particular issue,

1 so I can count two plus maybe two, it's already four, so I
2 foresee a problem.

3 I would like to know that as far as I'm aware that the prosecutor
4 and the civil parties together had six-and-half, seven days to
5 examine this witness. So I would maintain that we have at least a
6 similar amount of days to our disposal to cross-examine the
7 witness as well.

8 [15.35.05]

9 The other discussion is quite interesting, but it's not the first
10 time that we have this discussion, the discussion about the
11 probative value of statements given before the Investigating
12 Judges which are not dealt with or mentioned during the
13 examination of a witness.

14 We had this discussion with the senior legal officer and she told
15 me -- and I think it's important that that is put on the record
16 -- she told me or us that persons present at the time that she
17 took the position she thought that the Trial Chamber would take
18 the position that only those excerpts which were discussed with
19 the witness or by the witness could be used as evidence, and not
20 other statements or excerpts which are not dealt with in court.

21 MR. PRESIDENT:

22 Yes, please.

23 MR. SMITH:

24 Thank you, Your Honours. I think there's a couple of things that
25 have been confused here.

1 Firstly, the Prosecution is not asking Your Honours to take the
2 witness statements -- this witness's statements and trial
3 transcript into account without them being placed before the
4 Chamber.

5 [15.36.27]

6 We put them on our list to be placed before the Chamber, and Your
7 Honours' have already stated that once the witness appears the
8 documents are in fact beyond but before the Chamber. That was a
9 ruling of Your Honours.

10 Secondly, the practice at the International Criminal Tribunal for
11 the Former Yugoslavia is that if a witness appears that statement
12 can go in as evidence in conjunction with the witness testimony.

13 [15.36.56]

14 Also, the practice is that witness statements can go into the
15 Chamber's consideration without that witness appearing if that
16 statement does not relate to material relating to the acts and
17 conduct of the accused.

18 In this situation, because the witness is here, he's here to be
19 cross-examined on his statements and any testimony he gives. And
20 so it is the international practice that statements that have
21 been put before the Chamber can be taken into account.

22 Thank you.

23 MR. KARNAVAS:

24 I apologize, Mr. President, but just--

25 MR. PRESIDENT:

1 You are not yet permitted to take the floor, Counsel. You can't
2 just stand up and talk. You promised once that you would seek
3 leave from us.

4 Now, concerning the delay and the loss of time for counsel for
5 civil parties this morning because of the traffic jam, today's
6 hearing will be delayed to four-twenty.

7 However, there have been interruptions from parties concerning
8 questions, objections, so this contributes to the loss of the
9 time to be given to the civil party lawyers.

10 [15.39.15]

11 To reflect this, the Chamber decides that an additional one hour
12 will be provided to civil party lawyers tomorrow morning to
13 continue their questionings to this witness.

14 Secondly, concerning the documents to be the basis on the
15 Chamber's decision, the Chamber finds that in -- at paragraph 3
16 of the Rule and Evidence Provision, the Chamber has not observed
17 any other provisions besides Internal Rule 87.3, that the Chamber
18 will consider evidence to be placed before the Court or the
19 documents that are placed before the parties by the Chamber.

20 [15.40.42]

21 Documents considered to be -- will be considered to be placed
22 before the Court when their contents are summarized before the
23 Court. This is the basis for the Chamber to consider its
24 decision.

25 Secondly, because of the facts in the Closing Order are broad in

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1 nature, the Chamber considers Internal Rule 89 ter concerning
2 severance of the proceedings. This was the basis of the Chamber's
3 decision when it comes to the Severance Order.

4 This is different from the facts set out in the Closing Order;
5 that is why we are dealing with this segment, Case 002/1. The
6 Chamber has been following the order as mentioned in the
7 memorandum that was sent out to the parties.

8 And in order to make this clear or even clearer, I would like to
9 hand over to Judge Lavergne to specify this issue because it
10 deals more with the French proceedings.

11 Judge Lavergne, you may proceed.

12 JUDGE LAVERGNE:

13 Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.

14 [15.42.59]

15 I do not know whether the reference to French civil law is
16 actually pertinent, but what I know is that you've made proper
17 reference to Rule 87.3 which is the rule that is applicable to
18 this Case and which provides clearly that for the Chamber to rule
19 it has to rely on documents tendered into evidence.

20 And we should also be clear on this point; we cannot make do with
21 parts of documents read out. When a document is tendered into
22 evidence, it is the entire document which is used by the Chamber
23 as the case may apply.

24 I think we have already clarified this matter and stated that
25 when a witness is testifying all prior testimonies, all prior

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1 declarations, have to be tendered into evidence, which means that
2 the parties have the opportunity if they so wish to rely on those
3 documents to ask questions, and that is part of adversarial
4 proceedings.

5 [15.44.19]

6 So if the parties wish to use the documents, they may do so, and
7 if they do not wish to do so, so be it, and the Chamber relies on
8 those documents in making a ruling.

9 I hope this clarification settles the matter and the rule that
10 applies is Rule 85.3.

11 MR. PRESIDENT:

12 The Chamber now hands over to civil party counsel to continue her
13 questioning.

14 The Chamber will not give the floor to you again, Counsel. That
15 was your last forum. I asked you that clearly.

16 Now, civil party counsel can continue her questioning and the
17 proceedings will last until 4.20.

18 MS. NGUYEN:

19 Thank you very much, Your Honours.

20 BY MS. NGUYEN:

21 Q. Witness, just before the break, I asked you about the incident
22 where Son Sen reprimanded you for there being no CIA confessions
23 at S-21. I asked you for the date that he reprimanded you, and
24 you said it was probably around December. Can you clarify what
25 year this was, please?

1 [15.45.59]

2 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

3 A. Thank you for your clarification. It was in December 1975,
4 before I got married.

5 Q. Thank you, Witness. Did you feel under pressure from Son Sen
6 to obtain CIA confessions at S-21?

7 A. Thank you. Mr. President, at that time I understood that it
8 was more of an -- imposing an order than an explanation.

9 Q. So you understood that you must carry that -- carry out that
10 order; is that correct?

11 A. No one could reject the order of the Party. Soldiers had to
12 obey the orders.

13 Q. And was Son Sen, likewise, under pressure himself from the
14 upper echelons to obtain CIA confessions from S-21?

15 [15.47.52]

16 A. I would be speculating if I answered this question.

17 Q. Did Nuon Chea ever impose on you or order you or make you feel
18 pressured to extract confessions at S-21 for people being CIA?

19 A. Mr. President, when Son Sen talked about the facts that S-21
20 could not find any CIA, it was like an imposition of an order
21 already and that imposition of order was from Son Sen. And when
22 Nuon Chea came to supervise S-21, S-21 was already in a position
23 that it had to follow the Party's policies. Everyone had to be in
24 agreement that the Party's policy was to be implemented.

25 Q. Why was it necessary to have CIA confessions at S-21?

1 A. Mr. President, the duty of S-21 was to implement the
2 counter-espionage -- rather was to counter-espionage. That was
3 why we were required to find CIA, KGB and the territories
4 following "Yvon" agents.

5 MS. NGUYEN:

6 Your Honours, I now seek leave to have the witness shown another
7 document. This is document number D57 and it is ERN 008 -- sorry,
8 00088751. This document appears to only be in the Khmer language
9 although there is some English written on it.

10 [15.51.29]

11 MR. PRESIDENT:

12 The Court permits. The assistant is instructed to put up the
13 document onto the screen and court officer is instructed to bring
14 the document to the witness.

15 MS. NGUYEN:

16 Your Honour, I might just add that this document also goes by the
17 number D108/26.272.

18 BY MS. NGUYEN:

19 Q. Witness, have you seen this document before; do you recognize
20 it?

21 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

22 A. Mr. President, this document was shown to me during the Case
23 001 Trial. However, if we move into this -- move to the other
24 pages of this document, we would be able to see who was -- who
25 the interrogator was. Was it Mam Nai or Comrade Pon?

1 Q. Perhaps I would just get you to identify the document first
2 and then we can get into those details later.

3 [15.53.01]

4 Could you please turn over to the page to where there is a
5 chart-like schedule and could you please identify the columns --
6 the titles of the columns at the top of the page and also the
7 title of the document?

8 A. In the first column, it reads the names of the prisoner
9 entered on the 26 of November 1978.

10 Q. Are there any other identifying particulars contained on that
11 schedule such as names, age, gender, and where they are from?

12 A. In this document, yes, there is. There's the age of these two
13 individuals. It's 29 years old, both of them, both of them were
14 male, and they were sent from Kampong Saom. These two victims
15 were arrested and interrogated, and who were considered as the
16 foreign intelligence, were from Hawaii.

17 [15.54.59]

18 Q. Witness, you are referring to the first and second entry on
19 the document. Could you please read the names of these two
20 individuals?

21 A. The first one, his name was Christopher Edward DeLance.
22 Another one is Michael Scott Kemo (sic).

23 Q. Just for the record, I think that reads "Michael Scott Deeds".

24 Witness, do you remember seeing these two prisoners at S-21?

25 A. Thank you. Mr. President, when I went to S-21 I saw one

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1 English person. I do not recall his name, and I only knew about
2 the other three foreigners brought to S-21.

3 Q. Did you see any confessions from Christopher DeLance and
4 Michael Scott Deeds during your time at S-21?

5 A. Mr. President, I do not have the Khmer translation.

6 Q. Witness, I'll repeat the question again.

7 The question -- Witness, the question was: Did you see the
8 confessions of Christopher DeLance and Michael Scott Deeds during
9 your time at S-21?

10 [15.57.52]

11 A. Thank you. Mr. President, I have seen the confessions of these
12 four individuals. If you wish to ask me any specific questions
13 about these confessions, I am pleased to receive any confession.

14 MS. NGUYEN:

15 Yes, Your Honour, I might take this opportunity to hand over a
16 copy of the confession of Michael Deeds to the witness. It is a
17 rather lengthy document, and I think that it could help to
18 refresh his memory.

19 The ERN of this document is 00211734 -- that is the ERN of Khmer
20 version of the document. It is document D22/21/3. And the English
21 version of the document is ERN 00335569. The French version of
22 this document is ERN 00323822.

23 [15.59.27]

24 May I have the document passed to the witness, please?

25 MR. PRESIDENT:

1 What is the purpose of asking the witness concerning this
2 specific document?

3 MS. NGUYEN:

4 Your Honour, we've heard the witness give evidence about the
5 Party line in relation to CIA and KGB and "Yuon". The
6 significance of the document, Your Honour, is that it is a very
7 lengthy document. It contains a great deal of detail about CIA
8 operations, training, reporting lines, communications, equipment,
9 technical instruments, missions and purposes, and intelligence in
10 the region, which has a very Communist Kampuchea -- Communist
11 Party of Kampuchea political slant to it.

12 I just wanted to show the witness this document and have him
13 comment on whether or not -- or how the victims came to confess
14 to these things, or rather, the process taken, the efforts taken,
15 for the interrogators to extract this specific, very detailed
16 information from the victims.

17 [16.01.16]

18 The confession itself, Your Honour, is not to be used for -- to
19 prove the truth of its content, it's not the contents of the
20 document if it sought to be relied upon, these documents were
21 obtained under torture and I think that there is ample
22 jurisprudence that confessions made under torture are inherently
23 unreliable.

24 The information to be derived from this confession is to be
25 derived from the length of the confession, the details included

1 in the confession, the political slant taken in the information
2 given, and the resemblance to party propaganda of the information
3 extracted from the victims.

4 (Judges deliberate)

5 [16.04.07]

6 MR. PRESIDENT:

7 The Chamber rejects the counsel's request to put this document
8 for debate. Counsel may proceed further with other questions
9 instead.

10 MS. NGUYEN:

11 Your Honours, if you are against me on this one, I can move on,
12 but I would like to draw your attention to a ruling that the
13 Trial Chamber made in Case 001. Excuse me, Your Honour, it is a
14 division of the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges in Case 002
15 and also related to the PTC division.

16 It's document D130/8 and it's an Order on the use of statements
17 which were or may have been obtained by torture. It was dated the
18 28th of July 2009. And paragraph 27 of this document says:

19 "That the question of reliability of the information contained in
20 a confession does not arise if the information obtained is not
21 being used for the truth of its contents, but rather as evidence
22 that the CPK relied on the contents of the confession to carry
23 out systematic crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the
24 ECCC.

25 [16.05.38]

1 It goes on to say that, for example, a confession may contain
2 lists of names of people that the torture victim has identified
3 as traitors and if it can be demonstrated that the people listed
4 were later arrested or executed, this may assist in proving that
5 the charged persons relied on these confessions in order to
6 commit systematic arrests and/or executions. As such, the
7 information contained in the confession is not being used for the
8 truth of its contents; that is, it's not being used to establish
9 that the persons concerned were actual traitors, but rather to
10 show how the confession was used and that is, that it was used to
11 commit crimes against the persons named in the confession."

12 In this case, the -- the confession isn't relied on for its
13 inherent truthfulness, but if Your Honour -- if Your Honours are
14 against me here, I can move on and I can question the witness
15 from his memory.

16 (Judges deliberate)

17 [16.08.56]

18 MR. PRESIDENT:

19 The Chamber decides, therefore, that you may proceed with your
20 questionings.

21 MS. NGUYEN:

22 Your Honours, just to be clear, does that mean proceed to ask the
23 witness from his memory or -- yes, okay. Thank you very much.

24 Witness--

25 MR. PRESIDENT:

1 Indeed, you're supposed to proceed with the questions asking for
2 the witness -- asking witness to tell -- testify based on his
3 memories, what he witnessed and heard. So your questions could be
4 proceeded and the Chamber will also rule upon immediately if the
5 questions are not relevant.

6 BY MS. NGUYEN:

7 Thank you, Your Honours.

8 [16.10.08]

9 Q. Witness, you just mentioned before that you remembered the
10 confessions of the foreign nationals who entered into S-21.
11 Generally speaking, how long were these confessions; if you could
12 recall length of pages, for example?

13 MR. KAING GUEK EAV:

14 A. I don't remember, but I know it was lengthy.

15 Q. And the -- did these confessions come to you in both the
16 English language and the Khmer language?

17 A. The confessions came into two versions; both English and
18 Khmer.

19 Q. Did the prisoners -- the foreign national Western prisoners,
20 did they write in their own mother tongue, English?

21 A. Western prisoners made their confession in their native
22 language.

23 Q. Were these then, subsequently, translated into the Khmer
24 language or were they translated simultaneously as the confession
25 was being obtained?

1 [16.12.03]

2 A. In interrogating these four Westerners, I recruited a person
3 who could speak English very well to be with the interrogator
4 when interrogation took place.

5 Q. So the interrogation and the translation of the confession
6 were taken or were carried out by two different people?

7 A. Indeed, there were a translator or interpreter selected among
8 the prisoners and the interrogator.

9 Q. Would you agree, from having read those confessions, that the
10 information contained in the confessions align with the political
11 message that the Communist Party of Kampuchea wanted to send out
12 to its Party members?

13 A. I'm afraid I did not understand the question. Could it be
14 rephrased?

15 Q. Witness, you read these confessions and you understood their
16 contents; is that correct?

17 A. I neither reject this entirely, nor accept it entirely because
18 these accounts are separate. This confession was obtained in the
19 new context to me.

20 [16.14.33]

21 Q. And, Witness, could you please clarify for the Court what you
22 neither accepted nor rejected? What account did you neither
23 accept nor reject?

24 A. Normally, things that were new, I could never deny it
25 immediately, entirely, and I may remember them. And that's all.

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1 Q. During the interrogation sessions, were there any guidelines
2 given to the interrogators as to what should be extracted out of
3 the victims?

4 [16.15.48]

5 A. Normally, guidelines and objectives were communicated to us
6 all along. As the chairman of S-21, I just wished to know whether
7 the interpreter understood the language he's supposed to render
8 and I had to be with him sitting side by side to learn whether
9 this was genuine and, indeed, I learned from that moment that the
10 interpreter was of good quality; he could render the confession.

11 Q. Witness, what I'm interested in knowing is what did the
12 interrogators put to the victims to extract the confessions that
13 they obtained to the victims being CIA agents?

14 [16.17.19]

15 A. With regard to this specific case, I'm afraid I cannot
16 respond. The people whom I assigned to interrogate these four
17 Westerners were those who had been working at M-13 and
18 interrogation techniques were also taught to them there and they
19 were skilled in their job.

20 Q. Were the contents of documents such as the "Revolutionary
21 Flag" used by interrogators during the interrogation sessions
22 with victims?

23 A. The "Revolutionary Flag" magazines' portions regarding the
24 enemies of the nation including the CIA, KGB, and the "Yuon"
25 agents were well trained to every member of the Party. I don't

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1 believe that this notion would ever be conveyed to the prisoners
2 anyway because member understood it well.

3 MR. PRESIDENT:

4 Since it is now appropriate time for today adjournment, the
5 hearing session today will adjourn, and the following session
6 will be resumed tomorrow, at 9 a.m.

7 Security personnels are now instructed to bring the witness and
8 the accused persons to the detention facility and have them
9 returned to the courtroom by 9 a.m.

10 The Court is adjourned.

11 (Court adjourns at 1619H)

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